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In 1987, the American Red Cross and the Washington College of Law International Legal Studies Program convened a Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
The Workshop was composed of four sessions: 1) the United States position
concerning customary internationallaw relative to the Protocols, 2) the formation of general internationallaw; 3) customary internationallaw relative to the
conduct of hostilities in non-internationalarmed conflicts; and 4) customary internationallaw relative to the conduct of hostilities and the protection of the
civilian population in internationalarmed conflicts.
Although the primary objective of the Workshop was to define the parts of
the Protocols that are considered customary internationallaw, the participants
discussed many other important internationallegal issues. Some of these issues
included determining the internationalprinciples that bind all states; establish* Lee Arnold & Associates, Inc.; Member, Florida Bar; J.D. Washington College of
Law, The American University; B.A. Albion College.
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ing which parts of customary international law apply to the employment of
weapons of mass destruction; ascertaininghow customary international law is
developed; determining the evidence that constitutes state practice or opinio
juris; and determining whether the methods of establishing Hague law as customary law are different than the methods of establishing Geneva law as customary law.
Many distinguishedscholars and practitioners attended the Workshop to discuss these important issues. Included among these individuals were representatives from the Reagan administration and the United States Department of
State. Individualsfrom the United States and Canadian armedforces, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the American Red Cross also participated in the Workshop.

OPENING REMARKS
The Chairman, Mr. Raymond Geraldson,' convened the Workshop
at 9:00 a.m., January 22, 1987.

Mr. GERALDSON noted that the severe snow storm that had blanketed the Washington, D.C. area on that morning had delayed several
scheduled participants. He suggested that the Workshop should start
without them, using substitutes where necessary. He then introduced
Professor Claudio Grossman,2 representing the Washington College of
Law.
Professor GROSSMAN extended a welcome on behalf of the Washington College of Law to the Workshop participants. He emphasized the
long-standing commitment of the law school to international law in
general and to humanitarian law in particular. This Workshop is the
sixth in a series, beginning in 1982, and represents a tradition at the
Washington College of Law that will hopefully continue into the
future.
The CHAIRMAN next introduced Mr. Pierre Keller, 3 member of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). On behalf of the
ICRC, Mr. KELLER thanked both the American Red Cross Society and
the Washington College of Law for conducting this Workshop. He
4
noted that the ICRC advocates that all states ratify Protocols I and I1,
1. Former Vice-Chairman of the American'Red Cross Society Board of Governors;
Partner, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, Illinois; Trustee Emeritus, The American University; Member, Wisconsin, Illinois, and District of Columbia
Bars.
2. Raymond I. Geraldson Scholar of International and Humanitarian Law; Professor of Law and Director, Masters of Law International Legal Studies Program, Washington College of Law, The American University.
3. Member, Executive Committee, International Committee of the Red Cross.
4. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for
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so that the "Law of 1977" becomes universally accepted in its written
fopm, as treaty law. He pointed out that sixty-six states had become
party to Protocol I and sixty to Protocol II. Mr. KELLER stated that
these figures indicate that many members of the international community are already accepting the two Protocols. The ICRC will continue
to encourage governments to ratify both Protocols. He urged the
United States to ratify both Protocols, despite reluctance to accept
parts of Protocol I.
Mr. KELLER further noted that the objective of this Workshop,
which is to define the parts of the Protocols that are customary international law, remains important, even though many countries have already accepted the two Protocols as treaty law. Mr. KELLER indicated
that he wanted this Workshop to show that the two Protocols, especially Protocol I, are not merely artificial constructions developed by
either over-zealous bureaucrats or hopeless idealists, but rather are
rules with a solid basis in long-established law. In addition, Mr.KELLER noted that the discussions should indicate to what extent written
rules find their origin in customary law. He indicated that through this
clarification the Workshop will establish the main features characterizing these two instruments. Much of the written "Law of 1977" is complicated, whereas the rules of customary international law are more
general in character and, therefore, easier to understand.
Mr. KELLER indicated that, by identifying rules that are customary
in nature, this Workshop would also help single out those rules that
bind all states, including states that have not yet ratified the Protocols.
Thus, the Workshop could help in establishing those rules of the law
concerning the conduct of hostilities that are also applicable to the emsignature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doe. A/32/144, Annex I. 11 (1977), reprinted in 16
I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), openedfor signature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc.
A/32/144, Annexes I, 11 (1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol II].

The Protocols are additional to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31

[hereinafter First Geneva Convention of 1949]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter

Second Geneva Convention of 1949]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135

[hereinafter Third Geneva Convention of 1949]. Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.AS.
No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949] [all four
collectively hereinafter Geneva Conventions of 1949].
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ployment of weapons of mass destruction.
Mr. KELLER explained that although not all of the rules of Protocols
I and II have the nature of customary international law, the two treaties will have a great influence on the development of the law. Countries have negotiated the Protocols over a long period of time, and the
world community assembled in the Diplomatic Conference in Geneva
has accepted them by consensus. The Protocols, therefore, are evidence
of what government representatives world-wide thought should become
binding law. As a result, Mr. KELLER concluded that the two Protocols
are a fitting point of departure in the search for customary law.
The CHAIRMAN next introduced Mr. Joseph Carniglia, 5 representing
the American Red Cross Society. Mr. CARNIGLIA expressed the hearty
greetings of the Society and welcomed the participants to the Workshop. He noted that the histories of both the American Red Cross Society and the Washington College of Law have been related since the
founder of the American Red Cross Society, Clara Barton, retained
Ellen Spencer Mussey, cofounder and first Dean of the Washington
College of Law, as legal counsel to the Society. The collaboration between the two institutions most recently has manifested itself in a series
of jointly sponsored conferences, workshops, and seminars on international humanitarian law.
Mr. CARNIGLIA expressed his belief that the proceedings of this
Workshop, together with the proceedings of the two previous conferences published in the American University Law Review,6 will make
another valuable contribution to the increasing body of scholarly opinion and discourse on international humanitarian law in academic and
governmental circles.
After welcoming the participants to the Workshop, the CHAIRMAN
thanked the sponsors and the ICRC for their help and cooperation. He
then introduced the moderator for the first session, Professor Louis B.
SOHN, 7 who expressed the position of the United States on the relation
of customary international law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the
1949 Geneva Conventions.
5. Director (retired), International Services for the American Red Cross.
6. Conference, The American Red Cross-WashingtonCollege of Law Conference
on International HumanitarianLaw, 31 Am. U.L. REV. 805 (1982); Conference, The
American Red Cross-WashingtonCollege of Law Conference: InternationalHumanitarian and Human Rights Law in Non-InternationalArmed Conflicts, 33 Am. U.L.
REV. 9 (1983).
7. Woodruff Professor of International Law, University of Georgia School of Law.
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SESSION ONE: THE UNITED STATES POSITION ON THE
RELATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW TO
THE 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE 1949 GENEVA
CONVENTIONS
REMARKS OF MICHAEL J. MATHESON

8

I appreciate the opportunity to offer this distinguished group a presentation on the United States position concerning the relation of customary international law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949
Geneva Conventions. 9 This question is not an academic one, but has

considerable practical importance under present circumstances. As you
may well know, the executive branch has now completed an extensive
review of the Additional Protocols, both from the viewpoint of military
considerations and from the viewpoint of national policy.10 The result
of that review has been a recommendation that Protocol II, which deals
with non-international conflicts, be submitted to the Senate for advice
and consent to ratification with appropriate understandings and reservations, but that Protocol I, which deals with international conflicts, not
be submitted to the Senate." Judge Sofaer, the State Department Le-

gal Adviser, will describe the reasons for those conclusions. 2 Let me
not get into those reasons, but simply note the effect this fact has upon
the subject that we are dealing with today. I agree entirely with the
8. Deputy Legal Adviser, United States Department of State. These remarks are a
combination of Mr. Matheson's prepared text and his substantive modifications to that
text as presented at the Workshop, supplemented with footnotes where necessary.
9. See supra note 4 (referring to Protocol I which relates to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, and Protocol II, which relates to victims of noninternational armed conflicts).
10. Reagan, President's Message to the Senate Transmitting the Protocol, 23
WEEKLY COMIP. PRES. Doc. 91 (Jan. 29, 1987) [hereinafter President's Message]. The
President stated that the United States objective for codification of the Additional Protocols is to assure the greatest protection to victims of conflicts while satisfying legitimate military requirements. Id. He stated that ratification of Protocol II should also
allow the United States to continue its leadership in the international community. Id.
11. Id. The President transmitted Protocol II to the Senate for its advice, consent,
and ratification. Id. The administration views Protocol II as an expansion of the fundamental humanitarian provisions contained in the 1949 Geneva Conventions with respect to non-international armed conflicts, including humane treatment and basic due
process for detained persons, protection of wounded, sick, medical units, and noncombatants. Id. The President concluded that the United States cannot ratify Protocol I
because it is "fundamentally flawed." Id. Provisions that undermine humanitarian law
include treating wars of national liberation as international conflicts and granting irregular forces combatant status even if they do not distinguish themselves from civilians.
Id.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 114-56 (presenting Judge Sofacr's discussion of the rationale behind the position of the United States Department of State on
the Protocols).
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distinguished representative of the ICRC that those topics are of considerable importance now, although we may have somewhat different
reasons for saying so.
With respect to Protocol I, several important facts flow from this
situation. First, the United States will consider itself legally bound by
the rules contained in Protocol I only to the extent that they reflect
customary international law, either now or as it may develop in the
future. 13 Therefore, legal advisors within the United States Government will have to make a judgment on this, if they are to advise policy
makers and commanders as to what legal constraints will apply to
United States military options in the course of present or future conflicts. This, of course, is not a new problem, in that Protocol I has now
been in existence for almost ten years without United States ratification, but the administration's decision not to submit Protocol I to the
Senate puts the question in clearer focus and makes clear that it will
not go away. To the extent that other governments follow the lead of
the United States in this regard, it will pose the same questions for
them.
Second, Protocol I now cannot serve in itself as the baseline for the
establishment of common rules to govern the operations of military alliances in which United States forces participate. To establish a basis for
such common rules, the United States and its friends must now decide
which of the rules in Protocol I either reflect current customary law or
should be adhered to by free world forces as a predicate for their ultimate recognition as customary law.
Third, Protocol I cannot now be looked to by actual or potential adversaries of the United States or its allies as a definitive indication of
the rules that United States forces will observe in the event of armed
conflict and will expect its adversaries to observe. To fill this gap, the
United States and its friends would have to give some alternative clear
indication of which rules they consider binding or otherwise propose to
observe.
Finally, Protocol I now will not be universally seen as the next stage
in the development of humanitarian law for international armed conflict, particularly if other governments follow the lead of the United
States in rejecting the Protocol. It follows from this that those who
want to advance the codification and development of international humanitarian law will need to know what elements of Protocol I still com13. See supra notes 10-11 (referring to the President's recommendation that the
new rules governing the conduct of the United States and its allies should include the
positive provisions of Protocol I that relate to customary international law).
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mand the support of the United States and other like-minded governments, and therefore hopefully constitute a common foundation for the
development and observance of rules which improve upon the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other generally recognized statements of law in
this field.' 4
For all these reasons, it is important for both the United States government and the United States scholarly community to devote attention
to determining which elements in Protocol I deserve recognition as customary international law, either now or in the future. This Workshop,
therefore, is an important and timely exercise, particularly for those of
us who must help to decide where the United States government and its
friends should go from here.
The executive branch is well aware of the need to make decisions
and to take action on these issues. We know from our conversations
with our allies that there is a shared perception, particularly among
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, of a strong
military need for common rules to govern allied operations and a political need for common principles to demonstrate our mutual commitment to humanitarian values. We recognize that certain provisions of
Protocol I reflect customary international law or are positive new developments, which should in time become part of that law.
We therefore intend to consult with our allies to develop appropriate
methods of incorporating these provisions into rules that govern our
military operations, with the intention that they will in time win recognition as customary international law. One obvious possible way of doing this is to develop common principles that might be incorporated
into or serve as the framework for individual national military manuals.
There may be other means of accomplishing the same objectives. The
United States is not wedded to any particular approach and intends to
listen to all reasonable suggestions.
Having described the reasons why I believe that the topic of this
Workshop is important and very relevant to decisions currently being
taken with respect to Protocol I in the United States and other governments, it is of course much more difficult to say exactly which of the
rules contained in the Protocol currently are in fact a part of customary
law. As I am sure you all appreciate quite well, there is no clear line
drawn in the dust for all to see between those principles that are now
customary law and those which have not yet attained the degree of
14. See President's Message, supra note 10 (stating that the Reagan administration is consulting with its allies to devise an alternative reference for the positive provisions of Protocol I).
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acceptance and observance that might make them customary law. Instead, there are degrees of acceptance and degrees of observance, and
the judgment as to what degree of each is sufficient for establishment
as customary law is inherently subjective and hard to define precisely.
In addition, it may be possible in many cases to say that a general
principle is an accepted part of customary law, but to have considerable
disagreement as to the precise statement of that general principle.
In terms of our dealings with our alliance partners, it would typically
be difficult if not impossible to achieve a complete consensus among
various governments, even those with similar interests and outlooks, on
precisely which of the many rules in the Protocol have at any given
time passed over the line into customary law and which have not. Even
within the NATO Alliance, there are substantial differences in the general readiness of government lawyers to recognize that a new rule of
warfare has come into customary law, quite apart from the substance
of the rule in question.
As a result, in our discussions with our allies to date we have not
attempted to reach an agreement on which rules are presently customary law, but instead have focused on which principles are in our common interests and therefore should be observed and in due course recognized as customary law, whether they are presently part of that law
or not. Apart from being easier to deal with, this approach has the
added advantage of focusing attention on the substantive merits of the
various rules, as opposed to their precise current legal status.
Of course, this process itself can have a substantial influence on the
creation of customary law. The United States and other governments,
particularly those with significant military forces, can advance the process of recognition of principles as customary law by stating that they
are prepared to observe them in armed conflict and desire them to be
recognized in due course as customary law. Such statements could also
serve as a basis for future work in codifying rules in future negotiations
on law of war agreements.
With that background, let me then review the principles that we believe should be observed and in due course recognized as customary
law, even if they have not already achieved that status and their relationship to the provisions of the Protocol. Although I will not be stating
in each case whether the executive branch believes a principle to have
already become customary law, the other executive branch participants
in this Workshop will no doubt be getting into that later in these proceedings. Usually this sort of analysis is done by parsing each of the
articles and paragraphs of the Protocol and indicating one's view of
each in turn. For the sake of variety and perhaps comprehensibility, I
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would like instead to list the main principles we support and indicate
briefly how each relates to the provisions of the Protocol. Because of
the limits of time and human endurance, I will be speaking on the level
of general principles for the most part, but during the course of this
Workshop, no doubt we will be going into various principles in much
greater detail.
Let me start with the protection of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked, an area in which the Protocol does contain some useful codifications or improvements of existing rules. 5 We support the principle
that all the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked be respected and protected,
and not be made the object of attacks or reprisals, regardless of the
party to the conflict to which they belong, as well as the principle that
when such persons are given medical treatment, no distinction among
them be based on any grounds other than medical ones. These principles are contained in article 10 of Protocol I.1"
We support the principle reflected in article 11 that the physical or
mental health and integrity of persons under the control of a party to
the conflict not be endangered by any unjustified act or omission and
not be subjected to any medical procedure which is not indicated by the
state of health of the person concerned and which is not consistent with
generally accepted medical standards. This principle is reflected in article 11. We also support the principle that medical units, including
properly authorized civilian medical units,"7 be respected and protected
at all times and not be the object of attacks or reprisals,' 8 as well as the
principle that civilian medical and religious personnel likewise be
respected and protected.' 9 These principles can be found, of course with
considerable elaboration, in articles 12 through 20 of the Protocol.
Further, we support the principle that the relevant provisions of the
1949 Geneva Conventions be applied to all properly authorized medical
vehicles, 20 hospital ships, and other medical ships and craft,21 regardless of the identity of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked that they
serve. This is, in effect, a distillation of much of what appears in articles 18 through 23. We support the principle that known medical aircraft be respected and protected when performing their humanitarian
15.
16.
17.
18.

Protocol I, supra note 4, arts. 8, 10(1), (2).
Id. art. 10(1), (2).
Id. arts. 12-13.
Id. art. 20.

19. Id. art. 15.
20.
21.

Id. art. 21.
Id. art. 22.

424
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functions.22 That is a rather general statement of what is reflected in
many, but not all, aspects of the detailed rules in articles 24 through
31, which include some of the more useful innovations in the Protocol.
Next, let me turn to the treatment of the missing and remains of the
dead.23 Again, this is an area in which the Protocol includes some useful innovations. We support the principles that families have a right to
know the fate of their relatives and that each party to a conflict should
search areas under its control for persons reported missing, when circumstances permit, and at the latest from the end of active hostilities.
These useful principles are reflected in articles 32 and 33 of the
Protocol.
We likewise support the principles that each party to a conflict permit teams to search for, identify, and recover the dead from battlefield
areas, and that the remains of the dead be respected, maintained, and
marked.24 We support the principle that as soon as circumstances permit, arrangements be made to facilitate access to grave sites by relatives, to protect and maintain such sites permanently, and to facilitate
the return of the remains when requested. These principles can be
found in article 34.
Thus far, the general principles I have stated more or less parallel
the general content of the Protocol. In the next sections, however, you
will observe significant differences or omissions, reflecting the fact that
the executive branch has serious problems with a number of items in
the next sections of the Protocol. As I mentioned earlier, Judge Sofaer
will be commenting on many of these problems in his remarks.20
With respect to methods and means of warfare,20 we support the
principle that the permissible means of injuring the enemy are not unlimited and that parties to a conflict not use weapons, projectiles, and
materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. These principles are contained in article
35. We, however, consider that another principle in article 35, which
also appears later in the Protocol, namely that the prohibition of methods or means of warfare intended or expected to cause widespread,
long-term and severe damage to the environment, 27 is too broad and
ambiguous and is not a part of customary law.
22. Id. art. 24.
23. Id. arts. 32-34.
24. Id. art. 34(1).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 114-56 (discussing the complications revolving around the Protocols).
26. Protocol I, supra note 4, part III.
27. Id. art. 35(3).
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We support the principle that individual combatants not kill, injure,
or capture enemy personnel by resort to perfidy, 28 and that internationally recognized protective emblems, such as the red cross, not be improperly used. Those principles are reflected in articles 37 and 38. But
we do not support the prohibition in article 39 of the use of enemy
emblems and uniforms during military operations.
We support the principle that no order be given that there shall be
no survivors nor an adversary be threatened with such an order or hostilities be conducted-on that basis. This is contained in article 40. We
also support the principle that persons, other than airborne troops, parachuting from an aircraft in distress, not be made the object of attack.
This is, of course, contained in article 42.
Next, with respect to combatant and prisoner-of-war status,29 we
support the principle that persons entitled to combatant status be
treated as prisoners of war in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Conventions, as well as the principle that combatant personnel distinguish
themselves from the civilian populations while engaged in military operations. These statements are, of course, related to but different from
the content of articles 44 and 45, which relax the requirements of the
Fourth Geneva Convention concerning prisoner-of-war treatment for irregulars, and, in particular, include a special dispensation allowing individuals who are said to be unable to observe this rule in some circumstances to retain combatant status, if they carry their arms openly
during engagements and deployments preceding the launching of attacks. As Judge Sofaer will explain, the executive branch regards this
provision as highly undesirable and potentially dangerous to the civilian
population and of course does not recognize it as customary law or deserving of such status. 30 It probably goes without saying that we likewise do not favor the provision of article 1(4) of Protocol I concerning
wars of national liberation 3 ' and do not accept it as customary law.
On the other hand, we do support the principle that, should any
doubt arise as to whether a person is entitled to combatant status, he
be so treated until his status has been determined by a competent tribunal, as well as the principle that if a person who has fallen into the
28. Id. art. 37.
29.

Id. art. 44.

30. See infra text accompanying notes 124-56 (presenting the viewpoint of the
State Department on the problems contained in Protocol I).
31. Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 1(4). This provision provides that the Protocol
shall apply to armed conflicts in which people are fighting against colonial domination
and alien occupation, as well as against racist regimes in the exercise of their rights of
self-determination. Id.
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power of an adversary is not held as a prisoner of war and is to be tried
for an offense arising out of the hostilities, he should have the right to
assert his entitlement to prisoner-of-war status before a judicial tribunal and to have that question adjudicated. Those principles are found
in article 45. We do not favor the provisions of article 47 on mercenaries, which among other things introduce political factors that do not
belong in international humanitarian law, and do not consider the provisions of article 47 to be part of current customary law.
The next section of the Protocol deals with the critical subject of the
protection of the civilian population, 2 which was the focus of much of
the work of the Diplomatic Conference. Here again, much of this part
of the Protocol is useful and deserving of treatment as customary law,
although certain provisions present serious problems and do not merit
such treatment. We support the principle that the civilian population as
such, as well as individual citizens, not be the object of acts or threats
of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among
them, and that attacks not be carried out that would clearly result in
collateral civilian casualties disproportionate to the expected military
advantage. These fundamental principles can be found in article 51.
We also support the principle that the civilian population not be used
to shield military objectives or operations from attack, and that immunity not be extended to civilians who are taking part in hostilities. This
corresponds to provisions in articles 51 and 52. On the other hand, we
do not support the prohibition on reprisals in article 51 and subsequent
articles, 33 again for reasons that Judge Sofaer will explain later, 34 and
do not consider it a part of customary law.
We support the principle that starvation of civilians not be used as a
method of warfare, and subject to the requirements of imperative military necessity, that impartial relief actions necessary for the survival of
the civilian population be permitted and encouraged. These principles
can be found, though in a somewhat different form, in articles 54 and
70. We support the principle that all practicable precautions, taking
into account military and humanitarian considerations, be taken in the
conduct of military operations to minimize incidental death, injury, and
32. See id. part IV (asserting the protections of cultural and religious objects and
the protections against the effects of hostilities on the civilian population, which pro-

hibit parties to a conflict from directing their activities against the civilian population,
attacking civilians indiscriminately, or engaging in reprisals against civilians).
33. See id. arts. 52-56 (listing civilian objects that according to the Protocol are not

subject to attacks or reprisals, in particular the protections of works and installations
containing dangerous forces).

34. See infra text accompanying notes 146-52 (discussing the problems inherent in
article 51).
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damage to civilians and civilian objects, and that effective advance
warning be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population,
unless circumstances do not permit. We also support the principle that
attacks not be made against appropriately declared or agreed non-defended localities or agreed demilitarized zones. These various principles
are reflected in articles 57 through 60. On the other hand, we do not
support the provisions of article 56, concerning dams, dykes, and nuclear power stations, for reasons that again Judge Sofaer will discuss, s
nor do we consider them to be customary law.
Turning now to the field of civil defense, we support the principle
that civilian civil defense organizations and their personnel be respected
and protected as civilians and be permitted to perform their civil defense tasks except in cases of imperative military necessity. We also
support the principle that in occupied territories, civilians receive from
the appropriate authorities, as practicable, the facilities necessary for
the performance of their tasks. These principles reflect, in general
terms, many of the detailed provisions in articles 62 and 63.
Moving next to the subject of persons in the power of a party to the
conflict, 36 we support the principle that persons who were considered as
refugees or stateless persons before the beginning of hostilities nonetheless be treated as protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention,37 and that states facilitate in every possible way the reunion of
families dispersed as a result of armed conflicts and encourage, in particular, the work of humanitarian organizations engaged in this task.
These rules are found in articles 73 and 74.
We support in particular the fundamental guarantees contained in
article 75, such as the principle that all persons who are in the power of
a party to a conflict and who do not benefit from more favorable treatment under the Conventions be treated humanely in all circumstances
and enjoy, at a minimum, the protections specified in the Conventions
without any adverse distinction based upon race, sex, language, religion
or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, or any
similar criteria.38
We support the principle that these persons not be subjected to violence to life, health, or physical or mental well-being, outrages upon
personal dignity, the taking of hostages, or collective punishments, and
that no sentence be passed and no penalty executed except pursuant to
35.

See infra text accompanying notes 146-50 (stating the reasons why Judge

Sofaer is not in favor of article 56).
36.
37.

Protocol I, supra note 4, arts. 72-79.
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 4.

38. Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 75(1).
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conviction pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted court
respecting the generally recognized principles of regular judicial
procedure. 39
Likewise, we support the principle that women and children be the
object of special respect and protection, that women be protected
against rape and indecent assault, and that all feasible measures be
taken in order that children under the age of fifteen do not take a direct part in hostilities." We support the principle that no state arrange
for the evacuation of children except for temporary evacuation where
compelling reasons of the health or medical treatment of the children
or their safety, except in occupied territory, so require. These principles
are contained in articles 76, 77, and 78. We also support the principle
that journalists be protected as civilians under the Conventions, provided they take no action adversely affecting such status. This principle
can be found in article 79.
The final part of Protocol I deals with the implementation of the
Conventions and the Protocol. Although many of these provisions are
procedural in character, 4 ' certain of the principles contained in this
part also merit acceptance as customary law. We support the principle
that all necessary measures for the implementation of the rules of humanitarian law be taken without delay, and that the ICRC and the
relevant Red Cross or Red Crescent organizations be granted all necessary facilities and access to enable them to carry out their humanitarian functions. "2 Likewise, we support the principle that legal advisors
be made available, when necessary, to advise military commanders at
the appropriate level on the application of these principles, and that
their study be included in programs of military instruction. 43 These
principles are found in articles 80 through 85.
We support the principle that the appropriate authorities take all
reasonable measures to prevent acts contrary to the applicable rules of
humanitarian law, take all appropriate steps to bring to justice any persons who have willfully committed such acts, and make good faith efforts to cooperate with one another in this regard. These principles are
contained, though of course in more detailed form, in articles 85
through 89.
Finally, we strongly support the principle that Protecting Powers be
39. Id. art. 75(2), (4).
40. Id. arts. 75(5), 76-77.
41. See id. arts. 78-89 (addressing the measures for the execution of obligations
and the repression of breaches of the Conventions and the Protocol).
42. Id. art. 81.
43. Id. arts. 82-83(1).
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designated and accepted without delay from the beginning of any conflict. This principle is contained in article 5, but with the important
difference that as stated in that article, it is not unequivocal and is still
subject, in the last instance, to refusal by the state in question.
Turning now to Protocol II, the situation is of course somewhat different. Because the executive branch intends to submit this Protocol to
the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, with certain understandings and reservations, 44 it will in due course define the legal obligations of the United States with respect to non-international armed
conflicts. Our friends can look to it as a common baseline defining the
minimum standards of conduct that will be observed in cooperative
military operations that are subject to the Protocol. Potential adversaries can look to it as a clear indication of the minimum rules that
United States forces expect to observe and to be observed by our opponents. The international community hopefully can look to the Protocol
as the accepted baseline for future improvements in the law of noninternational conflict. This does not mean, however, that it is simply an
academic exercise to inquire as to which parts of Protocol II currently
constitute, or should in the future constitute, customary international
law. This remains a practical question for several reasons.
First, it is not clear whether Protocol II will achieve the same sort of
universal adherence that the 1949 Geneva Conventions have achieved
over the years. Already, a number of Third World governments that
have ratified Protocol I have at the same time declined to ratify Protocol II,1 apparently for fear that this could in some fashion give legal or
at least political legitimacy to current or future insurgent or secessionist movements within their territories or perhaps be used to justify
outside intervention on behalf of such movements. This perception is of
course contrary to the express terms of the Protocol, which state that
nothing in the Protocol can be invoked to affect the national sovereignty or authority of any state or to justify external intervention.4 0
Nonetheless, there may, in the end, be a number of States that decline
to become party to Protocol II. To judge the legality of the conduct of
these states in non-international conflicts and hopefully to influence
44. See President's Message, supra note 10, at 91 (noting the objectives of the
administration in codifying Protocol II).
45.

See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE

1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARY 1551-1561
(Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, & B. Zimmermann eds. 1987) [hereinafter COMIMENTARY
ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977] (charting the countries of the world
and their formal responses to Protocols I and II as well as to other international
agreements).
46. Protocol II, supra note 4, art. 3.
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their behavior, it is necessary to determine which parts of the Protocol
are binding on them as a matter of customary law.
Second, as finally adopted, Protocol II does not cover all non-international conflicts as traditionally understood and applied in common article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. Specifically, it applies by
its terms only to internal conflicts in which dissident armed groups are
under responsible command and exercise control over such a part of
national territory as to carry out sustained and concerted military operations. This is a narrower scope than we and other Western delegations
would have desired and it has the effect of excluding many internal
conflicts in which dissident armed groups occupy no significant territory but conduct sporadic guerrilla operations over a wide area. In addition, because Protocol II by its own terms excludes conflicts covered
by Protocol I, technically it does not apply to the category of so-called
wars of national liberation that are covered by article 1(4) of Protocol
I.
Because of these limitations, we have recommended that United
States ratification be subject to an understanding declaring that the
United States will apply the Protocol to all conflicts covered by common article 3 of the 1949 Conventions, thus including all non-international armed conflicts as traditionally defined. We will likewise encourage other states to take the same step. Nonetheless, we of course
cannot unilaterally bind others to apply the Protocol to all such conflicts. Therefore, it will be important to decide, with respect to such
conflicts that are not technically within the scope of the Protocol, which
of its provisions are nonetheless binding as a matter of customary law.
Third, there are other situations of internal violence that even fall
below the threshold of common article 3. These are referred to in Protocol II as "situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar
nature, as not being armed conflicts."' 7 It is unclear to what extent
some of the principles or concepts contained in Protocol II should apply
to such situations. In any attempt to further develop and codify the law
that might apply in such cases, however, it would be very useful to
know, as a possible starting point, which of the provisions of Protocol II
already apply to internal armed conflicts as a matter of customary law.
The executive branch has not attempted to evaluate which provisions
of Protocol II are part of current customary law to the same degree
that it has done with respect to Protocol I. The basic core of Protocol II
is, of course, reflected in common article 3 of the 1949 Conventions and
47.

Protocol II, supra note 4, art. 1(2).
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therefore is, and should be, a part of generally accepted customary law.
This specifically includes its prohibitions on violence toward persons
taking no active part in hostilities, hostagetaking, degrading treatment,
and punishment without due process. On the other hand, certain parts
of Protocol II are obviously new to the law of non-international armed
conflict, although they are generally meritorious and hopefully will in
due course become part of customary law. We in the executive branch
will be listening with considerable interest to the discussion of the customary law content of Protocol II that is scheduled for later in this
Workshop.
That is the end of my prepared comments. I know it would be impossible to discuss all of the aspects of the areas that I have briefly covered, but I am sure that later in the Workshop the details will be explored at considerable length. Some general discussion about the
approach the United States is taking would be useful now, and I certainly invite your comments, criticisms, and questions. Thank you.
DISCUSSION

Opening the discussion, Professor COVEY T. OLIVER48 asked Mr.
Matheson whether the Reagan administration had proposed ratification
of Protocol II with understandings or reservations. Mr. MATHESON replied that the administration was recommending both understandings
and reservations. Major General GEORGE S. PRUGH4' asked whether
the government planned to publish the military review mentioned in
Mr. Matheson's remarks.50 Mr. MATHESON responded that he was re-

ferring to an extensive classified military review the Joint Chiefs of
Staff conducted. The materials that the administration plans to submit
to the Senate will include an extensive explanation of the position of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will set forth those positions during the
course of testimony in ratification hearings. The administration will
communicate the substance of that study, designated unclassified, although it is unlikely they will publish the study.
Professor HOWARD S. LEVIE51 noted that Mr. Matheson had men-

tioned only the administration's position on Protocol II to the Senate
and wondered if the Reagan administration planned to release the reasons why the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed ratification of Protocol I.
48. Hubbel Professor Emeritus, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
49. Major General (retired), former Judge Advocate General of the United States
Army and Delegate to the Diplomatic Conference.
50. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (describing the executive
branch's review of the Protocols).

51.

Professor of Law Emeritus, Saint Louis University School of Law.
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Mr. MATHESON replied that the State Department intended to send to
the Senate information covering the positions of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on Protocol I and Protocol II. Commander WILLIAM J.
FENRICK, 2 referring to Mr. Matheson's statement on the interest of
the United States in sharing with its allies a common position on Protocol 1I,51 asked Mr. Matheson whether the United States envisages any
situations where Protocol II will apply outside the boundaries of the
United States. Mr. MATHESON replied that this situation might arise
where a friendly foreign government, engaged in an internal, non-international armed conflict, has requested and received various kinds of
support, such as training or material, from the United States. In such a
case, if the other government were a party to Protocol II, the United
States would want to encourage respect for its provisions. Therefore,
knowing the content of those rules as well as gaining the support of the
United States for those rules is useful to the world and especially the
adversarial nations involved.
Professor THEODOR MERON 54 found two of Mr. Matheson's points
extremely important. First, Professor MERON noted Mr. Matheson's
statement that the United States basically supports the principles and
fundamental guarantees articulated in article 75 of Protocol I." This
statement is of major significance because article 75 contains a minicatalogue of some of the major tenets of the basic human rights norms
that the United States has not yet ratified in any of the human rights
instruments to which it is a party. By recognizing this catalogue as a
part of customary international law, the United States government
could help develop both humanitarian and human rights law.
Second, Professor MERON found the Reagan administration's approach to the threshold of applicability of Protocol I1" quite important.
Protocol II, under article 1, is supposed to follow the principles of applicability stated in common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of
1949. On closer inspection, however, Protocol II raises the threshold of
applicability of the system of norms with regard to internal armed conflicts to a higher level than common article 3. Thus, while there is a
considerable improvement in the applicable norms themselves, the rais52. Commander and Director of Law - International, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Canadian Armed Forces.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48 (discussing the United States posi-

tion on Protocol II in relation to co-operative military operations).
54. Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40 (discussing the position of the United
States on Protocol I, article 75).
56. See supra notes 10-11 (discussing the Reagan administration's position on the
applicability of Protocol II); see infra text accompanying notes 115-23 (same).
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ing of the applicability threshold renders the prospect of states' actual
application of those improved norms improbable. The Reagan administration's proposal to apply unilaterally Protocol II in all common article
3 situations should become a model for all countries, especially developing countries, to follow.
Mr. MATHESON, agreeing with Professor Meron's statement, noted
that it is useful to know what is now recognized as customary international law in internal confficts as a starting point for the future development of principles below these existing thresholds. Captain J. ASHLEY
ROACH57 asked Mr. Matheson what the position of the United States
would be if an alliance conffict erupted where Protocol I bound some
members of the alliance and not others. Mr. MATHESON admitted that
this question raised a serious problem and was the focus of much discussion within the NATO alliance. He indicated that such a case exemplifies the need for a common baseline of principles and rules that
everyone must observe in the conduct of military operations. Some
members of the NATO alliance, of course, will have ratified Protocol I
and may thus have incurred some additional obligations. Mr. MATHESON recognized, however, that this point is not a serious impediment to
military cooperation. The United States and the NATO alliance are
currently studying the issue in light of the necessity for a mutual understanding of which rules each country will observe.
Professor SOHN then presented a hypothetical situation related to
Mr. Matheson's explanation. Noting that the United States has objected to the reprisal provisions of the Protocol,88 Professor Som wondered what would happen if Italy, which has ratified the Protocol, refused to participate in certain reprisals that the United States wants to
take. Mr. MATHESON replied that the United States has looked at the
reprisal question primarily in terms of determining the extent that the
United States should reserve concerning the option of responding to
attacks on allied civilian populations. He further stated that the ability
of the United States to take a reprisal action depends on the existence
of a request by an actual ally to take such an action on its behalf.
Additionally, the ally making the request must legally have the opportunity to take reprisal action itself. Some members of the NATO alliance believe that they may call upon the United States to help with a
reprisal and others do not.
Captain ROACH asked Mr. Matheson to explain the position of the
57.
58.

Captain, Office of the Judge Advocate General, United States Navy.
Protocol I, supra note 4, arts. 20, 51(6), 52(1), 53(c), 54(4), 55(2), 56(4)

(prohibiting reprisals against civilian targets).
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United States regarding irregulars in the territory of a state that has
ratified Protocol I. Mr. MATHESON explained that this issue is not a
practical problem because it presupposes that the movement of the irregulars satisfies all the standards under article 1(4), which is unlikely.
Professor HAMILTON DESAUSSURE 59 asked for an explanation of the
apparent inconsistency between the United States rejection of the provisions in article 56 of Protocol I, relating to dams and dykes, and the
simultaneous acceptance of article 15 of Protocol II, which contains
similar provisions. Mr. MATHESON replied that the United States military based its objections on a pragmatic, real-world estimation of the
difference between the two situations. The military perceives that in
international conflicts, many situations may arise where it is important
to attack and destroy parts of an electric power grid, such as a nuclear
or hydroelectric generating station. In internal conflicts, on the other
hand, such a significant real-world need will not exist. Preserving the
military option in international conflicts where such facilities are more
likely to become an object of military attack, therefore, is very
important.
Professor SOHN interjected that there is a difference between dams
and dykes, on the one hand, and electric power generating stations,
particularly nuclear ones, on the other. He asked Mr. Matheson how
the United States could possibly reserve the option to destroy nuclear
power plants when the repercussions might occur all over the world and
not just locally, as the Chernobyl disaster aptly demonstrated.
Mr. MATHESON responded that all other rules of war designed for
the protection of civilian populations, such as the rule of proportionality
and the rule of reasonable precautions apply and advanced warning,
govern these attacks. The United States maintains the position that it
cannot accept the almost total prohibition on such attacks contained in
article 56. In any case, in situations where the United States military
targets a part of the power grid connected to a hydroelectric or nuclear
facility, the United States would have to consider the possible effects on
the civilian population and strive to obtain its military objective in ways
that would not inflict drastic effects on that population.
Mr. DIETER FLECK60 asked Mr. Matheson for a clarification of
whether the United States held the position that the general rule of
proportionality would govern attacks on dams, dykes, and nuclear generating stations in any given situation. Mr. MATHESON concluded that
Professor of Law, University of Akron, School of Law.
60. Leiter Des V6ilkerrechtsreferat, Bundesministerium Der Verteidigung, Bonn,
Federal Republic of Germany.
59.
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the rule does not apply where the military advantages are not proportionate to the risk to the civilian population. Professor SoHN then asked
if the rule of proportionality would forbid an attack on a dam above a
valley that would kill many people in the valley. Mr. MATHESON
agreed that the risks to civilians would outweigh the military advantage
in that case if the dam were contributing little electrical power, such as
when the dam was either shutdown or malfunctioning.
Professor WALDEMAR A. SOLF 1 found it difficult to reconcile the
United States objections to article 39 of Protocol I, which restricts the
use of enemy uniforms in military operations, with the United States
objections to article 44(3), which gives irregulars protection even
though they are not in uniform. He found the objections of conventional military combatants to article 44(3) understandable in that the
civilian population is thereby more protected because the article prevents the use of civilian disguise to achieve surprise. He therefore focused his question on why the United States allows the use of enemy
uniforms to achieve surprise.
Mr. MATHESON replied that it was a question of priority. The United
States military contends that there are certain adversarial forces that
would use enemy uniforms in their operations in any case; therefore, it
is important from the beginning to preserve that option for the United
States as well. At the same time, the need to protect the civilian population from the dangers associated with irregulars who fight among
that population, without distinguishing themselves, mandates the opposition to article 44(3).
Major General PRUGH asked for an explanation of the reasons why
the Reagan administration objects to article 44(3) in view of the established policy that Edward W. Haughney"2 and he had assisted in formulating. He explained that this policy extended the prisoner of war
status "to the little kid in black pants down at'the end of the trail who
might have had a gun in his hand a few minutes ago."
Mr. MATHESON responded that the administration believes that the
civilian population is at a considerable risk if irregulars operate among
them without distinguishing themselves, except in very extreme situations when they are actually conducting their operations. He pointed
out that the kinds of organizations operating in this fashion are typically perceived as unlikely to adhere to the rules of warfare. Under
61.

Adjunct Professor of Law and Senior Fellow, Washington College of Law Insti-

tute; Member, United States Delegation to the Diplomatic Conference on International
Humanitarian Law, 1974-1977 (deceased).
62.

Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law.
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present conditions, the balance swings away from the positions taken
during the Vietnam War. Mr. MATHESON, thus, concluded that the decision is largely a matter of historical development and an appreciation
of the current world situation.
Mr. HANS-PETER GASSER 3 concluded the discussion portion of session one with a question regarding the position of the United States on
the new rules protecting civilian and cultural objects as well as the environment. Mr. MATHESON replied that the application of the major
rules, such as the rule of proportionality and the rule against attack,
would include civilian and cultural objects. He indicated that the
United States has no great concern over the new definition of "military
objective" set forth in article 52(2) of Protocol I. The United States,
however, considers the rule on the protection of the environment contained in article 55 of Protocol I as too broad and too ambiguous for
effective use in military operations. He concluded that the means and
methods of warfare that have such a severe effect on the natural environment so as to endanger the civilian population may be inconsistent
with the other general principles, such as the rule of proportionality.
SESSION TWO: THE FORMULATION OF GENERAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW IS IT GENERATED? HOW IS
THE EXISTENCE OF ITS NORMS ASCERTAINED?
Professor Louis B. SOHN, the moderator for session two, asked Mr.
Gasser to give a short overview of the current official status of the Geneva Conventions and the Protocols. Mr. GASSER reported that 165
states were party to all four Geneva Conventions of 1949. ° In addition,

102 states signed the Final Act of the 1977 Diplomatic Conference. "
Sixty-two states signed Protocol I, and fifty-eight states signed Protocol
II within the one year period open for signature, under article 92 of
Protocol I and article 20 of Protocol II, respectively. 0 Sixty-six states
have ratified Protocol I, and sixty have ratified Protocol II as of the
63. Legal Advisor to the Directorate, International Committee of the Red Cross.
64. See States Partiesto the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, States Parties
to the Protocolsof 8 June 1977, 256 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 110, 111 (Jan.-Feb. 1987)

[hereinafter States Parties] (listing the states that have become parties to the Convention since 1981, thus bringing the total to 165 states).
65. See 10 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC

CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw APPLICABLE IN
ARMED CONFLICTS, GENEVA (1974-1977)
15-107 (1978) [hereinafter OFFICIAL

RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE] (reproducing the signatures to the Final

Act of the Diplomatic Conference).
66.

INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS & LEAGUE OF RED CROSS SOCIETIES, INTER-

NATIONAL RED CROSS HANDBOOK 399-403 (12th ed. 1983).
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Workshop.6 7 Some NATO allies have ratified both protocols. These include Italy, Belgium, Norway, and Denmark.6 8 The United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom are also working toward ratification in their executive departments. It is the ICRC's
understanding that the Reagan administration is trying to convince
some of its allies to adopt a position similar to that of the United States
on Protocol I. The People's Republic of China has ratified both Protocols, while the USSR has indicated that it accepts both texts as good

law, but is withholding formal ratification until all five Permanent
Members of the Security Council agree to ratify both texts. The Soviet

response in effect acknowledges that it will not ratify until the United
States does so.
REMARKS OF THE MODERATOR

Thank you Mr. Gasser for your report. I would like to begin by making a few remarks about the substance of session two. The Workshop
must envisage the formulation of international law in light of the three
legal systems involved: the law of the United Nations, the law of the

Hague, and the law of Geneva.
The Charter of the United Nations contains several important provi-

sions regarding the use of force. The United Nations has implemented
these provisions through several documents, including the Declaration

of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations,09 the

Definitions of Aggression,70 other documents on the impermissibility of
intervention in the internal affairs of other states, and more than fifty

documents on human rights, which are relevant to humanitarian law.
The law of the Hague includes the conventions of 1899 and 1907,1 to
67. See States Parties, supra note 64, at 112-14 (listing the states that are parties
to Protocol I and Protocol II as of December 31, 1986).
68. Id.
69. Declaration of Principles of InternationalLaw Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operationAmong States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1971), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970).
70. Resolution of Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 13 1.L.M. 710 (1974).
71. See Hague Convention No. I of July 29, 1899, for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 392 (defining and governing the peaceful settlements of disputes); Hague Convention No. II of July 29, 1899, with Respect
to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403 [hereinafter
Hague Convention No. II of July 29, 1899] (defining and governing the uses of war on
land); Hague Convention No. III of July 29, 1899, for the Adaption to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864, 32 Stat. 1827,
T.S. No. 396 (defining and governing the uses of maritime warfare); Hague Convention No. IV of July 29, 1899, Prohibiting Launching of Projectiles and Explosives from

AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

[VOL. 2:415

which the majority of the influential states are parties. Finally, states
now generally accept the law of Geneva, expressed in the Conventions
of 1929 and 1949, as a part of customary international law, regardless
of whether they have ratified these conventions.

With regard to the sources of international law, in my opinion only
one source of international law exists: the common will of the states of
the world. This "common will" is expressed in many ways: explicitly
and implicitly, by action or inaction, or by the practice of some states
and the acquiescence of others. The crucial point in any particular case
is whether states generally accept a rule as the standard. Therefore, a
large number of states, rather than every state, must accept the rule.
Persistent objectors cannot stop new rules from developing, but they
can prevent application of those rules to themselves.
I also hope this Workshop will focus on what is the best evidence of
the existence of a rule of customary international law, particularly in
the humanitarian law field. If, for example, one of the Protocol I rules
Balloons, 32 Stat. 1839, T.S. No. 393 (prohibiting the use of projectiles and explosives
from balloons); Hague Convention No. I of October 18, 1907, for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 32 Stat. 2199, T.S. No. 536 (providing for the peaceful
settlements of disputes); Hague Convention No. II-of October 18, 1907, Respecting the
Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts, 36 Stat.
2241, T.S. No. 537 (providing for the avoidance of armed conflicts of a pecuniary
origin); Hague Convention No. III of October 18, 1907, Relative to the Opening of
Hostilities, 36 Stat. 2259, T.S. No. 538 (providing for a warning prior to the commencement of hostilities); Hague Convention No. IV of October 18, 1907, Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter
Hague Convention No. IV of October 18, 1907] (defining and governing the uses of
war on land); Hague Convention No. V of October 18, 1907, Respecting the Rights
and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2310,
T.S. No. 540 [hereinafter Hague Convention No. V of October 18, 1907] (setting forth
the rights and duties of neutral states in case of war on land and regulating the position
of belligerents taking refuge in neutral territory); Hague Convention No. VIII of October 18, 1907, Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, 36 Stat.
2332, T.S. No. 541 (regulating the use of submarine contact mines); Hague Convention No. IX of October 18, 1907, Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time
of War, 36 Stat. 2351, T.S. No. 542 [hereinafter Hague Convention No. IX of October
18, 1907] (establishing the regulation of naval forces bombardment to safeguard the
rights of inhabitants and preserve important buildings); Hague Convention No. X of
October 18, 1907, for the Adaption to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention, 36 Stat. 2371, T.S. No. 543 (defining and governing the uses of maritime warfare); Hague Convention No. XI of October 18, 1907, Relative to Certain
Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War, 36
Stat. 2396, T.S. No. 544 (regulating the capture of ships during naval war to protect
civilian vessels); Hague Convention No. XIII of October 18, 1907, Concerning the
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, 36 Stat. 2415, T.S. No. 545 (providing for the rights and duties of neutral states in naval war); Hague Convention No.
XIV of October 18, 1907, Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives From
Balloons, 36 Stat. 2439, T.S. No. 546 (prohibiting launchings of projectiles and explosives from balloons).
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is similar to the rules of the 1949 Geneva Conventions or the Hague
Conventions, then that rule is most likely a binding rule. On the other
hand, if that rule departs too much from the existing law, it is probably
not a binding rule of customary international law.
In the past we relied principally on the correspondence of governments to determine the rules of customary international law. Learned
scholars would delve into the archives, read the international law
claims of one government and the replies of the other, deduce a new
rule of international law, and write an article or treatise stating that
rule. Many other authors would copy the rule from the first, thereby
leading jurists to agree that this general unanimity evidenced a new
rule, which everyone would then accept. Of course, this rule was not
only based on the scholars having said it was a rule; it was supposedly
derived from the practice of states.
The decisions of domestic and international tribunals were added to
this process in the nineteenth century. Scholars started to collect and
generalize these decisions into rules binding upon not only the parties
to the specific cases but upon the whole community of states as well.
Scholars could also generalize the concurrent domestic legislation and
the executive department proclamations of states into binding rules.
There are two United States executive proclamations that act as examples in this regard. In 1945, President Truman declared that a continental shelf existed for the United States. 2 Many other states followed
this great encroachment on the freedom of the seas, and no state objected. States considered it a customary rule within a few years, until
the United Nations finally codified it in the 1958 Law of the Sea Convention. 73 More recently, in 1983, President Reagan issued a Proclamation and Ocean Policy Statement 4 accepting ninety percent of the
Third United Nations Law of the Sea Convention 5 as an expression of
72. Proclamation 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945) (codified at 3 C.F.R. 67 (19431948 Compilation)) (providing the policy of the United States with respect to the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf); Executive Order 9633,
10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945) (codified at 3 C.F.R. 437 (1943-1948 Compilation)) (reserving and placing certain resources of the continental shelf under the control and
jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior).
73. Annex IV of the Law of the Sea Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened
for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311
[hereinafter Annex IV of the 1958 Law of the Sea Convention].
74. Proclamation 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983), reprinted in United States
Oceans Policy, Statement by the President, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 383 (Mar.
10, 1983) (providing the United States policy concerning the exclusive economic zone
of the United States on March 10, 1983).
75. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
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generally agreed upon international law. States now generally accept
these provisions as binding rules.
At the beginning of this century a new development - multiparty
conventions - was added to the process. According to Sir Frederick
Pollock, multilateral treaties are distinguished from bilateral treaties,
which are only binding upon the parties to them. He noted the "increasing frequency and importance [of] . . .agreement[s] [and] declaration[s] . . .made . . . by a considerable proportion, in number and
power, of civilized states at large, for the regulation of matters of general and permanent interest . . .[adopted at] congresses or conferences
held for that purpose.""6 This would include, in his view, the Hague
Conventions of 1899. He had no doubt that when all or most of the
great powers have deliberately agreed to certain rules of general application, the rules they approved had very great weight in practice even
among states that had never expressly consented to them. Declarations
and conventions of this kind may be expected to become part of the
universally received law of nations within a moderate time, in the absence of prompt and effective dissent by some power of the first rank. 7
The International Court of Justice stated in almost verbatim language the same principle in the North Sea Continental Shelf case.78
These rules become part of the corpus juris gentium. The court has
relied upon "emergent rules," thereby crystallizing rules from conventions that are not yet ratified. The court applied the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties79 ten years before it came into force and the
Law of the Sea Convention 8" even as it was barely being born.
This is a new era - unratified international agreements, if they represent a consensus among states at the time of signing, are binding as
customary rules of international law. This is true even if some states
dissent. Dissenting states that rely on the rule expressed in the AngloNorwegian Fisheries case, 81 that a dissenter is not bound by the rule,
may be bound anyway if the rule has become a jus cogens norm. For
example, it does not matter if some new state wants to dissent from the
76. Pollock, The Sources of International Law, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 511, 511-12
(1902) (stating that the increased frequency and importance of these agreements stems
from the congresses or conferences held for that purpose).
77. Id. at 512 (stating that general consent determines the law of nations).
78. North Sea Continental Shelf (Den. v. W. Ger., W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1968 I.C.J.
3 (Judgment of Feb. 20).
79. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 at 289 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
80. Annex IV of the 1958 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 73.
81. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Judgment of Dec.
18).
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United Nations Charter, that state is still bound.
REMARKS OF PROFESSOR COVEY T. OLIVER

I shall build upon three issues presented earlier: one from Mr. Keller's presentation this morning, another addressed in Professor Almond's paper distributed before the meeting, and the third distilled
from Professor Sohn's observations as to the various sources of customary international law that might reasonably be relied upon. With these
issues in mind, I shall deal with four points, taking Mr. Matheson's
presentation as background.
The first point is to note with satisfaction that at long last in this
conference we of the general international law field, including human
rights, and our colleagues in the humanitarian law field now converge
to face a common problem. I hope that as we face this common problem, the convergence will be improved along the lines that my colleague appearing shortly has called for. So I welcome this convergence
because basically, as we all realize, the aims of human rights law as it
has developed in general international law and humanitarian law are
the same: to deal with human problems, human needs, and human dangers. We share the common problem of how far we can go with customary law as a substitute for what we all desire and realize is better if
we can get it: explicit, positive, universal law.
My second point is that we must agree that customary law is present
more in the world today than it was in the world of centuries past,
when it existed only as a last and poor resort. The real problem for
humanitarian law is that customary law is even more uncertain and
more disadvantageous in this field than in general international law, for
the simple reason that judges and scholars are not making the real decisions involving human beings. These people may do a "post mortem"
as judges, but the real decisions have to be made by responsible field
commanders, and they have to be made on the basis of as much certainty and as much authority as possible.
My third point requires me to disagree mildly with the view of
Professors Buergenthal and Maier in their excellent Nutshell on Public
InternationalLaw that domestic versions of international law are unassailable in municipal proceedings. 2 There should not be a national or
domestic international law in the United States. That is to say, the
judge or scholar in the United States who is stating customary law
82. See T. BUERGENTHAL & H. MAIER, PuBLic INTERNATIONAL LAW 202-04

(1985) (stating that the United States recognizes the existence of customary international law).
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should be charged with finding universal law by appropriate proof, not
an American version of international law made up by judges using
analogy to the general law maritime.
For example, Professors Buergenthal and Maier state that it is for
the most part irrelevant whether the individual invoking international
law in an American court is a subject of international law.83 I dissent,
and I think they do as well in their treatment of the Filartiga" and
Tel-Orens5 cases. 86
My final point concerns what is to be done if uniform, positive law,
such as the rule in Protocol I or a substitute, cannot be achieved. One
approach I am sure we would reject out of hand is the Soviet selective
choice approach, so well remembered as a part of their effort to establish principles of coexistence. Are we in the United States in danger of
establishing our own version of coexistence by the process in which we
assert preferences as to what the law should be? That is one danger I
think we should avoid.
Given the present circumstances and considering the urgency of
human needs in comparison with the political situation, I do agree that
we need "positivization" by informal, international acquiescence or
agreement. I wish "positivization" were not something we had to explore, but I think it worthy of exploration on the merits. We must explore it, despite the problems of American national constitutional law
involved in this process of informal, nonexecutive agreement and nontreaty law that will be developed as a norm the United States will be
authorized to follow.
Finally, I challenge all of us, including myself, to think of other alternatives. Perhaps a transnationalrestatement of international law by
my colleagues and friends who did the excellent Restatement (Revised)
of Foreign Relations Law.87 In many ways, the current Restatement
(Revised)is, to a considerable degree, international law and useful positive law. Perhaps we should think in such terms transnationally, at
least as an alternative to the highly informal and not yet clearly
worked-out accommodation between "friends" Mr. Matheson proposed
this morning.
83.
rights,
84.
85.

See id. at 115 (stating that because the individual is the subject of human
nationality is irrelevant).
Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per

curiam), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).

86. See T. BUERGENTHAL & H. MAIER, supra note 82, at 205 (discussing the Fllartiga and Tel-Oren cases).

87.
1985).

RESTATEMENT (REvISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

(Tent. Draft No. 6,
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Shall we attempt these "positivization" efforts only with our friends
and allies? Should efforts be made across the Iron Curtain as to what
common principles are required if the Protocols are not universally accepted? Regrettably, I believe that striving for the less-than-best is justifiable under the circumstances. We must at the same time be mindful
of the difficulties and problems this approach presents. Not the least of
which is that this less-than-best, easier approach may in the long-run
have the effect of deflecting attention from what is really needed: an
up-to-date, effective, positive law of human treatment for all mankind.
REMARKS OF PROFESSOR THEODOR MERON

I am delighted that Professor Oliver referred to the common goals
that exist between human rights and humanitarian law. For far too
long, humanitarian law and humanitarian experts have been orphans of
international law from the perspective of the human person. In times of
violence or in times of serenity, the label is not important; it is the
protections that count. During the last few years, I have tried to bring
these two disciplines - these two systems of protection - closer together, and I believe that the exercise in which we are engaged today
brings this approach forward. This approach, which is of course traditional, can be characterized perhaps by the fact that the recent draft
Restatement (Revised) of Foreign Relations Law0s does not address basic questions pertaining to the Geneva Conventions. I do hope that
when we have our next Restatement, this gap between human rights
and humanitarian law will no longer be there.
The first question that I would like to address is perhaps somewhat
provocative. Why was it necessary to have our roundtable this morning
discussing general questions of formation of customary international
law? Why not start right away with the Protocols? I think that perhaps
there are some good reasons for following this format. We have to address these questions because of the special difficulties involved in the
ascertainment of state practice in international and internal armed conflicts and because of the frequency of violations or conduct which is not
consistent with the norms. Our object this morning is to create some
kind of a conceptual framework for the more specific roundtable discussions that will follow during this Workshop.
I would like to refer briefly to five principal questions. First, why is
the question of customary law important in humanitarian law in the
88.

1985).

RESTATEMENT (REVISED)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw (Tent. Draft No. 6,
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context of the Protocols? Second, where do we turn for the evidence of
state practice and opinio juris? Third, what can we learn from the judicial precedents or antecedents that we can find? Fourth, what are the
characteristics of lawmaking in the field of humanitarian law? Last,
what weight should we attach to violations?
First, what is the importance of the customary law character of certain norms stated in the Protocols? Obviously, customary law norms
also bind states that do not become parties to a particular instrument.
This is very important for the Protocols because they have been
adopted by roughly one-third of the international community. The
question is somewhat less important for the Geneva Conventions, which
fortunately have obtained virtually universal ratification. There are,
however, additional reasons why the question of the customary law nature of certain norms of humanitarian law may be important both in
the context of the Geneva Conventions and in the context of the
Protocols.
First, in some countries the question has significant internal law consequences. This is especially true in countries where customary law is
part of the law of the land, but treaties require implementing legislation to be a part of the law of the land and necessary implementing
legislation has not been adopted. Numerous countries following the
British system of public law fall into this category. Lest you think that
this question is academic, I would like to mention that my very tentative perusal of previously collected documents from the ICRC on the
subject suggest that between one-third and one-half of states parties to
the Geneva Conventions have adopted the necessary implementing legislation. In other words, there are many states that have not carried out
their international obligation to adopt the necessary domestic
legislation.
Second, if a norm reflects customary law, states cannot terminate
their obligations by withdrawal. This method is addressed to a certain
extent by the "denunciation article" common to the four Geneva Conventions,89 and perhaps to a lesser extent, by article 99 of Protocol I
and article 25 of Protocol II.
Third, reservations to treaty provisions would not affect the obligations of the parties with regard to provisions reflecting customary law
to which the states concerned would be subject independent of their
treaty commitments. As customary law, the norms reflected in interna89.

First Geneva Convention of 1949, supra note 4, art. 63; Second Geneva Con-

vention of 1949, supra note 4, art. 62; Third Geneva Convention of 1949, supra note 4,
art. 142; Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, supra note 4, art. 158.
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tional humanitarian instruments, such as the Protocols, might also be
subject to a process of interpretation different than the process of
treaty interpretation.
Finally, invocation of a norm as both conventional and customary
adds at least a rhetorical strength to the strongly emphasized claim of
the International Court of Justice in the Hostages case that the obligations in question that Iran breached were not merely contractual, but
were also obligations under general international law. 0 This is particularly important in the humanitarian law area because here some of the
norms are not merely customary, but may also have the special character of preemptory, jus cogens norms. We already know that the international community frequently invokes jus cogens norms as an important moral and legal barrier to violations of and derogations from
fundamental principles.
The customary law nature of certain provisions is also very important
in the context of writing new manuals of military law. Although the
question of whether a norm is customary will not be the exclusive consideration for the incorporation of a certain norm in a manual of military law, it is an important one and should be taken into account.
My second major area of concern is where to look for the practice of
opinio juris in the area of humanitarian law. The special difficulties I
have already mentioned lie in the fact that there is little significant
state practice by non-parties or even by parties. Moreover, an important portion of that state practice may be inconsistent with the norm
and reflect violations of the norm.
This Workshop should address the following questions. What acts
constitute good evidence of state practice with regard to the content of
the Protocols? What acts or statements demonstrate the existence of
opin'o juris with regard to the content of the Protocols? Are the methods of establishing the customary law character of the contents of the
Protocols, which are rooted in the law of Geneva, different from those
which are rooted in the law of the Hague? Because many provisions of
humanitarian instruments such as the Protocols reflect important and
even compelling principles of humanity, should the burden to be discharged in demonstrating the customary law character of certain
norms be lighter than in other areas of international law? Should the
type of evidence be different? Analogies to human rights norms, for
example, may suggest the possibility of a positive answer to this question. Where an examination of a particular norm included in the Proto90. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. 3, para. 95
(Merits Judgment of May 24).
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cols leads to a tentative conclusion that it was regarded at the time of
the adoption as declaratory of international law, what significance
should attach to the inconsistent practice of states since the adoption of
the Protocols?
9
REMARKS OF PROFESSOR HARRY ALMOND '

Professor Sohn remarked earlier that bilateral treaties are not really
a source of international law, or at least compared with multilateral
treaties, they are not of the same nature. We have to bear in mind,
however, that in today's world there are certain countries doing things
that must be judged against the interest and the expectations of the
larger global community. I am referring here largely to the arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. They
may not be lawmaking in the usual sense. The agreements may not
even reflect customary international law in the usual sense. Because
they involve the process of coercion, they create expectations that we
associate or identify with the emergence of customary international
law. Treaties dealing with areas as important as arms control will ultimately result in a convergence of global expectations with respect to
such agreements. This convergence is likely to occur because arms control is part of coercion control and it has as its objective control over
nuclear aggression.
With respect to the convergence of human rights and humanitarian
law, we have to bear in mind the distinctions between these two areas
of law. The distinctions are primarily procedural because human rights
are those rights invoked by an individual against a state. Humanitarian
law is not at present enforced against a state by individuals. It seems to
reflect the larger responsibilities and duties of nation states toward the
individual. What happens when an individual is denied these humanitarian treatments under, for example, article 3 of the Geneva Conventions? Has he any claim that he can raise against the country denying
him that treatment? We must bear in mind these significant differences
when we discuss these issues.
We need a frame of inquiry into the evolution of customary international law and an in-depth approach to the emergence of customary
international law. If we turn to the International Court of Justice, we
see today, particularly as a result of the ParamilitaryActivities case, 2
91. Professor of Law, National Defense University, The National War College.
92. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Merits Judgment of June 27) (basing its decision in part on
customary international law).
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that it is very unlikely that customary international law will ever be
invoked again in cases of that nature by any country of consequence.
Although I doubt that issues of that kind will ever again be raised in
that court in our lifetime, they will be raised, and they must be raised
in the global community context.
Customary international law among states with substantially competing ideologies is the subject of a challenge between contending public orders. When you look at Soviet writings, actions, and activities,
their views are so different from ours that you can find differences at
every stage in which we have either a use, invocation, or application of
the law. Therefore, if a rule is invoked among states for their own public policy, we have then contending claims as to what customary international law is all about. The Brezhnev Doctrine, for example, differs
from anything we have. It provides a different basis, a communist totalitarianism basis, for customary international law. In view of the severe
competition among states today, we must agree with Lenin that a military struggle of the communist and democratic states may be a final
struggle. But even short of a military struggle, ideological struggle is
such that the possibility of coexistence of social systems, one favoring
totalitarian, and the other favoring democratic values, is unlikely to
have more than a short period of coexistence.
There are some factors with respect to customary international law
that I think we ought to consider in our discussion. We need to determine the extent to which customary international law and its specific
rules are invoked, applied, or recommended among states. This is
largely a task of taking an inventory with respect to that law. We have
to find out among ourselves exactly what we are saying and what it is
we are sharing, and what we mean by customary international law. My
own reaction is that there are areas of major ambiguity because much
of customary international law is in a formative stage. We do not know
what it will look like when it has emerged as rule or directive. But
during the formative stage, the process in which the law is shaped
raises disputes concerning even the existence of such law.
The effectiveness of customary international law also has to be assessed. We have to determine the extent to which states enforce that
law and the extent to which they respect it in terms of its enforcement.
We are aware of such problems in the law of war and in humanitarian
law for the purpose of the conceptual framework of this Workshop. We
have customary international law evolving in outer space, with the law
of the sea, again with the law of war, and, although some would differ,
with respect to arms control and disarmament. By drawing on this
larger context, we can develop that frame of inquiry which I think you
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will now hear developed by Professor Reisman.
REMARKS OF PROFESSOR MICHAEL

W. REISMAN 93

The subject we are addressing today, how customary international
law is developed, is somewhat deceptive in its apparent familiarity. Any
college of international lawyers will agree on how to identify what is
customary law. We agree that laws are expectations shared by politically relevant actors, that they are attended by authority symbols that
indicate we are confronting law and by some sanction components that
indicate that the people who are committed to a particular law are going to make it effective. It is not terribly hard to apply these criteria to
a flow of behavior and to try to identify the expectations of law among
those who are politically relevant.
The problem we are faced with here is not so much "what is the
law," but "which law." International, constitutional or "constitutive"
revolutions have radically changed the process of lawmaking. We have
reached the point where we have to choose which law to use whenever
we address a major area of international law, for there are at least two
laws. One of the results is that the international legal system has become like a camera, every shot of which is a double exposure. This has
policy implications for those who want to improve the law of war as
well as implications for the democracies that may be called upon from
time to time to use force in international politics.
In the past thirty years, elite groups, largely from the Third World,
have become a dominant force in parliamentary arenas. These are arenas that are characterized by the doctrine of "one state, one vote."
Although there is no correlation between their particular numerical
power and actual political power, these arenas also control key symbols
of authority. Thus, we have a curious situation in which much that
purports to be new law has emerged that is heavily characterized by
the appropriate authority symbols of international law but does not
have the control component-the sanction component-because many
of the more powerful states have serious reservations about, or completely oppose, it. These more powerful states contend that the law that
continues to be enforced is the older, traditional, customary international law. This older law, in contrast, has a controlling component and
a sanction or effective control component, but in terms of the new symbology of authority, it lacks the authority component. Thus we have
two claimed versions of law for many key problems. I will give you
93.

Wesley N. Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School.
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examples of them and show you how they have been applied most recently by the International Court of Justice in the ParamilitaryActivities case. 4 The point I would like to make at the very beginning of this
is that with this bifurcation of international law, the preliminary question, again, is not "what is the law," but "which law."
In 1945, the victors of the Second World War, who were the dominant figures in international politics, established the United Nations.
They created an organization in which they reserved the critical power
through the institution of the Security Council; the other 45 original
members essentially had an advisory or recommendatory power. Many
of those smaller states were dissatisfied. Because it served United
States policy during the early years of the United Nations, the power
of the General Assembly gradually expanded with our encouragement.
The "Little Assembly," 5 and at a later stage, the Uniting for Peace
Resolution,9 transferred in a contingent fashion certain Security Council powers to the Assembly. By the early 1960s, as the process of
decolonization accelerated, many new states came into the United Nations. They sought to expand this transfer of power even further.
Because there had already been a fair amount of speculation among
scholarly writers about the lawmaking capacity of the General Assembly, because there were some general references to this in the Charter
and because the International Court of Justice had given its blessing in
the Reparations" and later in the CertainExpenses of the United Nations cases, 98 it was not particularly difficult for this new majority to
begin to view itself as a lawmaking body. Over a period of time, an
interesting psycho-legal transformation took place. This large group began to view itself and its majority votes, if not as international law, at
least as "evidence" of international law. After 1974, the International
Court of Justice began to lend its support to that general view.
94. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Merits Judgment of June 27).
95. See Coster, The Interim Committee of the United Nations, 3 INT'L ORG. 444
(1949) (detailing the history, role, and functions of the Interim Committee of the
United Nations General Assembly, also known as the "Little Assembly," and evaluating its progress); Austin, Role of the Little Assembly in Promoting InternationalPolicy, DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 24, 1949 (describing the work of the Interim Committee of
the United Nations General Assembly in the promotion of international cooperation in
the political field).
96. G.A. Res. No. 377A, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 10, U.N. Doe. A/1775
(1951).
97. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949
I.C.J. 174 (Advisory Opinion of April 11).
98. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (Advisory Opinion of
July 20).
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The efforts of what we might call the enlarged international parliamentary arena have been broad. Almost every aspect of international
law has received its imprint. At first, the numerical power of this majority overran the wishes of politically powerful dissenting states. Parliamentary organizations, such as the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations General
Assembly in the 1960s, ground out international law that, at least on
paper, revised the world legal system, but in effect did nothing. The
leaders of the new majority appreciated this, and with the agreement of
the First and Second worlds, a new doctrine of consensus was established. Consensus is a technique whereby votes are suspended until the
key interests of the different groups are determined. Only after a draft
that adequately reflects those interests is agreed upon is the matter
then affirmed by an actual vote.
Even consensus ultimately failed to solve every issue. For many matters, no consensus could be achieved because they involved issues on
which the Third World is passionate and uncompromising, such as
decolonization, selective self-determinations, and perhaps certain other
property and economic matters. There are some matters on which the
General Assembly or other expanded parliament might discriminate in
favor of one of the superpowers. But even when there was no consensus,
the sheer weight of numbers meant that the majority could determine
the agenda, and they could determine the personnel of the conference
committee. The resultant disparity between the law that was customary
and the new parliamentary law with regard to the use of force was
hardly unique.
I would like to talk very briefly about the right to use force in general and then, about how force is to be used, for that is the major
subject of our meeting. The textual universe of the United Nations
Charter is fairly explicit on how force is to be used. Force is not to be
used unilaterally. The use of force was in fact rendered unnecessary as
the Security Council would do the job for you. The only exception to
this non-user regime was for a party that was a victim of an armed
attack to take defensive measures, until the Security Council acted.
The regime that was established in the Charter was also essentially
neutral and conservatory. The language of article 39 speaks in terms of
threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. All
unilateral efforts to change the status quo by force are unlawful.
This textual version has been changed over a period of time in some
very interesting ways. In 1970, the Declaration of Friendly Relations,"0
99.

G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. No. A/
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which was strongly supported by the Western states as a way of blocking the peaceful coexistence principles being promoted by the Soviet
Union, said in part:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to
determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their
economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.' 0°

Five paragraphs later, the operational section stated:
Every state has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples. . of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In
their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the
exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and

to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the
Charter."'

You will note here the beginning of an inversion from the old neutral
and essentially conservatory position. Members of a group have the
right to resist when a state forcibly impedes their rights to self-determination, freedom, and independence. The state against which groups are
operating is by its obduracy in violation of law, and groups that are
trying to change that state are entitled to international support.
The inversion may, in the minds of some of the drafters, have been
limited to certain historical atavisms. Western drafters may have
thought it referred only to South Africa and perhaps to the Portuguese
territories in Africa. It is very clear, however, that many people
thought they were voting about Israel, and others may have been voting
about things like Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), the Sandinistas,
the IRA, or other groups. The words "groups struggling for freedom
and independence," have no historical limitation. If you want to know
what they mean, you do not look to the travaux; you count noses in the
General Assembly, for the meaning will change as the General Assembly moves to a set of values different from those of the politically powerful states.
You find the same issues raised within the Protocols. Protocol I, article 1(4) reinforces what the Declaration said in the above-quoted passage regarding self-determination. Articles 43 and 44 further discriminate in favor of the type of struggle contemplated in the Declaration.
Article 1(4), at the same time, but in a reverse fashion, discriminates
8028 (1970).
100. Id. at 123.
101. Id. at 124.
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against states that react by severely impeding the right of reprisal. The
basic law of war, regarding both the right to use force and the way
force is used, is shifted here from a fairly value-neutral system, which
tried to mediate between different actors, to one that tends to discriminate in favor of a particular group.
The current struggle in southern Africa illustrates this new pattern.
My remarks now are not a commentary on the virtues of the ANC or
the iniquity of the South African government. This is simply an effort
to expose two chiastic legal paradigms. On May 19, 1986, the South
Africans mounted raids in Zambia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe. The
matter went to the Security Council and the South African representative said:
South Africa will not tolerate activities endangering our security. ....

[W]e will

not hesitate to take whatever action may be appropriate for the defense and security of our own people and for the elimination of terrorist elements who are
intent on sowing death and destruction in our country and in our region.? °

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) took the opposite position
in regard to Namibia and called upon all progressive and peace-loving
countries to render, increase, and sustain support in material, financial,
military, and other assistance to the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) to facilitate the intensification of its legitimate
armed struggle.
There are two innovations in cases like these. The first is the inversion of customary law and the creation of a discriminatory pattern in
favor of the group that is fighting for its "freedom and independence,"
as defined by the majority of the relevant parliamentary arena. The
second is a revision of the basic notion of self-defense, which has had
an impact on the United States and Central America.
There has been a great deal of discussion about the definition of an
"armed attack" because the definition determines the legal contingency
for the right of self-defense. 10 3 The General Assembly, in the Definition
of Aggression, in article 3(g), said that the "sending, by or on behalf of
a state, of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries which carry
out acts of armed force against another state of such gravity as to
amount to an armed attack is an armed attack.' 10 4 This seems to say
that the mere fact that armed bands from another state engage in in102. 41 U.N. SCOR (2684th mtg.) at 27-28, U.N. Doc. S/Pv.2684 (prov. ed.
1986) (statement of Mr. von Schirnding, South Africa).
103. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
104. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doe. A/9631
(1975).
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cursions is not enough. Such incursions are not an armed attack that
provide a right of self-defense until the incursions exceed a certain
quantitative threshold.
The implications of this particular holding were made very clear in
June 1986, when the International Court of Justice rendered its merits
decision in the Paramilitary Activities case.105 The court did two
things. First, while stating that the two types of law are not exactly
identical, it recognized that customary law and Charter law with regard to this particular problem are similar; 08 therefore, it is proper to
look at the productions of the new parliamentary arenas. Second, the
court, looking to the parliamentary arenas, concluded that armed attack no longer includes many of the elements of low-level and protracted conflict. The court by definition excluded from the category of
armed attack assistance to rebels in the form of provisions of weapons
or logistical or other support. 10 7 Henceforth, this can be viewed as a
threat to the peace which entitles the victim to go to the Security
Council, but it does not entitle it to use self-defense in a unilateral
fashion. This version of law is quite different from customary law and,
at least according to the court, it trumps it.
The classic debate about how we determine what is the law is likely
to miss the point in cases like these. If we had sent a team of lawyers to
argue the merits phase of the ParamilitaryActivities case in the International Court of Justice and it had not made the distinction between
parliamentary and customary law and not taken account of the fact
that the court was going to resonate to the Assembly's system, it would
have been quite hopeless. The formal institutions of the parliamentary
system are superordinating the new version of law in their decisions.
As Mr. Almond said earlier, law to be law has got to be effective.
Much of the new law is just law on paper, desirable as some of it may
be. But it is a confusing situation with a number of policy consequences. Because of the double exposure problem, the effectiveness of
law in restraining savagery in the use of force is going to be reduced.
The democratic polities are going to find it much harder to react and
proact with force while totalitarian polities will probably find it easier
to benefit from this particular ambiguity.
Those who identify with Western Europe, the United States, and
other democratic states have two tasks. One task is to work out ar105. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Merits Judgment of June 27).
106. Id. para. 181.
107. Id. para. 195.
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rangements about the use of force that are satisfactory to our minimum
requirements and are as humane as possible. The second task is to try
to address the law-making process that created the double exposure
problem. Neither of these tasks is easy. It is very hard to persuade
people to surrender the favorable tilt that has been built into the law of
war. It is very hard to ask people who are against apartheid or people
who want a national home for Palestinians to give up whatever they
think is going to serve their purpose in favor of something nebulous like
a neutral law of war. But unless this is done, we are going to find a law
on the books that has less and less effect in reducing the savagery of
war.
The constitutive and structural problem is also not easy to solve. I do
not think we can expect more consensus, and we may discover that it is
necessary to move into restrictive-access arenas, such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or the
Afro-Asian Consultative Committee. In such arenas, like-minded states
establish certain membership requirements and prescribe common law
among themselves that they will apply and make public, in so far as it
is appropriate. Hopefully, its cogency and fairness will attract some
support from others. The other possibility is simply to proceed in a
somewhat individual and homologous fashion, as the Supreme Court
discusses in the Scotia case. 10 8 This possibility seems to me to be very
slow.
The old customary route of prescription that Professor Meron referred to raises other problems. As he concluded, customary law requires a period of time for experimentation and gradual inference by
scholars of what the law is. The law of war, to be effective, should be
known ahead of time so it can be incorporated into training and planning. It should not be law only for post hoc appraisal. It should limit
the savagery of action on the ground. Custom here may not be an appropriate primary method.
DIscussION

Professor MERON began the discussion with a further elaboration of
Professor Reisman's statements and a review of international developments with respect to both judicial and parliamentary law making. One
striking feature of the decision of the International Court of Justice in
the ParamilitaryActivities case, is that the Court regarded common
108.

Sears v. The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170 (1871).
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articles 1 and 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions as customary law"' 0
without any further inquiry into the process or rationale for that finding. A review of international judicial decisions following the Second
World War shows a clear trend toward disregarding state practice and
making certain desirable humanitarian rules a part of customary law
through opinio juris sive necessitatus. The actions of the International

Court of Justice in the ParamilitaryActivities case reflect this trend.
Professor REISMAN next pointed out that a fairly similar phenomenon
arises in legislative law making in humanitarian law. In humanitarian
law, international law-making conferences do not attempt to codify the
existing state of the law. Instead, the conferences try to establish rules
that the majority of conference participants regard as more advanced,
more desirable, and more humanitarian. In both of these contexts,
therefore, lawmakers are less concerned about the actual practice of
states.
Professor REISMAN then elaborated that the International Court of
Justice's suggested criteria in the ParamilitaryActivities ease regarding violations follow the same trend. The court stated that when it reviews violations of the law and discovers that a state justifies its failure
to follow the international rule of conduct by emphasizing exceptions
contained within the rule rather than by frontally challenging the rule
itself, the effect is to confirm the rule of law rather than weaken it.1 20
Because these various norms contain humanitarian elements, international public opinion will construe them as constituting customary rules
of law even though the norms lack traditional ingredients for the formation of customary law.
Professor ALMOND stated that Professor Reisman's double-exposure
theory of the development of customary law is an important distinction,
especially if the United States invokes it before the International Court
of Justice again. Professor ALMOND indicated that the United States
will not turn to the International Court of Justice at any time in the
foreseeable future in light of the Nicaraguan matter. In his opinion, the
court handed down an inadequate opinion in the ParamilitaryActivities case that reflected the inability of the court to deal with certain
issues.
109. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, paras. 217-20 (Merits Judgment of June 27) (noting that the
Geneva Conventions are a development and expression of fundamental general principles of humanitarian law).
110. Id. (showing that the United States rather than challenging prohibitions
against the use of force attempted to prove that it fell within various exceptions to the
prohibition).
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Professor SOHN, in response to Professor Almond's statement, stated
that the International Court of Justice may have a chance to develop
the law in this area further because Costa Rica, unlike the United
States, has decided to contest Nicaragua on the merits. Costa Rica believes it can persuade the court that it made some mistakes in its prior
decisions. Professor SOHN noted that international lawyers have a duty
to write on the Nicaragua question rather than ignore the issue, so
Costa Rica can use those articles as references in its case against
Nicaragua.
Professor OLIVER, responding to Professor Sohn, stated that it is too
late to condemn the United States for contesting the decision of the
International Court of Justice, thereby passing up an opportunity to
contribute to positive multiparty treaty law and instead attempting to
elicit a general understanding among its friends on how to address certain problems. He noted that although such an understanding is better
than nothing, it does present a number of problems. One problem he
recognized involves the level of authorization needed to comply with
the United States Constitution upon entering such arrangements. Another problem he noticed relates to the definition of "friends." He indicated that the rules in humanitarian law should reflect a more universal
view, although plural systems are inevitable, given the reality of the
situation.
Professor SOHN agreed with Professor Oliver, stating that it was easier to think only about problems faced by military powers, especially
those involving the great powers, namely the United States, the Soviet
Union, and a few of their friends. Professor SOHN noted that Professor
Oliver recently reminded the panel to consider the situation in the
Third and the Fourth Worlds. If the United States truly believes in
democracy, then those Third or Fourth World countries should have a
voice, even if they are smaller and less important to the power structure. Professor SOHN indicated that domestically, we abandoned long
ago the idea that only the rich and the powerful should make decisions
regarding the manner in which the country is run, and that human
dignity requires that all four billion people have a voice in the political
process involving them.
Mr. MATHESON responded that the decision of the United States regarding the accepted rules of Protocol I has a number of objectives.
The first most immediate objective is simply the maintenance of present and future military alliances and the need to know which rules will
govern our common military operations. That objective is in part an
application of what we may perceive as law -

customary law

-

or

agreements to which we are party. He pointed out that other questions,
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such as what we want to do or not to do as a matter of policy, and what
makes sense in terms of military deployments and operations are also
objectives of this decision. He concluded that all of these are factors;
therefore, the military manuals resulting from this process will in part
reflect law and will in part reflect these other objectives.
Mr. MATHESON also commented that the NATO rules of engagement or other NATO procedures are not predominantly dictated by
law. Rather, some NATO matters represent decisions the military and
political authorities of the various countries within NATO made on
how to deploy their forces, what scope of authority is extended to their
commanders, and which matters they want to reserve for political decisions. This process will produce things that are not law and decisions
that are based on things other than legal considerations.
Mr. MATHESON remarked that those decisions do not suggest disparagement of the desirability of a universal, legally binding regime for
humanitarian law that is acceptable to everyone. The Diplomatic Conference, in his opinion, did not produce such a regime, even though the
administration wished it had. He indicated that in the future, the administration does not intend to dismiss that as the overall objective. If
it is possible over time to influence other governments to accept beliefs
of what are the appropriate norms, he suggested these norms be reflected in customary law. He indicated that the administration advocates a multifaceted, step-by-step approach without abandoning what is
obviously the most ideal solution. At present, the administration cannot
reach that point, and Mr. Matheson noted that it will work toward that
goal over the years, but in the meantime, has a number of other issues
it must work on as well.
As to the issue Professor Oliver raised about the Constitution
presenting a barrier in some areas, Mr. MATHESON responded that

United States military and political authorities do enter into arrangements that are not necessarily legally binding or that the law dictates,
but that govern their relations with other military establishments and
the deployment of forces without any constitutional problems arising.
In response to Professor Meron, Professor REISMAN stated that it is
useless to talk about law, unless people believe that those laws are right
and comply with them because others are willing to sustain those laws
or raise the cost for violating them. If that is the case, a political factor
always exists to restrain how far one can go. Professor REISMAN noted
further that one cannot go farther than those with effective power in
the particular legal system and ability to lend their resources allow.
Professor REISMtAN questioned why the International Court of Justice
should be reasonable when it is not subject to such a political restraint.
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He theorized that the court could imagine itself as a philosopher in an
ivory tower and create the best of all worlds. If power is a variable that
has real political effect in human life, we have to restrict our use of the
term "law" so that it addresses communications that have authority
and control. Control in the international system is much more complex
than in a domestic system. Congress generally has control because its
decisions are effective, unless there is massive resistance from the public. Professor REISMAN noted, however, that international decisions do
not have the same impact; therefore, large states or concentrations of
large states must often be looked to for control. He concluded that this
approach is inconsistent with notions of state equality, democracy, and
universality, but does recognize political reality.
Professor REISMAN commented that when you create law that does
not have control, people who are not deterred when presented with the
legal symbol ignore it because they are the "bad men" in Holmes's
definition,"' 1 and because the law provides no sanction. He noted that
those governments that the legal symbol deters, particularly those that
have populations that are acculturated to respond to that symbol, find
that their behavior is somewhat more limited, leading to asymmetrical
results and problems of pluralistic international law, which are unsatisfactory. He indicated that one cannot use law effectively as a lawyer
advising clients or as a judge making decisions if two, three, or even
four versions of a law are available; therefore, the law fails to contribute much to society and ultimately depreciates the legal symbol.
Professor REISMAN recognized that the United States is not abandoning the International Court of Justice, and that no one should characterize what the United States did in the ParamilitaryActivities case
as an abandonment of the court. He indicated that the United States
has submitted to the court in another case, and noted further that although the United States has legally withdrawn from article 36(2) of
the International Court of Justice Statute, it has not withdrawn its
judge nor has it denounced the statute. He indicated that the court
remains a potentially useful instrument, and the United States should
use it efficiently. He noted, however, that the court does present certain
problems, and that its role may need revision. Professor REISMAN raised
one reservation with regard to Mr. Matheson's remarks. He recognized
that if a group of individuals have sufficient effective power, their behavior can shape law and overcome the problem of pluralism.
Professor MERON provided a historical perspective on the processes
under review. He noted that the Court in the ParamilitaryActivities
111.

Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
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case did not examine the traditional components of customary law to
reach certain conclusions on whether the Geneva Conventions are customary norms. He recognized that this judgment is not very exceptional in terms of techniques the judicial bodies use. He observed that
the 1946 High Command case'1 2 had an even greater absence of discussion of actual state practice. The tribunal regarded the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1929113 largely as declaratory of international law by 1941, only twelve years after its signing. In that
proceeding, the tribunal counted 35 provisions of that Convention, even
some that are quite esoteric, as being declaratory of customary law.
Professor MERON.noted that many scholars' statements that were then
disputed, perhaps rightly so, are now cited as authoritative sources of
international law. In addition, the accumulation of judicial opinions
produces a certain effectiveness, and if those judgments are widely perceived as reflecting desirable humanitarian principles, even though they
initially are not effective, we should consider their effectiveness through
this process of public perception in the long run.
Professor MERON recognized that when the military writes its next
manual of military law, it will become impossible to write it as a practical matter if the military were to focus exclusively on the rules already crystallized as customary law. He added that the armed forces
must have a comprehensive set of rules that it can apply in combat
situations. The only way to achieve such a set of rules is to combine
rules that are already viewed as effective international law with those
principles or norms that are acceptable as guidelines for United States
forces. Professor MERON suggested that the military include them in
such a manual, otherwise the military will be left with no effective rules
of combat.
Professor GROSSMAN asked Professor Reisman whether the deterioration of the regime outlawing the threat or use of force in article 2(4) of
the United Nations Charter represented a complex phenomenon, rather
than just an attempt to introduce the notion of "just war" by those who
claim legal justification for the struggle of their people. For example,
there were early claims that article 2(4) did not prohibit humanitarian
intervention if force was used proportionately and met certain criteria.
Regional organizations exercise independent powers under an interpretation of article 52 that permits them to operate without explicit ap112.

United States v. Von Leeb (The High Command Case), reprintedin TRIALS

OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NURENBERG MIUTARY TRIBUNALS vol. 10, at 1-1322,

vol. 11, at 3-756 (1950).
113. Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, 47 Stat. 2021, T.S. No. 846, 118 L.N.T.S. 343.
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proval of either the Security Council or the General Assembly under
the Uniting for Peace Resolution. If we really want to control the use
of force, Professor GROSSMAN advised that perhaps we should consider
actors, motives, and rationalizations other than just the process of deterioration that took place via the introduction of the notions of self-defense and war.
Professor REISMAN agreed with Professor Grossman that it is much
more complex, and that the examples cited illustrate that the general
deterioration of the regime established in 1945, which had a certain
conservative thrust, has been changed since 1970. Portions of the Charter support the new approach; other provisions have also changed.
Professor REISMAN concluded that we must remember not to study
the law of war as if it were alone in a closed universe. He stated furthermore that if we want to use generative logic, we can take several
isolated decisions and gradually build up a relatively beautiful system
for protection in times of war. If what the actual combatants out in the
field are doing is inconsistent with this system, however, there is no
point in calling that system "law."
THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES ON CURRENT
LAW OF WAR AGREEMENTS: REMARKS OF JUDGE
ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, LEGAL ADVISER, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, JANUARY 22, 1987114

It is a pleasure to appear before this distinguished group to describe
the position of the United States government on a matter that has occupied a great deal of my personal time and attention during the past
year. The executive branch has been engaged in a detailed review of
the two 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
has considered at great length how best to further the goal of promoting widespread acceptance of the highest achievable standards for humanitarian law in armed conflict.
As you know, the United States has traditionally been in the forefront of efforts to codify and improve international law in this field,
with the objective of giving the greatest possible protection to victims of
armed conflicts, consistent with legitimate military requirements. The
Geneva Diplomatic Conference that produced the 1977 Protocols provided an important opportunity to the world community to take a great
step forward toward this objective. In our view, that conference was
114. Judge Sofaer was unable to attend the Workshop and deliver this speech.
What follows is his prepared text supplemented with footnotes where necessary.
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partially successful, but unfortunately yielded in important respects to
the efforts of many delegations to politicize humanitarian law to the
benefit of organizations with terrorist aims or tactics.
In particular, the executive branch has concluded that the United
States should ratify Additional Protocol II, which deals with non-international armed conflicts, but not Additional Protocol I, which deals
with international armed conflicts.
Protocol II was designed to expand and refine the basic humanitarian provisions contained in common article 3 of the Four 1949 Geneva
Conventions with respect to non-international conflicts. While the Protocol does not, and should not, attempt to apply to such conflicts all the
protections prescribed by the Conventions for international armed conflicts, such as prisoner-of-war treatment for captured combatants, it
does attempt to guarantee that certain fundamental protections be observed. These include:
(1) humane treatment for detained persons, such as protection from
violence, torture, and collective punishment;" 5
(2) protection from intentional attack, hostage taking, and acts of
terrorism of persons who take no part in hostilities;"'
(3) special protection for children to provide for their safety and education and to preclude their participation in hostilities; 117
(4) fundamental due process for persons against whom sentences are
to be passed or penalties executed; 8
(5) protection and appropriate care for the sick and wounded, and
medical units which assist them;11 9 and
(6) protection of the civilian population from military attack, acts of
terror, deliberate starvation, and attacks against installations containing dangerous forces.120
In each case, Protocol II expands and makes more specific the basic
guarantees of common article 3 of the 1949 Conventions. 2 For the
most part, the obligations contained in Protocol II are no more than a
restatement of the rules of conduct with which United States military
115. Protocol II, supra note 4, arts. 4, 5 (prescribing standards of treatment for

persons deprived of their liberty and persons not participating in hostilities).
116. Id. art. 4.
117. Id. art. 4(3) (mandating steps required for the special needs of children).
118. Id. art. 6 (prescribing guidelines for the penal prosecution of persons charged
with crimes related to an armed conflict).
119. Id. arts. 7-12.
120. Id. arts. 13-18.
121. Compare Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 4, common art. 3 (stating
the "basic" guarantees) with Protocol II, supra note 4, arts. 4-18 (stating the more
specific "new" guarantees).
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forces would almost certainly comply as a matter of national policy,
constitutional and legal protections, and common decency. These obligations are not uniformly observed by other states, however, and their
universal observance would mitigate many of the worst human tragedies of the type that have occurred in internal conflicts of the present
and recent past.
Therefore, I expect that Protocol II will be submitted to the Senate
for its advice and consent to ratification with certain understandings
and reservations. With our support, I expect that in due course the
Protocol will be ratified by the great majority of our friends as well as
a substantial preponderance of other states.
In one important respect, the Protocol did not meet the desires of the
United States and other Western delegations. It only applies to internal
conflicts in which dissident armed groups are under responsible command and exercise control over such a part of the national territory as
to carry out sustained and concerted military operations.' 22 This is a
narrower scope than we would have desired and has the effect of excluding many internal conflicts in which dissident armed groups occupy
no significant territory but conduct sporadic guerrilla operations over a
wide area. 12 3 I believe that the United States should make clear when
it ratifies Protocol II that it will apply the Protocol to all conflicts covered by common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and only
such conflicts, which will include all non-international armed conflicts
as traditionally defined, but of course not internal disturbances, riots,
or sporadic acts of violence.
The executive branch has also conducted a thorough review of Additional Protocol 1,124 which deals with international armed conflicts.
This Protocol was the main object of the work of the Geneva Diplomatic Conference that concluded in 1977, and represented an attempt
to revise and update in a comprehensive manner the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims,' 25 the 1907 Hague Conven122. Protocol II, supra note 4, art. 1(1).
123. Compare id. art. 1 (providing the narrower, final language that the Diplomatic Conference adopted) with Draft Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts, art. 1, reprinted in INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 33 (1973)
[hereinafter DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12
AUGUST 1949] (giving the broader language the ICRC drafted after the Conference of
Government Experts and used as a negotiating text for the Diplomatic Conference).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 11-43 (discussing the executive branch's
review of Additional Protocol I).
125. Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 4.
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tions on Means and Methods of Warfare, 12 and customary international law on the same subjects.
Our extensive interagency review of Protocol I has, however, led us
to conclude that the Protocol suffers from fundamental shortcomings
that cannot be remedied through reservations or understandings. It is
therefore unlikely that Protocol I will be submitted to the Senate. 21
In key respects, Protocol I would undermine humanitarian law and
endanger civilians in war. Certain provisions would inject subjective
and politically controversial standards into the issue of the applicability
of humanitarian law. Protocol I also elevates the international legal status of self-described "national liberation" groups that make a practice
of terrorism. 28 This would undermine the principle that the rights and
duties of international law attach principally to entities that have those
elements of sovereignty that allow them to be held accountable for
their actions and the resources to fulfill their obligations.
Equally troubling is the easily inferred political and philosophical intent of Protocol I, which aims to encourage and give legal sanction not
only to "national liberation" movements in general, but in particular to
the inhumane tactics of many of them. Article 44(3) grants combatant
status to armed irregulars, even in cases where they do not distinguish
themselves from noncombatants, with the result that there will be increased risk to the civilian population within which such irregulars
often attempt to hide.
The reasons for these regrettable aspects of Protocol I are apparent
from an examination of the actions of the Diplomatic Conference
which produced it. The Geneva Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict, which sat between 1974 and 1977, was convened under the auspices of the ICRC, to improve the laws of war set forth in the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.129
126. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land [hereinafter

Hague Regulations], annexed to Hague Convention No. IV of October 18, 1907, supra

note 71; Hague Convention No. V of October 18, 1907, supra note 71; Hague Convention No. IX of October 18, 1907, supra note 71.

127. See President's Message, supra note 10 (transmitting Protocol II but not Protocol I to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification).

128. See Rule 58, Rules of Procedure, OFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLONIATIC
supra note 65, CDDH/2/Rev. 3, at 15 [hereinafter Rule 58] (providing
the rules that allow national liberation movements to participate in the Diplomatic
CONFERENCE,

Conference).
129. Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Develop-

ment of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, para. 1, 1
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE, supra note 65, at 3 [hereinafter
Final Act].
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The ICRC and the Conference developed many constructive ideas to
help minimize the suffering of combatants and noncombatants in
armed conflict. But from the beginning of the Conference, an effort
began to extend the law of international armed conflict to cover the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and other radical groups,
many of whom were accorded observer status.1 30
The first substantive address, after election of the Conference president, urged the Conference to recognize "certain values and elementary
rights which went beyond the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights," because millions were "still under colonial oppression in the
African continent, while international Zionism had placed the Palestinian population in an impossible situation." 131 The speaker asked the
Conference to consider not only effects, but causes as well, and to recognize "there were such things as just wars. '132 He said, "It was quite
obvious that it was the Zionists who wanted to throw the Arabs into
the sea .

[and that] national liberation movements did not want to

shed blood, only to secure recognition of their rights. 33
The Conference adopted in committee during its first session what is
now article 1(4) of Protocol 1."' This article makes the laws of international armed conflict applicable to "armed conflicts in which peoples
are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and
against racist regimes in the exercise of the right of self-determination." 135 Never before has the applicability of the laws of war been
130. Rule 58, supra note 128; Final Act, supra note 129, para. 3. The Final Act
recognized the following national liberation movements as observers: African National
Congress (South Africa), African National Council of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), Angola
National Liberation Front, Mozambique Liberation Front, Palestine Liberation Organization, Pan-Africanist Congress (South Africa), People's Movement for the Liberation
of Angola, Seychelles People's United Party, South West Africa People's Organization
(Namibia), Zimbabwe African National Union, and Zimbabwe African People's
Union. Id.; see also 5 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE, supra
note 65, CDDH/SR.6-7, at 56-65 (discussing the issue of invitations to national liberation organizations to participate in the Diplomatic Conference as observers).
131.

5

OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC

CONFERENCE,

supra note 65,

CDDH/SR.1 para. 29, at 12-13 (providing the statement of Mr. Ould Dada, President
of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania).
132. Id. CDDH/SR.1 para. 30, at 13.
133. Id. CDDH/SR.1 paras. 31-32, at 13.
134. CDDH Res. 53, adopted id. CDDH/SR.22 para. 21, at 229. The Conference
adopted the report of Committee I at the twenty-second plenary meeting of the First
Session on 29 March 1974. The language of the Committee's draft is substantially the
same as the language finally adopted in the Fourth Session. Compare Report of Committee I, 10 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE, supra note 65,
CDDH/48/Rev. 1 para. 14, at 3, 7 (giving the language for article I that Committee I
adopted) with Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 1 (providing the language that was finally
adopted).
135. Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 1(4).
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made to turn on the purported aims of a conflict. Moreover, this provision obliterated the traditional distinction between international and
non-international armed conflicts. Any group within a national boundary, claiming to be fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation, or a racist regime, can now argue that it is protected by the laws
of war, and that its members are entitled to POW status for their otherwise criminal acts. Members of radical groups in the United States
have already done so in our own federal courts.136
The ICRC and most Western nations expressed no admiration for
article 1(4).137 Some contend, however, that as a result of the new rule,
humanitarian law now governs the actions of national liberation
groups.13 While the PLO and other "freedom fighters" may now claim
the benefits of the laws of war, they thereby become bound to obey
these rules. This, in some eyes, is seen as an advance for humanitarian
law.
In fact, radical groups rarely have the resources and facilities to provide the protections for prisoners of war required by the laws of war.
Even if they had the resources, no reason exists to believe they have the
inclination to provide them, or to abide by the law's limitations on the
actions they may take, particularly against civilians. In fact, no doubt
recognizing that the PLO and other "freedom fighters" have concentrated their guns, bombs, and rockets on civilian noncombatants, the
supporters of article 1(4) obtained at the Conference an additional protection for these groups. Article 44(2) provides that once a group quali136.

See, e.g., United States v. Shakur, 817 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1987) (denying re-

lease from pretrial detention on charges of armed robbery, flight from prosecution,
racketeering, armed kidnapping, and the murder of a member of the "New Afrikan
People's Organization" and self-proclaimed "prisoner of war"); United States v.
Torres, 583 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (noting the denial of defendant members of
the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional Puertorriquena (FALN) motion to dismiss on the grounds that the court should treat them as prisoners of war); United
States v. Lopez, No. 80 CR 736-4 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 1981) (LEXIS, Genfed library,

Dist file) (denying the defendant Puerto Rican nationalist's oral motion to dismiss an
indictment on the grounds that he was a "prisoner of war").
137. See, e.g., 8 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE, slipra note
65, CDDH/I/SR.6 para. 30, at 49 (stating the views of Mr. Marting, the ICRC representative); id. CDDH/I/SR.2 paras. 50-52, at 14 (providing the statement of George
Prugh, representative of the United States); id. CDDH/I/SR.2 para. 49, at 14 (providing the statement of Mr. Girard, representative of France); id. CDDH/I/SR.2 paras.
44-48, at 13, 14 (recording the statement of Mr. Draper, representative of the United
Kingdom).

138. 6 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE, supra note 65,
CDDH/SR.36 paras. 72-75, at 44-45 (citing the statement of Mr. Ullrich, representative of the German Democratic Republic); Id. CDDH/SR.36 para. 79, at 45-46 (noting the statement of Mr. Herczegh, representative of Hungary); id. CDDH/SR.36 paras. 89-90, at 47-48 (giving the statement of Mr. Clark, representative of Nigeria).
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fies as a national liberation movement protected by article 1(4), no conduct by members of the group can lead to the loss of its status as a
protected organization. The rationale for this rule is that individuals
can be punished separately for their conduct. The effect is to preserve
the right of such organizations to be treated as combatants, even
though they are almost exclusively engaged in terrorizing civilians.
The Conference went even further in accommodating the needs of
terrorist groups at the expense of the civilian population that humanitarian law is intended to protect. A fundamental premise of the Geneva
Conventions has been that to earn the right to protection as military
fighters, soldiers must distinguish themselves from civilians by wearing
uniforms and carrying their weapons openly. Thus, under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, irregular forces achieve combatant (and, if captured,
POW) status, when they (1) are commanded by a person responsible
for subordinates; (2) wear a fixed, distinctive insignia recognizable
from a distance; (3) carry weapons openly; and (4) conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.13 9 Fighters who
attempt to take advantage of civilians by hiding among them in civilian
dress, with their weapons out of view, lose their claim to be treated as
soldiers. The law thus attempts to encourage fighters to avoid placing
civilians in unconscionable jeopardy.
The terrorist groups that attended the Conference had no intention
to modify their conduct to satisfy these traditional rules of engagement.
Terrorists are not soldiers. They do not wear uniforms. They hide
among civilians, and after striking, they try to escape once again into
civilian groups. Instead of modifying their conduct, they succeeded in
modifying the law. Article 44(3) of Protocol I recognizes that "to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian
population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack." 140 But the provision goes on to state
"that there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature
' 141
of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself.
In such situations, "he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided
• . .he carries his arms openly: (a) during each military engagement,
and (b) during each time as he is visible to the adversary while he is
engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack
139. First Geneva Convention of 1949, supra note 4, art. 13(2); Second Geneva
Convention of 1949, supra note 4, art. 13(2); Third Geneva Convention of 1949, supra
note 4, art. 4(2).
140. Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 44(3).
141. Id.
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in which he is to participate."142 Furthermore, the section provides that
"acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall not
be considered as perfidious. '143
These changes undermine the notion that the Protocol has secured an
advantage for humanitarian law by granting terrorist groups protection
as combatants. Under the Geneva Conventions, a terrorist could not
hide among civilians until just before an attack. Under Protocol I, he
may do so; he need only carry his arms openly while he is visibly engaged in a deployment or while he is in an actual engagement.
The significance of Protocol I to terrorist organizations is not a matter of hypothetical speculation. They were at the Conference and lobbied hard for these provisions. The degree of their success is not in
doubt. After the vote on Protocol I, the PLO's representative "expressed his deep satisfaction at the result of the vote, by which the
international community had re-confirmed the legitimacy of the struggles of peoples exercising their right to self-determination." 1" Turning
to article 1(4), he explained its significance as authority for the PLO's
actions:
The Arab people of Palestine fell within all three of the categories mentioned in
paragraph 4: they were under colonial domination; their territory was under foreign occupation, despite the assertions of the terrorist Begin; and they were suffering under a racist regime, since Zionism had been recognized in a United
Nations resolution as a form of racism. He wished to express his gratitude to the
justice- and peace-loving peoples who had given their support to the struggles of
all peoples fighting for self-determination. 45

In addition to these fundamental problems, Protocol I presents serious problems as well for United States military operations. At the conclusion of the Conference, President Carter decided to sign the Protocol
along with Protocol II. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not object to this
decision, but reserved their ultimate judgment on the military acceptability of the Protocol and indicated the need for a thorough study of its
military implications before a decision could be made on United States
ratification. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did conduct such a thorough and
detailed study, including consultation with the major United States
military commands and special war games and simulations.
The study concluded that Protocol I is militarily unacceptable for
142. Id.
143. Id.
144.

6 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC

CONFERENCE,

supra note 65,

CDDH/SR.36 para. 113, at 53 (1978) (giving the statement of Mr. Armali, observer
of the Palestine Liberation Organization).
145. Id. para. 114.

AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

[VOL. 2:415

many reasons. Among these are that the Protocol unreasonably restricts attacks against certain objects that traditionally have been considered legitimate military targets. It fails to improve substantially the
compliance and verification mechanisms of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and eliminates an important sanction against violations of those
conventions. On the whole, it was judged to be too ambiguous and complicated to use as a practical guide for military operations.
A few examples of these military problems will illustrate the point.
Article 56 of Protocol I is designed to protect dams, dikes, and nuclear
power plants against attacks that could result in "severe" civilian
losses. As its negotiating history indicates, this article would protect
objects that would be considered legitimate military objectives under
14
customary international law. 6
Attacks on such military objectives would be prohibited if "severe"
1 47
civilian casualties might result from flooding or release of radiation.
The negotiating history throws little light on what level of civilian
losses would be "severe." It is clear, however, that under this article,
civilian losses are not to be balanced against the military value of the
target. If severe losses would result, then the attack is forbidden, no
matter how important the target. It also appears that article 56 forbids
any attack that raises the possibility of severe civilian losses, even
though considerable care is taken to avoid them.
Paragraph 2 of article 56 provides for termination of protection, but
only in limited circumstances. If it is once conceded that a particular
dam, dike, or nuclear power station is entitled to protection under article 56, that protection can only end if it is used "in regular, significant,
and direct support of military operations. 148 In the case of a nuclear
power plant, this support must be in the form of "electric power. "140
The negotiating history refers to electric power for "production of
arms, ammunition, and military equipment" as removing a power
plant's protection, but not "production of civilian goods which may also
be used by the armed forces." 150 The Diplomatic Conference thus neglected the nature of modern integrated power grids, where it is impossible to say that electricity from a particular plant goes to a particular
146. Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 56; see also 14 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPsupra note 65, CDDH/III/SR.18 para. 39, at 158 (statement
of Mr. Mazza, United States) (stating the differences between current international
LOMATIC CONFERENCE,

law and the proposed article).
147. Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 56(1).
148. Id. art. 56(2)(a)-(c).
149. Id. art. 56(2)(b).
150. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
45, at 672.
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customer. It is also unreasonable for article 56 to terminate the protection of nuclear power plants only on the basis of the use of their electric
power. Under this provision, a nuclear power plant that is being used to
produce plutonium for nuclear weapons purposes would not lose its
protection.
To take another example, article 51 of Protocol I prohibits any reprisal attacks against the civilian population, that is, attacks that would
otherwise be forbidden but that are in response to the enemy's own
violations of the law and are intended to deter future violations. Historically, reciprocity has been the major sanction underlying the laws of
war. If article 51 were to come into force for the United States, an
enemy could deliberately carry out attacks against friendly civilian
populations, and the United States would be legally forbidden to reply
in kind. As a practical matter, the United States might, for political or
humanitarian reasons, decide in a particular case not to carry out retaliatory or reprisal attacks involving unfriendly civilian populations. To
formally renounce even the option of such attacks, however, removes a
significant deterrent that presently protects civilians and other war victims on all sides of a conflict.
For a third example, article 47 of Protocol I provides that "a mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of
war." 151 This article was included in the Protocol not for humanitarian
reasons, but purely to make the political point that mercenary activity
in the Third World is unwelcome. In doing so, this article disregards
one of the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law by
defining the right to combatant status, at least in part, on the basis of
the personal or political motivations of the individual in question. 52
This politicizing of the rules of warfare is contrary to Western interests
and the interests of humanitarian law itself.
At the same time, the Conference that produced Protocol I failed to
meet one of the basic objectives of the United States and other Western countries, that is, to bring about a major improvement in the mechanisms for enforcement of international humanitarian law. In particular, the United States sought to strengthen the institution of the
"protecting power." Under this concept, a neutral state assumes the
responsibility for protecting a country's citizens who are in the custody
or control of a particular enemy power, whether as prisoners of war,
civilian internees, or inhabitants of occupied territory. This practice has
only rarely worked since 1945, largely because of the refusal of com151.
152.

Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 47(1).
Id. art. 47(2).
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munist governments to allow a neutral power to inspect either their
prisoner of war or internment camps.
The Eastern Bloc countries likewise strongly resisted all efforts at the
Diplomatic Conference to require third-party supervision of compliance
with Protocol I and the Geneva Conventions. The results of the effort
to strengthen the compliance mechanisms of the Conventions were,
therefore, meager. Article 5 of Protocol I describes in detail the procedures to be used in appointing a neutral protecting power. It does not,
however, expressly require that a state holding enemy prisoners of war
or civilians accept such a power. On the contrary, it expressly refers to
the requirement that a protecting power be accepted by the detaining
power. 153 There is no reason to believe that these provisions will be
more successful than comparable provisions in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.
Similarly, one major innovation of Protocol I is the creation of a permanent fifteen-member international fact-finding commission to investigate alleged serious violations of the Protocols and the Geneva Conventions and to facilitate resumption of compliance through the use of
its good offices.1 54 However, the Commission cannot act without the
consent of the parties to the dispute, which can be given either on a
permanent one-time basis or an ad hoc basis for a particular dispute.
Given the persistence of Soviet refusal to allow third-party supervision
of the Geneva Conventions, it is extremely unlikely that either the Soviet Union or any of its allies or clients would consent to the activities
of the Commission.
In our view, Protocol I cannot be made acceptable through the taking of reservations or understandings at the time of United States ratification. The defects in Protocol I are so fundamental that we should be
unwilling to associate ourselves with it, irrespective of any reservation.
To ratify the Protocol would signal to the world that it is the document
that sets the governing standards for military conduct in international
conflicts, replacing the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The filing of technically effective reservations would fail to prevent the unacceptable aspects of the Protocol from gaining enormously in prestige. Our position
would be deemed the "minority" view - the "imperialist" or "racist"
position - as compared to the "accepted" and "humanitarian" view.
Furthermore, any attempt by reservation to cure even the most important of the defects in the Protocol would require the filing of many,
perhaps dozens, of reservations, some taking fundamental exception to
153.
154.

Id. art. 5(2).
Id. art. 90.
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central parts of the Protocol. The number and types of reservations
necessary for this purpose would probably be regarded by many as incompatible with the object and purpose of the Protocol, and we would
be accused of ratifying in bad faith.
We recognize that certain provisions of Protocol I reflect customary
international law, and others appear to be positive, new developments.
For example, the Protocol provisions on the protection of medical aircraft 55 and on the missing and the dead"5 ' are useful changes in current law, even though by themselves they will not solve the problems
demonstrated in recent conflicts. We want to preserve these new developments and encourage their universal acceptance and observance in
time.
We therefore intend to consult with our allies to develop appropriate
methods for incorporating these provisions into rules that govern our
military operations, with the intention that they shall in time win recognition as customary international law separate from their presence in
Protocol I. In this way, we would hope to salvage the positive aspects of
the Protocol, while rejecting attempts to impose unacceptable conditions on the acceptance of such improvements in international humanitarian law.
I believe that United States ratification of Protocol II will advance
the development of reasonable standards of international humanitarian
law that are consistent with essential military requirements. The same
is not true with respect to Protocol I, and this agreement should, in my
view, not be ratified. We will attempt in our consultations with allies
and through other means, however, to press forward with the improvement of the rules of international humanitarian law in international
armed conflict, without accepting as the price for such improvements a
debasement of our values and of humanitarian law itself.
Taken as a whole, these actions will demonstrate that the United
States strongly supports humanitarian principles, is eager to improve
on existing international law consistent with those principles, and will
reject revisions of international law that undermine those principles.
DETERMINING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
RELATIVE TO THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES IN NONINTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS
Professor Grossman convened the afternoon session at 1:00 p.m.,
155. Id. arts. 24-31.
156. Id. arts. 32-34.
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OPENING REMARKS OF THE MODERATOR

Professor GROSSMAN noted the particular significance of this discussion in light of the recent announcement that the United States might

ratify Protocol

11.157
REMARKS OF DEAN JAMES

E.

BOND

158

After reviewing the literature written in the field during the last ten
years, I have concluded that some parts of the Hague Regulations"'
and common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions constitute the
only customary law that is applicable to non-international armed conflicts. I reject any notion that Protocol II embodies customary international law. Whether at some distant point in time it might be seen as
evidence consistent with evolving state practice is, I think at best, speculation. The major point I wish to make is that we cannot expect the
formal, treaty law in this area to go much beyond the kind of general
provisions that are found in the Hague Regulations and common article
3.
Such provisions are admittedly so general that they might more
fairly be characterized as principles rather than rules because these
provisions apply to situations where it is unreasonable to expect the
parties to the conflict to observe detailed rules with respect to both engagement and other parties of the conflict. Typically, these conflicts
occur in less developed countries. These countries have neither the resources nor the institutional infrastructure to comply with the types of
detailed provisions found in the Geneva Conventions or in Protocol II.
It may well be that a country like the United States, on the other hand,
can contemplate good faith in the adoption of Protocol II because the
United States is a country that at least has the resources and institutional infrastructure to comply with the detailed provisions. It is extremely naive, however, to expect that insurgents or guerrillas or even
the nominal governments found in some Third World countries would
be able to do so. The most one can hope for in this area is an attempt
to comply with some general principles. The specifics of compliance
must by necessity be left to the parties and the particular circumstances of the conflict. If there is any more particularized law applica157. President's Message, supra note 10.
158. Dean, University of Puget Sound School of Law.
159. Hague Regulations, supra note 126; Hague Convention No. V of October 18,
1907, supra note 71; Hague Convention No. IX of October 18, 1907, supra note 71.
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ble to these conflicts, it will be found, not in sources such as Protocol
II, but rather in the field training manuals of the various armed forces.
When I was the most junior officer at the Judge Advocate Generals
School in the early 1960s, I was assigned the task of revising the armywide instruction in the law of war. The Department of the Army had
decided in the wake of the disclosures of My Lai that our troops
needed to be advised, not of their rights as prisoners of war, but rather
of their obligations when taking persons into their custody.
With very little knowledge and no supervision, I set about the task.
Because there was great pressure to have something done, I simply
adopted the Geneva Conventions, virtually without modification. I have
no idea whether this instruction is still given to raw recruits across the
United States. I would be surprised if it was still given because among
the provisions included in that instruction were several paragraphs on
the obligation to disobey superior orders. That is not the kind of instruction one normally associates with the armed forces training.
I do think that in the context of army training manuals, you may
find some more particularized evidence of what the law of war is in this
area. Moreover, in this area, you will find no distinction in the rules as
they apply to an international armed conflict or non-international
armed conflict. One simply cannot expect grunts or even captains to
distinguish between the niceties of the rules they must obey when they
are in an international armed conflict as opposed to a non-international
armed conflict. At that level, the distinction is in fact nonexistent.
REMARKS OF COMMANDER

V. J. FENRICK

In discussing this topic, it might be a useful exercise to examine Protocol II and see if much of it fits into current customary international
law. One of the problems with customary law in a non-international
armed conflict, however, is that states are perhaps better known for
violating the law than for complying with it. In addition, it is very difficult to identify customary law for non-international armed conflicts
that is not rooted in treaty law. For that matter, Protocol II itself
presents certain very substantial difficulties if we try to argue that it
constitutes, either in its entirety or in part, customary law.
Many of the states that negotiated Protocol II, particularly the Third
World states, were displeased with the idea of having a Protocol II that
dealt with non-international armed conflicts. This dissatisfaction became especially pronounced after the issue of colonial, alien, and racist
regimes was adequately addressed by article 1(4) of Protocol I. In fact,
in the closing days of the Diplomatic Conference on the Additional
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Protocols, it appeared for some time that Protocol II would not be
forthcoming. The salvage operation that was conducted, and which
subsequently ensured that the Conference did adopt a Protocol II, resulted in the rejection of many of the provisions that were a part of the
draft of Protocol II. Furthermore, the normal incentive device for compliance with the law of war is the recognition of combatant and prisoner of war status under certain circumstances. Neither common article 3 nor Protocol II, however, provides for such recognition. I suspect
that any international lawyer has a constitutional predisposition toward
optimism, and perhaps some people might even view me as euphorically
optimistic in this particular case. Nonetheless, I am going to examine
Protocol II briefly and try to determine how many of its provisions reflect existing customary law.
Protocol II provisions that merely restate portions of common article
3 are part of customary law. In addition, Protocol II provisions that are
unrelated to common article 3, but are of a sufficient level of generality
may also be supportable for inclusion in customary law through state
practice. Most of Protocol II is concerned with the law of Geneva, including the protection of victims of war in areas under enemy control.
Articles 4 and 5 may be used as examples. Article 4 is concerned with
fundamental guarantees. Paragraphs 1 and 2 restate or amplify portions of common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. I would
suggest that these paragraphs already constitute customary international law. Paragraph 3, which provides for the care of children, is new
but might eventually become customary law. Article 5, which is concerned with persons whose liberty has been restricted, is also new but
might be suitable for eventual incorporation into customary law. Article 6, paragraph 2, which is concerned with penal prosecutions, may
already constitute customary law because it is essentially only a modest
elaboration upon common article 3.
The remaining paragraphs are new. Once again, they might be suitable for inclusion in customary law in due course. Moreover, articles 7
and 8, which concern the protection, care, and search for the wounded,
sick, and shipwrecked, are modest amplifications of common article 3. I
suggest, therefore, that they are already customary law. Finally, although articles 9, 10, 11, and 12 are concerned essentially with protection of medical personnel, the provisions concerning distinctive emblems, 160 and protection of medical transports are new.16 They are,
however, logical corollaries of the obligation to protect and care for the
160.
161.

Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 18.
Id. arts. 21-27.
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wounded, sick, and shipwrecked. Therefore, I hope these provisions will
be included in customary law through state practice.
Articles 13, 14, 15, and 16, on the other hand, tend to address
Hague law matters such as targeting. For example, article 13 is concerned with the general protection of the civilian population. Paragraph
2 of article 13 prohibits both attacks on and attempts to terrorize the
civilian population. If we adopt the approach that I believe Professor
Bond outlined for us earlier, an approach suggesting that there was in
fact some Hague law component in the law applicable to non-international armed conflicts, then arguably, parts of article 13 are a logical
extension of the humane treatment provision of common article 3.
The remaining provisions similar to Hague law, articles 14, 15, and
16, which are concerned with protection of objects indispensable to the
survival of the civilian population, works and installations containing
dangerous forces, and cultural objects in places of worship, respectively, are, however, all modifications of Protocol I provisions. Presently, these articles quite clearly are new law, although eventually they
might also become customary law through state practice.
Finally, article 17 prohibits the forced movement of civilians. This
provision is linked somewhat tenuously to the humane treatment provision of common article 3 and much more clearly to article 49 of the
fourth Geneva Convention. On balance, I suggest again that this provision constitutes new law.
Protocol II, simply put, is a sadly flawed document; it is little more
than a grab bag. It has a rather peculiar scope of application that is
clearly more restrictive than that of common article 3. It is difficult to
picture a conflict in which Protocol II would be applied, unless one
makes some kind of a statement upon ratification, as Mr. Matheson
indicated this morning, whereby the state would apply Protocol II to all
common article 3 situations.
The second issue I wish to address is the extent to which article 1(4)
of Protocol I constitutes customary international law, thereby moving
certain conflicts from the non-international to the international conflict
category. The 1949 Geneva Conventions apply to traditional international or interstate conflicts. In contrast, article 1(4) expands the traditional definition of international armed conflicts to include "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and
alien occupation and against racist regimes." To say the least, this provision is pejorative and imprecise. It has been criticized, both during
and after the Diplomatic Conference, for politicizing the law of armed
conflict. Obviously, one can ask what exactly constitutes "a people,"
and, furthermore, what state would ever admit that it was fighting in
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favor of colonial domination, or alien occupation, or a racist regime. As
the Israeli representative pointed out when explaining his vote, article
1(4) has within it a built-in nonapplicability clause that would ensure
that no state would ever apply it voluntarily.
As way of background, the precursors of article 1(4) are a series of
United Nations General Assembly resolutions proclaiming that wars of
national liberation are to be treated as international conflicts, with the
consequence that freedom fighters are treated as lawful combatants.
The ICRC draft of Protocol I originally did not contain a provision
similar to article 1(4). A provision was subsequently inserted at the
1974 session of the Diplomatic Conference at the encouragement of
Third World and East bloc delegations, despite the vigorous objections
of Western delegations. Indeed, the first time there was a vote on this
particular provision virtually all of the Western countries voted against
or abstained on the vote, with the exception of Norway. Three years
later, however, in 1977, article 1(4) was accepted in Plenary Session by
a vote of 87 in favor, 1 opposed (Israel) and 11 abstentions (including
the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and Japan). 6 2 Prior
to the vote, the delegation from the United States attempted to have
the provision accepted by consensus.
This negotiating history, combined with the United Nations General
Assembly resolutions discussed previously, is used by some to argue
that article 1(4) is a new international legal norm that developed during the course of the Diplomatic Conference. The one author who relies
particularly on this argument, Professor Cassese, however, concedes
that the primary targets of the provision, Israel and South Africa, are
not bound by the new norm. 6 3 Israel is not bound because it persists in
its objections to the article. South Africa is not bound because it only
participated in the first session of the conference. Obviously, however,
one can question the utility of a norm of international law that does not
apply to the countries to which it was designed to apply and that
utilizes such pejorative language that no state would willingly apply it
within its own boundaries regardless of its application to these particular countries.
I am inclined to think that those who favor article 1(4) as part of
customary law read much more into the negotiating history than it can
legitimately bear. My lack of criticism does not necessarily mean en162. 6 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE, supra note 65,
CDDH/SR. 36, para. 58, at 41 (Thirty-sixth Plenary Meeting, May 23, 1977).
163. Cassese, The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the HumanitarianLaw of Armed
Conflict and Customary InternationalLaw, 3 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 55, 71 (1984).
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thusiastic acquiescence. Whether or not article 1(4) constitutes a codification of a developing norm depends on an assessment of state practice, the negotiating history, and the legal weight assigned to United
Nations General Assembly resolutions. If one is reluctant to assign
much weight to General Assembly resolutions, and I must concede that
I myself am reluctant to do so, then one is unlikely to conclude that
article 1(4) can bind non-parties to Protocol I.
REMARKS OF HANS-PETER GASSER'0 4

The search for customary law relative to the conduct of hostilities in
non-international armed conflict is especially important because little
treaty law exists on this subject. Prior to Protocol II, there was no set
of written laws applicable to non-international armed conflict resembling Hague law, and Protocol II is not yet generally accepted. Of
course, there is the institution of recognition of belligerency, which
would make the whole set of law that is applicable to international
armed conflict also applicable to those types of conflicts. For several
reasons, however, it is today improbable that any recognition of belligerency would occur again. We also know that the participants of the
1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference were unwilling to codify significant
parts of the law relating to the conduct of hostilities in non-international armed conflicts. That this reluctance to create new law in the
field will disappear in the foreseeable future, thereby making way for
new initiatives, is highly improbable.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to continue with a few words on the
difficulty of finding evidence of the existence of customary law in this
field. It is generally accepted that the existence of a rule of customary
law presupposes state practice combined with opinio juris sive necessitas, which is the requirement that governments consistently behave in
a certain way with the belief that this practice is rendered obligatory
by the existence of a rule of law. A particular question that arises in
the case of Protocol II is whether the practice and the opinio juris of
insurgent groups in a civil war carry any significance in the creation
and ascertainment of customary law. In any case, it is very difficult to
obtain evidence not only of state practice in armed conflicts, but also of
opinio juris relating to that practice. Military manuals and other instructions relative to the law of armed conflicts, however, may provide
some help for the ascertainment of customary law. In any case, they
164. Legal Advisor to the Director for General Affairs, International Committee of
the Red Cross.
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must be consulted.
In general, military manuals provide rules that governments consider
binding not only for their own armed forces, but also for those of the
other side. One may assume that by issuing instructions to its armed
forces, a government expresses its conviction that respect for those
rules is obligatory. We may, therefore, accept the hypothesis that the
parts of military manuals not devoted to treaty law are, as a rule, evidence of customary law.
Analysis of the manuals and instructions that were at our disposal in
Geneva revealed that none of them refer specifically to the conduct of
military operations in internal armed conflicts. The parts of the manuals that reflect Hague law are geared to international armed conflicts.
At the very most, manuals refer to common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Article 3 is limited to expressing the fundamental
rules for the treatment of persons who no longer take part or never took
part in the hostilities and thus are protected by Geneva law. This article, therefore, is not concerned with Hague law at all.
How does one understand this embarrassing silence concerning the
way military operations should be conducted in a civil war? Do governments believe that there are no rules in this field, and that there are no
international constraints on the conduct of military operations in civil
wars, or on the contrary, do they imply that their armed forces have to
observe the same standards in all kinds of military operations whether
they be in the context of an international or non-international armed
conflict? This question remains open.
A rather curious way of dealing with the issue is found in the 1956
United States Department of the Army Field Manual, which under the
title of "Customary Law" states in paragraph 11 (a), "[t]he customary
law of war becomes applicable to civil war upon recognition of the
rebels as belligerents.' ' 5 If you interpret this text literally, it means
that only upon the recognition of belligerency would any rule of customary law of war become applicable to the non-international armed
conflict. This interpretation is obviously incorrect.
Other military texts also serve as evidence of the existence of customary law, especially in non-international armed conflicts. The first
important category of such texts are codes of conduct. One example is
the operational code of conduct for the Nigerian Army that the Federal
Government of Nigeria issued in July 1967. This instruction was
drafted for the civil war arising out of the secession of the Biafra prov165. U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE para. 11(a), at 9 (1956 & Supp. 1976) [hereinafter 1956 FIELD MANUAL 27-10].
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ince and includes several provisions relating to the conduct of hostilities
which take the form of commands to the members of the armed forces.
It seems to be a fair assumption that the Nigerian government acted
with the expectation that the insurgent side would follow and respect
the same rules. The issuance of the code was not merely an internal
action of one side in the civil war. This code is, therefore, an interesting
example of a source which must also be consulted when looking for
customary law.
There are other texts of this kind. For instance, in 1947, Mao Tse
Tung issued a proclamation to his armed forces commanding them to
respect some fundamental humanitarian rules. The government of El
Salvador as well has recently put out such a code of conduct for its
armed forces, and even the insurgent democratic forces of Nicaragua
have drafted a code and given it to their soldiers in the field. All of this
material either can help us find already existing customary law or can
add to the formation of customary law in this domain.
We find evidence of customary law in the field on another level as
well. Indeed, the United Nations General Assembly adopted in 1968
Resolution 2444 by consensus.166 Under the title of "Respect for
Human Rights in Armed Conflicts," that resolution states three basic
principles "for observance by all governmental and other authorities
responsible for action in armed conflicts"' 67 without qualifying which
type of armed conflict these principles were meant to apply. The resolution further states the proposition that "the right of parties to a conflict
regarding means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited"108, and goes on
to reaffirm both the prohibition on attack of civilians and the distinction to be made between civilians and military objectives."0 9 It is not
the purpose of this expos6 to explore deeply the legal significance of the
General Assembly resolutions, but it can be said without hesitation that
this resolution expresses customary law. It is also of some interest to
see that in 1956, the ICRC issued its Draft Rules for the Limitation of
Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Times of War.' The
166. Final Act of the United Nations International Conference on Human Rights,
Res. XXIII of May 12, 1968, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 32/41, U.N. Sales No. E.68.XIV.2
(1968), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICrs 197-98 (D. Schindler & J. Toman 2d rev. ed. 1981) [hereinafter THE LAWS OF ARMED CoNFLIcrs]; G.A. Res. 2444,
23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 50-51, U.N. Doc. A/7433 (1968) [hereinafter G.A.
Res. 2444].
167. G.A. Res. 2444, supra note 166.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. These draft rules are explained in Draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949. DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, supra note 123; see also INT'L CO.M. OF THE RED
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ICRC expressly recommended that these rules should be applicable to
both international and non-international armed conflicts.
Mr. Chairman, I will now review the law of non-international armed
conflict and briefly give my opinion as to which provisions thereof can
be properly considered customary law. I will not confine myself to the
written law of Protocol II. I think the first rule to be considered is also
the basic rule of the law of war for internal conflicts: the proposition
that the right to choose methods and means of warfare is not unlimited.
General Assembly Resolution 2444 is good evidence of its legal value.
We can even say that without this rule no law of war would exist.
It can also be argued that the Hague rule that prohibits the use of
arms, projectiles, materials, or methods of warfare that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is customary law. It is, however,
doubtful whether there are any specific rules of customary law that
make the general principles operational.
The prohibition contained in Protocol II against ordering that there
shall be no survivors is also part of customary law. Interestingly, this
rule is the only one based on Hague law that survived the Diplomatic
Conference. A conviction that this was already customary, binding law
must have existed among the participants in the Conference. Another
rule in the same context is the prohibition against attacking persons
who have surrendered and who are recognized as hors de combat. This
rule is one of those basic rules which belong to jus cogens.
The prohibition against resorting to perfidious means in warfare is
not contained in Protocol II. Protocol II is, therefore, no evidence for
the existence of such a prohibition as part of customary law. Can we
imagine, however, that it should be considered acceptable to fight with
perfidious means in an internal war, whereas perfidy is prohibited in
international armed conflict? Arguably not. It is, however, beyond any
doubt that the rule prohibiting perfidious use of the protective emblems
of the Red Cross or Red Crescent is of customary law character.
Experience shows that these emblems are fairly well respected, also
in non-international armed conflicts. Their potential has never been
contested as a matter of principle. One can assume that the obligation
to respect the emblems and the concomitant prohibition of its abuse are
both parts of customary law.
The general rule prohibiting the attack of the civilian population is
also of a customary law character. Again, Resolution 2444 seems to be
sufficient evidence of this proposition. I must, however, agree with
CROSS, DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF AUGUST

1949: COMMENTARY (1973) (commenting on the draft Additional Protocols).
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Commander Fenrick that those rules which specify the general prohibition are probably not customary law.
One rule that Commander Fenrick did not address is article 18, concerning relief operations. Is there an obligation based on customary law
to accept a relief operation in favor of the civilian population in general
or in favor of some especially vulnerable groups, such as the sick or
wounded, women, children, and elderly? The tough negotiations at the
Diplomatic Conference on this subject suggest that the answer to this
question is not self-evident.17 1 Indeed, the rule adopted by the Conference in article 18, paragraph 2 states that the obligation to organize a
relief operation is "subject to the consent of the High Contracting
party concerned."
In its recent judgment on the merits of the ParamilitaryActivities
case, the International Court of Justice said, "There can be no doubt
that the provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces in
another country, whatever their political affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded as unlawful intervention, or as in any other way contrary to international law. '17 2 This interpretation is a somewhat broad
statement of the law. The experience of the ICRC with its own relief
actions shows, however, that in practice governments and insurgents do
accept such relief actions. Furthermore, governments usually do not object to relief operations in favor of civilians in rebel-held territory.
There is, therefore, considerable state practice relating to the acceptance by governments, and also by insurgents, of relief operations on
behalf of the needy populations undertaken according to the criteria of
the ICRC. It is not clear, however, whether governments feel obliged to
comply owing to a rule of international law or for other considerations.
Mr. Chairman, I have come to the conclusion that there is quite a
considerable body of customary law in our field. There may be difficulties in proving the existence of a rule, or of its content, but that does
not mean that the rule does not exist.
REMARKS OF PROFESSOR WALDEMAR SOLF

I am very encouraged to hear all of these ideas advocating the view
that customary international law does apply to non-international armed
conflicts, that at least common article 3 is customary international law,
and also that a good part of the law of the Hague, at least in principle,
171. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977, supra
note 45, at 805-09.
172. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 242 (Merits Judgment of June 27).
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is customary international law. I do not wish to quarrel with that.
I also want to state that if these questions had been posed at Columbia University Law School in 1887, the response would have been that
although Professor Lieber drafted the instructions for use in the United
States Civil War, the instructions apply to international armed conflicts
as well. 73 Some might disagree, however, and argue that the Lieber
Code only applies to recognized belligerence. The holding of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Prize Cases 74 followed the
latter view, although Professor Lieber himself never did. Professor
Lieber wrote a very comprehensive code for the conduct of war, including among other things, the conduct of hostilities and the use of starvation as a legal method for inducing surrender. Professor Lieber, of
course, wrote his code for the respective governments of the United
States armies then engaged in a civil war.
Near the end of the Lieber Code, however, there are a few instructions, also referred to briefly in common article 3, that the application
of these principles does not change the legal character of the parties to
the conflict. For example, they still remain amenable to treason law. As
a pragmatic suggestion, Professor Lieber does not rely on foreign
states' recognition of the belligerency or the independence of the belligerency or any other recognized legal status for justification of the status
of the rebels. Professor Lieber alternatively suggests that the ultimate
decision is that of victory in the battlefield. This brings to mind a previous pragmatic gentleman by the name of Harrington, writing in about
1607, who said treason never prospers.", What is the reason? If it
prospers, none dare to call it treason.
I think we owe it to Professor Reisman and others who made the
point that no matter what we professors, academics, and diplomats say,
it is governments that really make international law, regardless of
whether you call it state practice or state nonpractice. I wish to remind
everybody working in this area, that we ought to consider what the
governments really had in mind while gathered in Geneva for four
years writing the Protocols.
First of all, they took the position that there was no custom and that
nothing you could call the law of nations or international law had any
relevance whatsoever to non-international armed conflicts. Their agree173. U.S. DEP'T OF WAR, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARMIES OF
THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD, GENERAL ORDERS No. 100 (1863) (Lieber Instructions) [hereinafter Lieber Instructions], reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS,
supra note 166, at 3.

174.
175.

The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
J. HARRINGTON, EPIGRAMS, 168 Bk. IV, Ep. 259 (Scholar Press ed. 1970).
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ments rather pointedly upheld this belief. They inserted a de Martens
Clause into their preamble." 6 Every comprehensive international treaty
on humanitarian law since 1899 has had a de Martens Clause. Professor Theodore de Martens of the Russian delegation at the Brussels
Conference of 1874 proposed such a clause to assuage the liberation
movements of that day, namely the small countries, who were unhappy
because there was no explicit provision giving combatant status and
prisoner of war entitlement to resistance movements, guerrillas, and
partisans.
The small countries were able to delete from the drafts proposed by
the major powers any explicit reference to the effect that it is a violation of international law for individuals to engage in combat activities
without distinguishing themselves, without carrying their arms openly,
by being a part-time combatant, or by carrying out a levee en masse in
occupied territory. The original draft made it a violation of international law for partisans or guerrillas to do any of these things. The
small countries argued that only- a few circumstances exist when these
rules would be applicable, but the large powers resisted. Professor de
Martens finally came up with a compromise, which became the clause
bearing his name. The de Martens Clause provides that in cases not
covered by the articles as to who is a privileged combatant, the population and the combatants remain either under the protection of the government or the rules of law of nations as they were derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and the dictates of
public conscience. If anybody had asked Professor de Martens what he
meant by that, I am sure he would have responded that all of these
established customs have an influence in making binding international
law, but that they must be accepted in the practice of the states. He
might have even mentioned opinio juris.
This formula appears in all of the Geneva Conventions and in Protocol I. The drafters of Protocol II, however, pointedly omit the rules of
international law derived from established custom. The Conference
participants apparently believed that there were no rules of international law in this field, and that there were merely principles of humanity and dictates of public conscience. The latter could perhaps be
equated to some sort of emerging customary international law.
Of course, the Diplomatic Conference was wrong, because all of us,
as well as the International Court of Justice, agree that common article
3, which deals with protection of persons who are not engaged in the
conflict but who are in the power of a party to the conflict, is custom176.

Protocol II, supra note 4, preamble.
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ary international law. In fact, we consider it jus cogens. Hague law,
however, is contained in articles 13 through 18 of Protocol II, primarily
in the form of general principles. Protocol II contains little in the way
of actual rules, except for some oddities which I can explain on another
occasion. For example, article 13, which deals with the immunity of the
civilian population from direct attack and provides that civilians who
participate in hostilities lose their protection, duplicates article 51,
paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Protocol I almost verbatim. There is one
difference, however, in that article 51 (Protocol I) contains a provision
stating that these rules are additional to other applicable rules of international law that the drafters of article 13 (Protocol II) deliberately
omitted. The participants at the Conference said that they deliberately
omitted it because as far as they were concerned the only conventional
law on the subject was common article 3.177 I do not know why they
forgot article 19 of the Hague Cultural Convention.178 They did remember it later.
The drafters argued that common article 3 has no relevance to the
subject of the conduct of hostilities. They reasoned that common article
3 cannot be read as being broader in scope than the Geneva Conventions, except to the extent that the Geneva Conventions deal with protection of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked. Common article 3 does
not deal with either battles or bombardments of areas under the control
of adverse parties.
There is a complete omission of the obligation to respect and ensure
respect of the laws of war in Protocol II. Many of us make a great deal
out of this obligation. I, however, do not think this obligation adds a
thing to pacta sunt servanda which I think we all agree is a binding
principle in the maxims of international law.
In conclusion, my caveat is not intended to discourage efforts to identify emerging and settled general international law in this area. Rather,
I only suggest that while we are in the process of doing this we should
at least contemplate what effect, if any, the express provisions of the
report of the Diplomatic Conference have on certain signals within the
text of Protocol II.
177. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977, supra note
45, at 1451.
178. The Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, art. 19, 249 U.N.T.S. 215, 240-88.
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17
REMARKS OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL BURRUS CARNAHAN 1

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are by statute the primary military advisors
to the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the National Security
Council. It was as a Joint Chiefs of Staff officer that I became involved
with Protocols I and II. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked to give
their military advice on whether or not the United States should ratify
Protocols I and II. My role as a Joint Chiefs of Staff officer is similar
to that of a military law clerk because the Joint Chiefs of Staff are a
collegial body similar to the Supreme Court or the International Court
of Justice. The Chiefs of Staff of the four armed forces of the United
States reach their decisions as a group. The staff officer's job is to come
up with a draft opinion like a law clerk, to circulate it among the justices, or in this case among the Generals and their subordinates, and to
assume that they have the votes of the four services.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended against ratification of Protocol I, but did not object to the ratification of Protocol II. I think we had
no objection to the ratification of Protocol II because we could not
think of any possible way that it would apply to us. That is not really
true, of course, as there is an additional situation in which Protocol II
might be applied beside the unlikely possibility of civil war breaking
out again. General Pearle faced such a situation in the mid-1960s, in
which the United States Armed Forces were in some way aiding the
government of a state facing an insurgency or an internal armed
conflict.
Naturally, the question arose as to the extent to which our armed
forces, aiding a state government in that type of situation, are bound by
Protocol II. We looked to the text of Protocol II, article 1 and found
that it was ambiguous. It states that the Protocol applies to armed conflicts between the armed forces of a government and other armed
forces. It, however, does not say "only" between those two armed
forces. The text of the Protocol itself, therefore, leaves open a "grey
area" between clearly an international armed conflict between states
and clearly an internal armed conflict. In this grey area lies the situation in which you have the regular armed forces of another state participating in what otherwise would be a purely internal armed conflict.
We also concluded that a political decision would determine whether
Protocol II would bind the United States Armed Forces in such a situation. The president would have to decide this if the armed forces were
179. Lieutenant Colonel, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States
Air Force.
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sent into an area.
The next question to arise was whether the United States could live
with Protocol II rules. The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that there was
no military objection to ratification of Protocol II. Let me expand on
this. In doing so, however, I want to stress that throughout this I am
speaking purely in my private capacity. I know there are other lawyers
in the armed forces who are going to disagree with what I am going to
say from this point on.
I personally believe that there is a substantial likelihood that in the
future, situations will arise in which Protocol II will be applied in internal armed conflicts involving intervention by an outside armed force.
You would either have to consider that situation to remain an internal
armed conflict, governed by Protocol II, or consider it to be an international armed conflict, which would fall under Protocol I. I think that
combatants faced with a situation in which they could choose to conduct their operations either under Protocol I or Protocol II are more
likely to choose Protocol II. Therefore, I think we may very well have a
situation where Protocol II may form the basis for new customary law
governing this type of "grey area" situation. I think it is going to be an
attractive option in such situations. This, I emphasize once again, is
purely my own opinion.
I, however, would add one caveat to that. I have real doubts as to the
viability of article 15 of Protocol II. That article provides protection to
dams, dikes, and certain nuclear power stations. This type of rule may
well make more sense in a civil war situation than it does in an international armed conflict because often in civil war, both parties have an
interest in preserving the economic infrastructure of the country that
they are both fighting to control. Hence, article 15 may have a better
chance of application in an internal armed conflict than it would in an
international armed conflict. Even so, I cannot believe that if the conflict becomes an intense conflict, article 15 is going to survive for very
long. The items listed in that article are traditionally thought of as legitimate military targets in wartime. I suspect that article 15 is a house
of cards that will be blown over by the first few violations in an internal
armed conflict.
I just wanted to try to touch briefly on the grey area between purely
internal armed conflict and purely international armed conflict and indicate that, perhaps because of my pessimism on the future of Protocol
I, I am guardedly optimistic that Protocol II may well form the basis of
a new customary law both for internal armed conflicts and perhaps for
this grey area between internal and international armed conflict.
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DISCUSSION

Dean BOND disagreed that Protocol II has a narrower scope of application than common article 3 because common article 3 is scarcely selfdefining in terms of the circumstances where it might reasonably apply.
Dean BOND explained that the criteria suggested in Protocol II for its
application are the same criteria that one would most likely use in deciding whether common article 3 applied. He did not disagree that
some provisions of Protocol II are consistent with customary international law applicable to non-international conflict, but said it was
merely a coincidence. He indicated that those provisions are not customary international law simply because they are found in Protocol II;
they are customary international law for reasons independent of Protocol II. He noted that it is wrong to cite the Protocols as evidence that
those particular provisions are customary international law.
Another participant strongly agreed with Commander Fenrick on the
scope of Protocol II. He viewed it as somewhat narrower in scope than
common article 3 largely because Protocol II requires some sort of control over territory. He likened it to recognition of belligerent status
under the old style of law.
This participant also commented on the almost reverential references
to manuals in the presentations. He was involved in drafting manuals,
and to a considerable extent, these manuals merely represent one person's point of view regarding the international law of war that hopefully other people will support.
This participant conceded that there is an effort to make manuals as
authoritative as possible. He warned, however, that they should not become classified as stating the law as such. It was his experience that a
number of scholars tend to look to these manuals as almost binding
regulations, although most of the manuals have an explicit provision
close to the beginning stating that the manual is actually only an interpretation of the international law of war. Such provisions typically
state that the manuals are as accurate as possible in their interpretation, but if wrong, the reader should not view the manual as any kind
of binding regulation.
This participant also stressed the importance of history in this field.
He said that there are not many studies of state practice in internal
armed conflicts or in international armed conflicts to determine the actual practice of states. This participant pointed out that any attempt to
state the law abstracted from state practice often appears unrealistic to
the people who actually apply the law.
Mr. GASSER defended Protocol II. He said that everyone would like
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to produce the perfect text of laws applicable to internal armed conflict.
What we have now, he pointed out, is not perfect but it is an unacceptable compromise between military and security considerations on the
one hand and humanitarian concerns on the other. That text has the
advantage of being acceptable to Third World countries although they
initially rejected the idea of such a Protocol. Mr. GASSER also noted
that the new law is more complex than simply having two circles, one
containing customary law and the other representing written law imposed by the "automatic majority." Much of Protocol II, for example,
was made against the initial wish of this "automatic voting majority."
Mr. GASSER also suggested that perhaps Protocol II should not be
considered that bad because a stronger text would probably remain unacceptable to many governments. He added that Protocol II may be a
suitable basis for a further development of international humanitarian
law.
With regard to the applicability of Protocol II, Mr. GASSER said
there was little doubt that its scope is narrower than the scope of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. He stated that the authors of
the ICRC Commentaries to the Convention as well as many other experts would reject the contention that the control of territory is a criteria for the applicability of article 3. It is a new criteria that makes the
scope of application of Protocol II narrower than that of article 3.
Lieutenant Colonel CARNAHAN returned to the observation made
earlier that military manuals tend not to give much guidance for conduct in internal conflicts or civil wars. Lieutenant Colonel CARNAHAN
suggested that this silence results from guidance that is difficult to formulate, thereby causing one of the problems associated with military
manuals. As with any other government document, often the hard
questions tend to remain unanswered in military manuals. A consensus
on such policies within that agency is necessary, unless every particular
item is sent to the head of the agency for approval. If this method were
followed, Lieutenant Colonel CARNAHAN suggested, it would not survive for a long time in any bureaucracy. Instead, a consensus within the
agency regarding what the document will say is needed. If two different
agency bureaus are at loggerheads over a rule, Lieutenant Colonel
CARNAHAN suggested the natural solution is simply to leave out any
mention of that problem. He thus concluded that one problem with
government manuals is that they tend to deal only with clear-cut, easy
cases.
Lieutenant Colonel CARNAHAN then commented on the problem of
translating the information provided in these manuals into combat behavior. He said people often forget that the problem with the law of
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war is not convincing law professors, diplomats, or judges sitting with
the International Court of Justice, but rather convincing soldiers that
they should behave in a certain way. He gave the example that if one
told an infantry rifle platoon leader that the right to injure the enemy is
not unlimited, the infantry leader would probably give an unprintable
reaction.
Lieutenant Colonel CARNAHAN said he worked for an army chemical
corps officer, not a lawyer, and remarked that one can imagine what
the officer thinks of the law of war. In the view of many people, the law
of war does not recognize the existence of the profession of his boss.
The officer's boss was a navy commodore who came from the submarine service. He remembers the law of war during the World Wars as
requiring submarines to surface, signal a merchant ship to lower its
lifeboats, sink the merchant ship with naval shellfire, and then tow the
lifeboats to safety. Lieutenant Colonel CARNAHAN thus cautioned that
even though the rules are very humane and agreeable with fellow diplomats, they must be credible for soldiers to follow them.
Mr. SURBECK 1 80 took exception to Dean Bond's assertion that Protocol II is unrealistic. First, arguably one could apply his assertion to
practically all the laws of war. In examining the history of the laws of
war, the Hague law of war, and the Geneva Conventions all faced at
one time a fair degree of suspicion if not outright skepticism. He
pointed out that despite this history, these laws survived and proved
their validity after enough time had elapsed.
Mr. GASSER disagreed with Dean Bond also on another ground. Using El Salvador as an example, he noted that Protocol II has reached a
fair degree of implementation. Complete respect of the rules is rarely
achieved, but both sides appeared to put these provisions into practice.
Mr. SURBECK added that the ICRC dedicates a great deal of time
teaching and convincing the belligerents on both sides of a conflict that
these provisions are valid and have already proven extremely useful.
Dean BoND replied that he would not dispute that the existence of
Protocol II and other kinds of humanitarian law enables outside
groups, such as the International Red Cross and foreign governments,
to pressure combatants into complying with those provisions. Indeed, he
thought that this pressure is one of the most useful functions that such
documents perform. He noted, however, that it is one thing for combatants to acquiesce to particular kinds of conduct because they are required to do so, but quite another to acquiesce for reasons independent
of those beliefs. Dean BoND said such acquiescence did not prove that
180. Delegate, International Committee of the Red Cross, New York.
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these rules are recognized as binding law because all good law reflects
self-interest and in turn ensures its respect. In those instances, one
should demonstrate that such conduct is the result of the recognition of
customary international law. He indicated that at least in the foreseeable future, more violations than compliance will occur as a result of
the more detailed provisions of Protocol II.
Professor REISMAN commented that available army manuals and the
rules of engagement are useful sources for the identification of customary expectations, although one should distinguish these sources from
actual practice. When we talk about the law, Professor REISMAN said,
we are not really describing actual behavior. Rather, we are describing
expectations of demanded behavior. A discrepancy may arise between
that demand and actual practice. Effectiveness is needed to sustain
those legal expectations so that laws continue to influence actual practice. The manuals are meant to instruct troops, and presumably, those
troops internalize them as criteria for determining whether or not to
comply with some "code."
Dean BOND recognized that manuals are very good indicators of the
views of the right behavior of a particular military institution. A comparison of internal instructions from a wide variety of different military
institutions is useful. He indicated that if the scholar finds much overlap, it permits him to make certain inferences about the existence of
customary law. This approach seemed more reliable to Dean BOND
than deriving logical inferences from the code of the Geneva Conventions to develop something new. He stressed that if manuals are available to be studied, they can be useful. He also indicated that if there is
an interest in the actual law concerning conflict, if possible, one should
examine the rules of engagement to expedite the discovery of customary law.
Dean BOND pointed out that although it is difficult to obtain such
manuals, they would help scholars define customary law. He referred
back to Lieutenant Colonel Carnahan's primary point that scholars
want to gain an insight into the expectations of the people who actually
make these critical decisions in the field, so these scholars can influence
or shape them. Dean BOND indicated that if the manuals are made
available, he would know what the rules are, so he could best advise
others. For these reasons, he concluded, this sort of material is an important source.
Professor ALMOND said that he served for part of the period on the
United States delegation to the negotiations for the Protocols. He asked
Mr. Gasser to try to refresh his memory, as to whether articles 13, 14,
and 15 of Protocol II come from Hague law or Protocol I. Those arti-
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des, as they appear in Protocol II, have no provision with respect to
reprisals although those that appear in Protocol I do. There is no clear
showing why this distinction was made. Mr. ALMOND asked Mr. Gasser to refresh his memory as to why the Conference did not cover reprisals in Protocol II. Mr. GASSER could not directly recollect why reprisals were not covered in Protocol II, but recalled that every reference to
reprisals or retaliation was stricken from the Protocol II draft in the
final negotiating rounds of the Conference. He also recalled that the
delegations from Pakistan, India, and Iraq were opposed to them.
Mr. BRUNO ZIMMERMANN 1" 8' added that while he had not directly
participated in the debates of the Committee that drafted Protocol II
during the Diplomatic Conference, he understood there were two main
reasons for not including any mention of reprisals in Protocol II. First,
reprisals were deemed to belong exclusively to disputes between states,
there being no possibility for entities other than states to use that machinery. Mr. ZIMMERMANN noted that during a long discussion, some
delegations tried other possible names for this concept such as "measures similar to reprisals" and even a complex formula that would read,
"the parties shall respect this Protocol in all circumstances, whatever
violations they may pretend the other party has committed." Second,
he indicated that the staff of the ICRC, whether in relation with common article 3 or with Protocol II, has always pretended that there was
no escape from those rules, through reprisals or other means, unless
specifically foreseen in the text of the rule itself. Thus, every proposed,
alternative language to the term "reprisal" failed in Protocol II.
Professor SOLF interjected that every reference to the term "parties"
was carefully deleted in Protocol II. Inferentially, he said, article I recognizes "parties" when it describes the threshold, but the word "party"
was excised automatically from the rest of the text. This deletion occurred because Mr. Justice Hussein of Pakistan and Mr. Alfoluci of
Iraq did not want to indicate in any way that they were parties to a
non-international armed conflict for fear that it would raise the stature
of the rebels in their respective domains.
Professor MERON returned to Professor Reisman's point that in situations of armed conflict, whether international or internal, it is extremely difficult to collect credible evidence of state practice. Not only
do violations abound both types of situations, but access to the theatre
of operations is very limited, and the collection of reliable, credible
facts is often defeated. Given the situation, Professor MERON said that
181. Legal Advisor, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva,
Switzerland.
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manuals of military rules of engagement provide the best evidence of
state practice in the long-run. He stressed that individuals should look
for concrete evidence of state practice in this area.
Professor MERON'S second point concerned the distillation from Protocol II of customary law. Protocol II deals primarily with evidence of
either human rights or the law of Geneva. He found that very few provisions in Protocol II are actually rooted in Hague law. Nevertheless,
he noted that the efforts of Mr. Gasser and others to extrapolate from
the existing provisions some prohibitions derived from Hague law are
worthwhile.
Professor MERON invited the group to address the relevance of the
Hague law to Protocol II situations. As an example, Professor MERON
referred to an Appendix Professor Robert Goldman wrote that appeared in an Americas Watch report entitled Land Mines in El Salvador and Nicaragua:The Civilian Victims. 82 Nicaragua has not ratified
Protocol II, although El Salvador has. Professor MERON pointed out
that in his Appendix, Professor Goldman states that the Land Mines
Protocol 183 is not applicable because it is limited to international conflicts. Nevertheless, the customary international law of the Hague Conventions is applicable to non-international armed conflicts; therefore,
principles such as the principle of distinction, the principle of immunity
of civilian populations, and perhaps, the principle of avoiding unnecessary suffering apply.
Professor MERON then asked the panel to address the relevance of
the applicability of the Hague principles without addressing their abstractions. He added that it is the translation of the specific rules in
practice and not the high level of abstraction that is causing problems.
Commander FENRICK indicated that it is difficult to establish whether
much or any of the Hague law applies to internal armed conflicts. The
only way he could recognize the Hague law applying to such conflicts is
through an examination of article 3 and an attempt to expand the humane treatment aspect of that article to claim that some of the Hague
law is included under this analysis. It is certainly an imaginative approach, Commander FENRICK noted, because similar language used in
other parts of the Geneva Conventions clearly does not apply to the
182.

AMERICAS WATCH, LAND MINES IN EL SALVADOR AND NICARAGUA: THE CI-

VILIAN VICTIMS

(1986).

183. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps,
and Other Devices (Protocol II), annexed to United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restriction of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons: Final Act, app. C,
opened for signature Apr. 10, 1981, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 95/15 (1980), reprinted in
19 I.L.M. 1523, 1529 (1980) [hereinafter Land Mines Protocol].
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conduct of hostilities. The Geneva Conventions are much more closely
restricted to people in some sort of custody. Thus, Commander
FENRICK determined that the role of Hague law in internal conflicts
was modest.
Commander FENRICK then refocused the discussion to the fact that
there are only a few modern war manuals. When the Canadians began
drafting their war manuals for the Canadian Armed Forces, they wrote
letters to many countries in an attempt to obtain copies of their manuals. Several countries replied in such a way that the uncertainty of the
existence of the Geneva Conventions became obvious. Canada received
one letter from a country that Commander FENRICK euphemistically
described as one of the large Eastern industrial competitors of the
United States that made reference to the Hague Conventions of 1907.
The response, however, did not mention the Geneva Conventions of
1949. The only countries that he knew to have well-developed manual
programs were the Federal Republic of Germany and the United
States. Commander FENRICK could not think of any country where the
desk officers who are responsible for law of war matters would consider
their manuals as accurate reflections of the current state of the law.
Professor GROSSMAN then turned the discussion to the problem of the
expectations coming from various actors, such as the military, the civilian population, and the victims. He said that the victims can become
important actors, as shown in Argentina where some of the military
were subject to trials as well as judged and condemned because they
were involved in the disappearances of victims.
If we search for different levels of expectations of behavior from actors, Professor GROSSMAN said, it is very important to identify the manner used to find evidence of those practices. Professor GROSSMAN suggested that such evidence is not found exclusively in manuals the
armies distribute, but in the expectations of behavior that the civilian
population holds as well. He raised another issue for debate when he
asked the extent to which the norms of customary international law,
coming from the law of human rights, are found applicable in noninternational armed conflicts.
Professor GROSSMAN mentioned particular principles embodied in
different conventions. The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,"" establishing conditions for a valid declaration of an emergency situation, stipulates that some rights are nonderogable and devel184. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/

6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
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ops criteria to derogate other rights. 185 Similarly, article 27 of the
American Convention on Human Rights18 6 and the European Convention on Human Rights18 7 provide for a special body of practice and
jurisprudence applicable to such situations. Professor GROSSMAN cited
as an example of a principle of customary international law the right to
be recognized as a person with certain rights and obligations before the
law. He further noted that disappearances that took place in numerous
countries stopped because of the tremendous international and domestic reaction. He indicated that these norms are potentially applicable to
non-international armed conflicts as well. Professor GROSSMAN concluded that state practice is heading in that direction.
Dean BOND distinguished general principles of law from customary
international law. He preferred to build on the theory not dealing with
customary international law, but rather seeking some common principles from among a whole series of documents. Some of these principles
are intended to deal with law of war situations, while others deal with
civil and emergency situations. Dean BOND pointed out that it is difficult to abstract principles from various documents because the principles tend to be very abstract and generalized. He noted that one can
never know with certainty whether the application of a principle in a
particular instance is always required or whether it is consistent with
that principle.
Professor OLIVER found Dean Bond's argument very interesting. He
remarked that although the general principles of law common to civilized nations are a source of international law, their application is limited by the scope of article 38 of the statute of the International Court
of Justice. Professor GROSSMAN interjected that in addition to such
general principles, very concrete rights exist, such as the right to be
recognized as a person, which is not merely a principle but an established right. Dean BOND replied that although he did not disagree with
Professor Grossman's theory, its implications in a concrete situation are
not as clear as the general proposition.
In examining the rules of the Hague law relating to the conduct of
hostilities in non-international armed conflict, Mr. GASSER indicated
that only a slight part of human rights law directly relates to that area
of law. He disagreed with Commander Fenrick's and Lieutenant Colo185. Id. arts. 4, 5.
186. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 27, O.A.S.T.S.
No. 36, O.A.S.O.R. OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65, rev. 1, corr. 2, reprinted in 9

I.L.M. 673 (1970).
187. European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S.
221.
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nel Carnahan's attempts to question the value of military manuals as
evidence of state practice. He added that such manuals are of great
importance in influencing the behavior of troops and also in indicating
to the opposing side in a conflict which rules the armed forces are
ready to respect. He remained convinced that not only the ICRC's efforts to disseminate such rules to the armed forces, but also its project
to create a model manual for armed forces are useful contributions to a
better respect of the humanitarian rules.
Mr. GASSER returned to Professor Meron's question of the applicability of Hague law to specific situations. For example, a party to a conflict may use antipersonnel mines to attack the civilian population. As
the attack on the civilian population is prohibited by customary law,
mines may of course not be used against civilians. Thus, Mr. GASSER
said, in such circumstances Hague law is relevant. He then raised the
question whether the Hague law rule prohibiting booby-traps and toys
containing explosive devices applies to international armed conflicts.
The Land Mines Protocol specifically prohibits the use of such devices
for international armed conflicts. 88 He asked if such horrible weapons
may nevertheless be used in non-international armed conflict, even
though the armed forces are the same and the civilians - the victims
- are also the same. He concluded that the resort to such perfidious
means is as illegal in non-international armed conflict as it is under the
law of international armed conflict.
Professor SOLF responded that if a specific law or any kind of general
international law applicable in non-international armed conflict exists,
it is still emerging. He said that the laws against the use of such things
as children's booby traps and explosive children's toys are probably in
the process of becoming norms. He, however, cautioned the other participants to be very careful not to generalize or claim that if the use of
a particular weapon is prohibited in an international armed conflict, it
is also prohibited in a non-international armed conflict. Professor SOLF
then referred to the use of riot control agents as an example. Ninety
percent of the states represented in the General Assembly at one time
indicated that they thought the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925189 prohibited the use of riot control agents, tear gas, and defoliants in wars. The
United States did not join in that resolution, but most states take that
position. Professor SOLF recognized that states should not be prohibited
188. Land Mines Protocol, supra note 183.
189. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 12, 1925, 26 US.T.
571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 65.
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from using riot control agents in situations of tension or disorder within
their state and in a non-international armed conflict. These tools, he
added, are the most humane type of weapon used to control those types
of situations. He emphasized that it is therefore dangerous to generalize about applying norms of international conflicts to non-international
conflicts.
Dean BOND then replied to Dr. Gasser's assumption that Protocol II
has a narrower scope of application than common article 3. He rejected
the idea that almost any type of internal disturbance is a non-international conflict that article 3 covers, and assumed most people would
also reject it. Many types of internal disturbances are simply not subject to anything resembling the law of war.
Dean BOND claimed that it was very difficult to imagine a situation
where a sovereign state would admit that a non-international conflict
within the purview of article 3 existed, unless the opposing party controlled some territory. He noted that as a practical matter, much of the
law of war requires the control of some territory for its implementation.
This suggested to him that the control of territory is an appropriate
criterion for determining whether article 3 applies as well as Protocol
II.
Professor ALMOND said this discussion suggested a kind of enigma
that also surfaced in a question he presented earlier concerning reprisals. Although Mr. Surbec's response was that the ICRC did not want
to deal with "parties" in this situation, Professor ALMOND indicated
that Protocol II is a supplement to common article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions and that article 3 indeed refers to the "parties." Thus, he
said, one must deal with the term "parties." Professor ALMOND stated
that the development of international law applicable to a situation
where a state is involved in something other than an international conflict will not occur, unless the leaders of a state are willing to recognize
that they are dealing with a "party" or the equivalent of a "party" in
such conflicts. Otherwise, he said, the state will find that these international laws bind them, but not their opponents.
Mr. GERALDSON concluded that most people engaging in the panel
discussion agreed that some provisions of Protocol II reflect customary
international law. Mr. BROCHES' 90 then offered a card the ICRC published, the Spanish language version of which he believed was in use in
El Salvador. The card reads as follows:

190.
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THE INTERNATIONAL LAWS FOR ALL COMBATANTS ARE:

1. All civilians, particularly women, children and aged people must be respected.
2. It is forbidden to attack persons, vehicles and installations which are protected
by the Red Cross sign. The Red Cross sign is reserved for:
- the wounded and the sick
- hospitals and ambulances
- doctors and nurses

- relief goods and transports of the Red Cross
- delegates of the Red Cross

3. It is forbidden to attack or mistreat:
- a wounded enemy combatant

- an enemy combatant who surrenders.
4. a. Prisoners must be respected. It is forbidden to kill, torture, or mistreat
them.
b. Wounded or sick prisoners must receive medical treatment.
c. If you are taken prisoner yourself, you have the right to the same
treatment.

Mr. GASSER said that this card is still in use. He said that the ICRC
also had a card for the Rhodesia Civil War that was similar to the
Nigerian Code of Conduct, which came from the Nigerian Federal
government under the influence of the ICRC. The use of these cards,
he concluded, is some possible evidence to show what the participants
in a conflict consider to be customary law in this field.
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATIVE TO THE
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES AND THE PROTECTION OF
THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT
The panel convened at 9:30 a.m., January 23, 1987, with Waldemar
Solf presiding as Moderator.
The Moderator, Professor SOLF, noted that states, not parties to the
Protocol must define customary international law for the conduct of
hostilities, and that this issue is of paramount importance in the United
States as well in light of the decision of the Reagan administration not
to submit Protocol I to the Senate for its advice and consent. He also
noted that a substantial body of both natural and customary law serves
as the basis of the law of armed conflict. He added that the rise of
massive citizen armies necessitated the codification of some of the rules
and the preparation of military manuals, so that soldiers might rapidly
learn the restraints that humanitarian law demanded. These codes were
based on the principles of military necessity, humanity, and to a lesser
extent, chivalry.
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REMARKS OF PROFESSOR WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN

The proper starting place to analyze the customary international law
of armed conflict is Francis Lieber's code of instructions for the army
during the American Civil War. This code, which President Lincoln
promulgated as General Orders No. 100, April 24, 1863,191 is considered an authoritative restatement of the principles of military necessity
and the customary law of war (jus in bello) that developed in the seventeenth century. The code did not simply set out rules and prohibitions, it had an underlying concept: "permissible violence. ' "2
The heart of the concept, the principle of military necessity, influenced all specific rules regarding the means and methods of warfare.
Lieber's definition of military necessity was, "Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in the necessity of those
measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and
1 93
which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war. 1
In other words, Lieber included two elements in this definition: utility
and legal permissibility. The means must be truly useful, and even if
they are useful by some calculation, they may not be used if the law of
war prohibits them. Lieber elaborated on this definition by giving specific examples of actions that military necessity permitted.
In his development of the concept of military necessity, Lieber emphasized the positive aspect of the principle. Actions that the belligerent takes are authorized or justified so long as they are not prohibited.
The Lieber approach was often copied and subsequently influenced
greatly many military manuals and conventions developed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The positive concept of authorized
actions was incorporated into United States military manuals until the
1956 manual,194 which perhaps with war crimes in mind, categorized
activities that are not military necessity and never returned to Lieber's
idea that we start with a notion of what the belligerent can properly do.
In his elaboration, Lieber included strictures that might be considered expressions of the principle of humanity. He reported, "Men who
take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on this
account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God.""9 5
This is a very interesting restatement of the "just war" concept of right
191.

Lieber Instructions, supra note 173, at 3.

192.

See 3 C.

HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND AP-
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193.
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intention. Even a "just" belligerent using generally proper means must
have the right intention.
Lieber continued his explanation of the concept of military necessity
by expressing principles usually associated with the principle of
humanity:
Military necessity does not admit of cruelty -

that is, the infliction of suffering

for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in
fight, nor of torture to extort confessions. It does not admit of the use of poison
in any way, nor of the wanton destruction of a district. It admits of deception,
but disclaims acts of perfidy; and, in general, military necessity does not include

any act of hostility which makes the return to peace unnecessarily difficult.,t

In my view, there is a constant interaction between the principles of
military necessity and humanity. This is a very subtle type of analysis.
It is not merely a type of cost effectiveness analysis. Rather, it incorporates the moral dimensions of the interaction of belligerents.
In the nineteenth century, concepts that formerly might have derived
from natural law principles were increasingly described as flowing from
the "principle of humanity." The principle of humanity was a secular,
higher, normative source of law associated with the idea of "civilization" and "progress." An explicit conventional reference to the principle of humanity is the concept prohibiting any means of war causing
"superfluous suffering," which was expressed in the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration.197 While the Declaration holds that "the only legitimate object which States should endeavor to accomplish during war is
to weaken the military force of the enemy," it concludes that "this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable"
and that "the employment 8of such arms would, therefore, be contrary
to the laws of humanity.""
The principle of humanity tends to waver between emphasizing the
proposition that states should avoid unnecessary damage and suffering,
which is simply a different way of stating the principle of military necessity, and emphasizing the proposition that certain means are inadmissible, such as poison, regardless of their putative military utility. If
the means cause superfluous suffering, there is something innately unacceptable about them.
196. Id. at 178-79.
197. Declaration Renouncing the Use in War of Certain Explosive Projectiles of
December 11, 1868 (Declaration of St. Petersburg), reprinted in I THE LAW OF WAR:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 192 (L. Friedman ed. 1972) [hereinafter THE LAW OF
WAR].

198.
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In my concept of military necessity, I combine the principles of military necessity and humanity by adding an element that qualifies
Lieber's definition of military necessity; therefore, I use the term "legitimate military necessity." Legitimate military necessity permits or authorizes all measures truly necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military ends provided that the laws of war and natural law
permit them. It was not sufficient to say that whatever was truly necessary could be done as long as it does not violate the law of war. At any
point, the law of war may not cover all the subjects that are important
in a war. Accordingly, the additional dimension of natural law should
be included. Natural law goes beyond the subject of the just war doctrine and includes concepts of human rights. Natural law was out of
fashion in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, but it
was replaced by the concept of "humanity." I see the principle of legitimate military necessity as having three components: utility, legal permissibility, and some kind of higher law or resource that can be consulted when there is a gap in the law. These gaps occur frequently
because of technological changes and the differences in the character of
conflicts.
The developing conventional law of war in the de Martens Clause in
the Preambles to the 1899 Hague Convention No. III" and the 1907
Hague Convention No. IV200 significantly reflects the principle of humanity. The 1907 Hague Convention No. IV states that the High Contracting Parties "in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by
them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection
and rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the
usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity,
and the dictates of public conscience." 20 1 All four of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and most of the conventions in the law of international
conflict since then contain comparable references to the "laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience. "202 Additionally, a
number of specific provisions in the regulations of the 1899 and 1907
Conventions reflect the principle of humanity. For example, article
23(a) prohibits poison and poisoned weapons, article 23(b) disallows
199.
200.
201.

Hague Convention No. II of July 29, 1899, supra note 71.
Hague Convention No. IV of October 18, 1907, supra note 71.
Id. preamble.

202. See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 1, para. 2; Protocol II, supra note 4,
preamble; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpil-

ing of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction, Apr.

10, 1972, preamble, 26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062; Land Mines Protocol, supra
note 183, preamble.
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"treacherous killing," article 23(c) and (d) prevents denial of quarter,
and article 23(e) prohibits a nation from employing "arms, projectiles
or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering." '
In addition to serving as the basic principle of the customary law of
war, the term "military necessity" is used in the conventional law of
war as an exceptional justification for deviation from the law or as an
elastic clause. Article 23(g) of the regulations of the 1899 and 1907
Hague Conventions prohibiting the destruction or seizure of the enemy's property "unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war""" is the best known of these elastic
clauses.205 Another example is article 26, wherein the officer in command of an attacking force must warn the authorities of an inhabited
area before commencing bombardment, "except in cases of assault." 206
A third concept of military necessity was developed primarily by
German military writers, political theorists, and international law publicists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The so
called Kriegsraison doctrine held that Kriegsraison geht vor
Kriegsmanier (military necessity takes precedence over the law). The
underlying concept of the Kriegsraisondoctrine was an unlimited version of raison d'etat, producing the dictum that Not kennt kein Gebot
(necessity knows no law).
During the period of its formulation, theorists could defend this doctrine on the ground that the law of war was only customary and not
clear and binding. The Kriegsraison doctrine, however, was perpetuated after the codification of the customary law of war in the 1899 and
1907 Hague Conventions and applied repeatedly by the Germans in
World War I. English and French publicists attacked the Kriegsraison
doctrine prior to and during the First World War. American publicists,
on the other hand, attacked the doctrine during and after the war.
What could be called an "allied" view reiterated Lieber's version of the
rule: the laws of war limit military necessity. The "allied" view, however, failed to acknowledge that the existing customary and conven203.

See Hague Convention No. II of July 29, 1899, supra note 71, art. 23(e);

Hague Convention No. IV of October 18, 1907, supra note 71, art. 23(e).
204. See Hague Convention No. II of July 29, 1899, supra note 71, art. 23(g);
Hague Convention No. IV of October 18, 1907, supra note 71, art. 23(g).

205. Many war crime cases interpret article 23(g), including, for example, charges
of unjustified wanton destruction in the Second World War. Two of the best known
cases are United States v. von Leeb (The High Command Case), reprinted in TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NURENBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS vol. 10, at I1,322, vol. 11, at 3-756 (1950-1951), and United States v. List (The Hostage Case),
reprinted in id. vol. 11, at 759-1319 (1950).
206. See Hague Convention No. II of July 29, 1899, supra note 71, art. 26; Hague
Convention No. IV of October 18, 1907, supra note 71, art. 26.
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tional law of war did not regulate adequately many new means of total
war, such as submarine warfare, aerial warfare, and chemical warfare.
Thus, to say that the Allies adhered to the laws of war still left open
the question of their practices with respect to the means and methods
of warfare that the laws of war did not adequately regulate. The need
for the supplementary principle of humanity or natural law was evident. This was the case, a fortiori, in World War II.
The two basic principles of the customary law of war, according to
the "just war" doctrine, 07 are proportionality and discrimination, or
noncombatant immunity. The principle of proportion is central to the
principle of legitimate military necessity. The importance of the principle of discrimination or noncombatant immunity is not so clear. Thus,
the 1940 version of the United States Department of War Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare,0 8 lists three basic principles of the
law of war: military necessity, humanity, and chivalry. The manual describes the principle of humanity as "prohibiting employment of any
such kind or degree of violence as is not actually necessary for the purpose of the war. ' 20 9 This is a negative restatement of the principle
under military necessity that military measures be truly necessary for
the purposes of the war. The manual does not state explicitly the principle of discrimination or noncombatant immunity. The 1956 version of
Field Manual 27-10,210 which is still in force, departs from the traditional United States format of listing the principles of the laws of war
and emphasizes that military necessity is not a justification for violating the laws of war.2 '
It should be noted that the literature on the law of war following
both World Wars I and II was inclined to abandon hope on the principle of discrimination and noncombatant immunity due to the near-universal violation of the principle, notably in aerial bombardments. The
United States Air Force resurrected the principle of discrimination or
noncombatant immunity in the pamphlet International Law - The
Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations,112 under the category
of the principle of humanity. The pamphlet states that in addition to
forbidding the infliction of "suffering, injury or destruction not actually
207. See M. WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 138-59 (1977) (discussing the concepts behind the principle of the "just war" doctrine).
208. U.S.
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necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes" and
disproportionate means:
[t]he principle of humanity also confirms the basic immunity of civilian popula-

tions and civilians from being the object of attack during armed conflict. This
immunity of the civilian population does not preclude unavoidable incidental civilian casualties which may occur during the course of attacks against military
objectives, and which are not 2excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct
13
military advantage anticipated.

The Air Force maintained these two just war doctrines by developing
principles of proportion and discrimination. Proportion is the essence of
military necessity. Discrimination is one element of humanity.
If you take this approach, which I support, there are at least three
elements of humanity. There is the avoidance of unnecessary damage,
the avoidance of certain means that cause superfluous suffering or for
some other reasons are simply unacceptable, and the principle of discrimination or noncombatant immunity. Attempts to apply the principle of discrimination or noncombatant immunity are found in Protocol
I, particularly in articles 51 and 52.
2 14

REMARKS OF JUDGE CARL-IVAR SKARSTEDT

As a small introduction, I would like to remind you of the fact that
Sweden is a small country, and in Sweden relatively few of the jurists
and others with an interest in the subject are working full time in international humanitarian law. Some of us, including myself, do not have
the opportunities to work full time with this very interesting material,
but I am fascinated with it in spite of the lack of time I can devote to
it. Some of us who were responsible for the 1984 Final Report of the
Swedish International Humanitarian Law Committee215 realize that today we must rely on a broader explanation of how general international
law is developed and how it is generally enforced upon all states, not
only upon states to which the agreements formally apply.
In our view, there exists a general concept of justice, a general opinio
juris, that can be manifested, for example, in United Nations decisions,
both in the committees and in the General Assembly. This concept of
justice is not necessarily manifested through ratification or other international agreements established by diplomatic conferences. It is necessary to make this point because a greater awareness of the customary
core of the two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions could
213.

Id. para. 1-3a(2), at 1-6.

214. President, Court of Appeals for North Sweden.
215. SWEDISH INT'L HUMANITARIAN LAW Coms., FINAL
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hasten the ratification process for Protocol I. Protocol I, in the opinion
of Sweden and other countries, is to a large extent a codification and
specification of traditional principles already established under international humanitarian law.
Now, however, almost three years after the birth of the Final Report
of the Swedish Humanitarian Law Committee, I must confess that I
am not overly enthusiastic about the idea that customary law could
substitute for the formal ratification of the Additional Protocols or even
excuse a nonratifying state. A legal system that consists only in developing customary law seems realistic and even attractive in the short
term, but is a rather dangerous approach in most other respects.
In a separate section of its 1984 Final Report, the Swedish International Humanitarian Law Committee set forth some of the rules in Additional Protocol I that appear to have the status of customary law.
Such an inventory might be of practical significance in a situation
where Sweden, which has ratified Protocol I, comes into conflict with
an adverse party that has not ratified the Protocol. Under article 96,
which contains the principle of reciprocity, the Protocol applies only to
states that have ratified or acceded to it. This, however, does not support the conclusion that Sweden would not apply the rules of the Protocol in such a situation. The Committee notes that Sweden must always
respect the rules constituting international customary law. From the
humanitarian point of view, which the Committee was instructed to
take into account, it is natural to imagine that Sweden would do everything in its power to ensure that every party to a conflict in which
Sweden is involved applied Additional Protocol I.
Accordingly, the Committee has made an attempt to list some of the
rules in Protocol I that have the status of customary law, even if only in
their main outlines. Committee members had different opinions, and
none of us were quite sure of the acceptance and validity of our thinking. In the report we recognize that there are no guarantees that other
states will accept the Committee's opinion on which rules have the status of customary law, and it cannot be guaranteed that an adversary
will respect these rules.
The Swedish government has not yet given its formal approval to all
the ideas that the Committee has put forward in its report. Nevertheless, I have good reason to think that to a very large extent the government will follow the Committee's proposals. I am very glad that this
small paper from the Swedish International Humanitarian Committee,
two and a half pages of the total four hundred and thirty-three in this
report, possibly has contributed to a constructive and valuable dialogue
in this very competent Workshop. We can all be influenced by our dif-
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ferent interpretations so that we at least in the Western Hemisphere
can establish a common view as to which parts of Protocol I should be
accepted as customary law, even by those states that have not yet ratified the Protocols. Above all, we regard it as crucial to secure universal
adherence to the existing conventions and Additional Protocols, so this
body of international humanitarian law can be fully consolidated and
respected.
As a conclusion outside this legal sphere, let me state things as the
Red Queen confidently stated in Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking
Glass:216 I could have done it much more complicated. Our consolation
after this Workshop is that if we are confused, we are at least on a
higher level.
REMARKS OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL BURRUS M. CARNAHAN

When the British set up courts in India, they faced the problem of
finding a convenient source of traditional local law; a source that would
be accessible and understandable to English colonial judges and administrators. Fortunately, Hindu religious literature appeared to provide a
ready solution in the form of the ancient Code of Manu. Scholars later
determined, however, that the Code of Manu had never been a direct
source of law in traditional India. Rather, it was an idealized statement
of what the Hindu priesthood believed the law ought to be. Ironically,
it became positive law only at the hands of an alien imperial power.
The Code of Manu is a good example of the "venerated pseudo-code,"
a document highly valued in its society which appears to be a real code
of law, but which is not, in fact, a body of positive law.
The Code of Manu is not the only example of such a document.
Many so-called codes of the ancient Middle East, including the famous
Code of Hammurabi, appear to have had this character. During the
Middle Ages in Europe, Roman law was thought to be the ideal law for
the universal Christian community and was the only law studied in the
universities. The academic world ignored the law the European courts
actually applied. To the south and east of Europe during the same period, jurists and theologians developed Islamic law as a similarly idealistic system to govern the moral lives of believers. Meanwhile, the
judges that the rulers of Moslem states appointed often applied very
different rules in their courts.
In the modern world, the international law of armed conflict is unfortunately approaching this same venerated but irrelevant status. This is
216.
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especially true of humanitarian law, as reflected in the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the two Additional Protocols of 1977. During
this century, the written law of warfare has undergone a steady development toward both greater humanitarianism and greater complexity.
At the same time, it has become increasingly divorced from the realities of warfare.
Many provisions in Additional Protocol I illustrate why the written
law of war has become increasingly irrelevant. For example, articles
50(1) and 52(3) create a presumption of civilian status whenever
"doubt" exists. Military personnel will be unable to implement this presumption in many combat situations because survival often depends on
decisions based on inadequate information that is never free from
"doubt." Article 56 creates a special protected status for certain installations containing "dangerous forces," even if those installations are
otherwise legitimate military objectives. To make matters more difficult, article 56 establishes no clear standard to determine whether an
installation is protected. After entitlement to protection is established,
however, it can be lost only as the result of a confusing and excessively
high level of abuse by the enemy.
Paragraph 8 of article 51 furnishes another prime example of impracticality. While paragraph 7 provides that the presence of civilians
shall not be used to render military objectives immune from attack,
paragraph 8 states that "[a]ny violation of these prohibitions shall not
release the Parties to the conflict from their legal obligations with respect to the civilian population and civilians." Although the defending
party has deliberately and unlawfully used a civilian population to
screen military objectives from attack, the attacking party still must
break off the attack if it appears that collateral civilian casualties
might be "excessive," or the attack otherwise indiscriminate. The purpose of this 'rule is obviously humanitarian. In reality, it would only
encourage efforts to use civilians to screen objectives from attack, at
least from a law-abiding attacker.
Finally, Protocol I radically undercuts the doctrine of belligerent reprisals. Therefore, one side in a war can no longer answer unlawful
attacks by punitive, proportionate violations.217 The doctrine of reprisal
has often been abused, and it is difficult not to sympathize with the
humanitarian motives behind efforts to prohibit belligerent reprisals.
Still, it has long been recognized that "actual reciprocity is an essential
217. See Protocol I, supra note 4, arts. 51-56 (prohibiting reprisals against civilian
persons, civilian objects, cultural objects, food and things indispensable to the civilian
population, the environment and certain dams, dikes and nuclear power stations).
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and just condition of the observance of the rules of war." 218 Eliminating belligerent reprisals would remove one of the few practical deterrents against violations of humanitarian law.
Whereas the 1977 Protocol I contains many examples of an impractical or excessively idealistic approach to the law of war, the ascent of
international humanitarian law into venerable irrelevance may have begun long before, as reflected in the demise of the concept of belligerent
occupation. The law of belligerent occupation developed during the
nineteenth century in an effort to reconcile the legitimate defense needs
of invading armies with the rights of inhabitants of occupied territory.
Since the end of World War II, however, no government has claimed
unequivocally to exercise rights of belligerent occupation.
Reluctance to make such a claim may be due in part to the recent
unfortunate tendency to regard all occupation of foreign territory as an
act of aggression, even if the occupation arose out of a legitimate act of
self defense. This reluctance, however, has also undoubtedly arisen
from the complex, cumbersome, and restrictive regime established for
occupations by the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War.2"" Under the 1949 Convention, the
law of belligerent occupation has restricted the rights of occupying
powers so much that no nation engaged in an armed conflict has been
willing to admit that it is legally bound to apply that Convention.
To the extent that it attempted to reform the law of belligerent occupation, the Fourth Geneva Convention on civilians may claim the same
type of dubious success as the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928.220 The
Kellogg-Briand Pact attempted to abolish "war" as an instrument of
national policy. It has been eminently successful in accomplishing its
goal, with the notable exception of the period from 1939 to 1945. Since
1928, there has been a distinct reluctance to declare war or to recognize the existence of a state of war anywhere in the world. The term
"war" was simply read out of the international vocabulary. Instead, of
course, we have seen a blossoming of "acts of forcible self-defense,"
"armed conflicts," and "humanitarian interventions." Similarly, the
1949 Fourth Geneva Convention has succeeded in eliminating recognition of belligerent occupation from the practice of states as a means of
denying the applicability of the onerous regime the Convention
218. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 236 (H. Lauterpacht 7th ed.
1948) (describing actual reciprocity not only as an essential condition, but as a just
condition of the observance of the rules of war).
219. Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, supra note 4.
220. Treaty for the Renunciation of War, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No.
796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
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established.
I suspect that nations will make similar denials with many of the
rules of the Protocol that are impractical. Nations, even if they are
parties to the Protocol, simply will not recognize that they are involved
in a situation where the protocol has to be applied. Armed conflict will
go the way of war, and the existence of armed conflict will not be
recognized.
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949, together with the two Geneva
Protocols of 1977, make up a subtle, detailed body of law that is 559
articles in length, comparable in complexity to the Internal Revenue
Code of the United States. One may wonder whether any nation at
war, even given the best will in the world, can comply fully with all this
law. As we have seen, one possible reaction to this situation is to deny
the applicability of the most inconvenient and thus often the most humane parts of this law. Another and probably more dangerous reaction
is to bring all international law into disrepute. Neither reaction serves
the humanitarian aims behind the law of Geneva.
Clarence Darrow once half-facetiously suggested that the legislature
be convened for a special session that could do nothing but repeal existing statutes. A similar pruning operation might strengthen the authority of international humanitarian law by eliminating provisions
least likely to be reflected in the actual practice of states at war. This
operation may already be taking place through the mechanism of customary international law.
The importance of custom lies in its stress on the general practice of
states, and hence on the practicality of the rules it establishes. When
juridically significant practice occurs on a matter that an existing
treaty covers, practice is usually thought of as an aid in interpretation
of the treaty. Opinions differ as to whether practice can amend a treaty
provision. In principle, there would appear to be no reason why later
custom could not supersede a prior treaty text as a source of law.
Whether considered as custom or as an aid to interpretation, the
main problem with practice is that it is an unwritten source of law,
often unavailable to decision makers when time and resources are limited. Scholars should identify and save the practicable parts of the new
written law, and in particular Protocol I, before they sink into the morass of irrelevance. Once identified, national decision makers can be
pressed to adopt these parts of the written law into state practice.
The main requirement to be applied in this process should be that a
written rule should have no significant military impact on the outcome
of international disputes. We must not forget that, however horrible it
is, the institution of war has survived because it serves a function in
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international society: it determines definitively which party to a dispute
is more powerful at a particular time and place. However humanitarian
it may be, no rule of international law is likely to survive if it gives a
significant military or political advantage to one side in a dispute. Such
a rule would undercut the function of the institution it was intended to
regulate because it would distort the real power situation. The proper
role of the law of war is to keep the violence inherent in war "on
track," to ensure that it does not spill over to harm persons and property not directly related to resolution of the dispute over power.
This is not a plea for the unlimited predominance of military necessity or Kriegsraison.Considered alone, the principle of military necessity might suggest to the leader of a commando unit behind enemy
lines that he should kill all his prisoners, or to the captain of a submarine that he should destroy the lifeboats from a torpedoed ship. Such
actions, however, are not likely to affect the ultimate outcome of an
armed conflict, and international law properly considers these actions
war crimes.
Turning to the text of Protocol I, it appears that most of the provisions contained in articles 10 through 20, which intended to improve
the status of civilian medical activities and civilian sick and wounded,
would meet the above test for inclusion in customary international law.
Even here, however, certain doubts must be noted. Article 16, for example, establishes such a high level of protection for medical activities
that it would protect the operation of clandestine hospitals in guerrilla
warfare situations. Consequently, no government facing a guerrilla conflict will ever admit that article 16 applies to its situation. It also will
probably deny that the rest of the Protocol and the Conventions apply
as well, except perhaps those provisions that it recognizes as customary
law.
Several rules in part IV of the Protocol that call for general protection of the civilian population are likely candidates for inclusion in customary law. The rules in article 51, paragraph 2 against attacking the
civilian population or engaging in acts primarily intended to terrorize
that population seem to be of this character. Similarly, the definition of
military objectives and civilian objects in article 52 is probably already
a part of customary law. The first paragraph of article 54, stating that
"[s]tarvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited," while
not currently part of the customary law of war, could be accommodated in that law, even though the remaining paragraphs of the article
raise practical problems.
Article 57, paragraphs 1 and 2(c) reflect the customary law of war
on land, stating that "constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian
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population, civilians and civilian objects" and "effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population,
unless circumstances do not permit." Paragraph 4 of that article, which
reads, "each Party to the conflict shall ...

take all reasonable precau-

tions to avoid losses of civilian lives and damage to civilian objects,"
similarly states a customary rule of air and sea warfare.
Articles 59 and 60, concerning undefended localities and demilitarized zones, are an accurate statement of state practice in implementing article 25 of the 1907 Hague Regulations on Land Warfare.221 On
the issue of who is to be considered a civilian, articles 73 and 79 of the
Protocol include refugees and journalists in this category. The main
problem in interpreting these provisions is how much civilians must
participate in the war effort before the Protocol no longer protects
them. The standard of the Protocol providing that civilians are protected unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities
furnishes little clarification.
It is thus hard to believe that governments at war will make a serious
effort to protect civilian members of military aircraft crews or the civilian crews of merchant vessels and civil aircraft that are otherwise legitimate military objectives, as article 50 required. In .general, the Protocol seems too rigid in its systems for classifying persons that an armed
conflict affects. An individual is either a member of the armed forces,
and therefore a legitimate target of military operations, or a civilian,
for whom constant care is required to minimize the chance of even collateral injury. State practice, on the other hand, suggests the existence
of at least one intermediate category: persons who, while not taking a
direct part in hostilities, are so intimately connected with a military
objective that they have forfeited the right to be free from risk of collateral damage.
Much of the excessive idealism that encumbers the written law of
war stems from efforts to "develop" international law rather than
merely "codify" existing custom. It appears impossible for great international conferences, heavily influenced by the practices and attitudes
of the United Nations General Assembly, to resist the temptation to
"develop" international law by negotiating agreements that include, to
at least some degree, the highest aspirations of every ideological bloc
represented at the conference. One problem with the Protocol and with
the whole process of negotiating international law is that decisions must
221. See Hague Convention No. IV of July 29, 1899, supra note 71 (stating "[t]he
attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings
which are undefended is prohibited").
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be reached at these international conferences by consensus. Often the
real goal of these conferences is to produce a political statement that,
as a United Nations General Assembly Resolution, reflects everyone's
view rather than an agreement that will work in practice.
As a result of the politics of the conference in which it was negotiated, Protocol I thus defines "armed forces," whose members are entitled to prisoner of war treatment upon capture, in the broadest possible
terms, but excludes an entire category of combatants-mercenaries-from any protection. 2 Similarly, Protocol I prohibits attacks intended to terrorize the civilian population, but accords
new international respectability to national liberation movements that
have traditionally claimed the right to use terror tactics.22 3
Perhaps the era of universal international law-making conferences
has come to an end. World values are now too diverse for the successful
development of general international law in great, all-embracing conventions. Piecemeal, limited agreements on specific subjects may be the
most that can be hoped for in the foreseeable future.
The diversity of national values also will affect the development of
customary international law and may lead to the rise of regional customs on the law of war. In principle, such a development would be
undesirable. Such a development, however, would better reflect international reality than a supposedly universal document that simply "papers over" deep divisions in ideology and practice.
While customary law develops through state practice, the ideal Geneva law, and particularly Protocol I, undoubtedly will remain formally
in force as a venerated pseudo-code. In the past, such codes have had
an interstitial and inspirational impact on the development of positive
law, and the same undoubtedly will be true of some parts of Protocol I.
REMARKS OF PROFESSOR HAMILTON DESAUSSURE

22 4

I want to begin by noting that the military manuals of the three
services effectively translate the language of the diplomats into language that commanders can follow, and they are widely disseminated.
In addition, the manuals reflect the practices of the services. Commanders of three and four star rank, who are typically people who select military objectives and targets, understand and take into account
these manuals, at least in limited conflicts.
After World War II, many people felt that no international law of
222.
223.
224.

Protocol I, supra note 4, arts. 43, 44, 47.
Id. arts. 1(4), 96(3).
Professor of Law, University of Akron, School of Law.
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air warfare existed. To the extent that we correct that perception or at
least say that some law, albeit imperfect and incomplete, exists, the air
commanders will not feel that they have unbridled license to bomb anything they want. It seems to me that the military objective expands and
contracts according to the intensity, duration, subjects, and location of
the armed conflict. I agree absolutely with Lieutenant Colonel Carnahan that "grey areas" exist in the law, and that is why I think that the
military objective itself fluctuates. For example, it may be entirely appropriate to bomb large industrial complexes in such a wide conflagration as World War II, but it would be totally out of line for a state to
take out a whole city, part of a city, or even part of an industrial complex in a limited engagement, such as the conflicts in the Falkland Islands, Nicaragua, or Grenada or the bombing of Tripoli in Libya by
United States Air Force jets. Therefore, countries must analyze the
type of conflict at issue to determine the scope of the military objective.
Protocol I contains some very interesting articles with respect to
bombing, which I do not have the time to discuss. I limit my comments
to the elusive concept of the military objective. It is often overlooked
that ever since the old balloon declaration in 1899225 all of the drafts

on the law of armed conflict addressed the issue of air attacks. In 1899,
the declaration prohibited dropping anything from a balloon for a period of five years. The Hague II Convention extended the declaration to
include not just bombs but projectiles or any other explosives. Similarly, a provision in the Hague regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV226 prohibits bombing of undefended towns by whatever means.
1 7
Hague Convention IX 22
also contained a similar prohibition of a bombardment of undefended sea ports.
No other regulation of air warfare was instituted until the Commission of Jurists in 1923 wrote the rules of air warfare. 22 8 These rules
included a very interesting provision that prohibited terrorism or bombing for the purpose of terror. Another provision that may have influenced the Protocol stated that only military objectives, that is to say an
object the destruction of which constitutes a distinct military advantage, may constitute a military target. The 1923 rules of air warfare
defined those objectives in an exclusive manner and included such
targets as military forces, military depots, factories, transport lines, and
communication equipment.
225. Hague Convention No. IV of July 29, 1899, supra note 71.
226. Id.
227. Hague Convention No. IX of October 18, 1907, supra note 71.
228. Hague Rules of Air Warfare of 1923, reprintedin 1 THE LAW OF WAR, supra
note 197, at 437-49. The draft rules were never adopted.
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The Protocols, however, do not give an exclusive enumeration because of the experiences in World War II and other such history. They
also make possibly unintended statements. The Protocols do not define
military objectives as those constituting a distinct military advantage.
Instead, they state that military objectives are limited to those objects
which by their nature, location, and use are military objectives and
which offer a definite military advantage. In other words, and maybe I
am looking at it too closely, the Protocols translate the old Hague rules,
which were never officially adopted but were often cited, from a onestep approach, which was that they were a military objective if they
offered a distinct military advantage, to a two-step approach. First,
they had to be a military objective and second, they had to offer a
distinct military advantage.229
This translation of approaches is not simply a quibble over words.
There could be targets that would be military objectives but in certain
limited cases do not offer a distinct military advantage. In the Falkland
War, for example, it might have been a military objective to hit a personnel depot in the heart of Argentina, but it would not have been a
distinct military advantage with respect to the reoccupation of the Falkland Islands. Another example, arguably, of hitting military objectives
without a distinct military advantage is the 1972 Christmas bombings
of Hanoi. The negotiations for truce were going on in Paris. The
Vietnamese, as I read it from unclassified literature, were fairly well
underground, and we were not going to stop the war effort by hitting
military depots in Hanoi. These were military objectives that did not
offer distinct military advantages.
I think also of my own experiences in World War II as a bomber
pilot, and I remember distinctly my commanders telling me that when
I was not able to get to the target I should divert and pick out some
fairly peaceful looking little village and hit the martialing yards there.
Now maybe that would have been a distinct military advantage in
1942, but in February 1945 I doubt that it was. I doubt if it was a
military advantage to hit Dresden in February 1945, a month and a
half before the end of the war, although if you asked the military, they
hit military objectives. I doubt frankly if there was a military advantage in attacking Tripoli and Khaddafi to combat terrorism. It is true
that bombing the radar sites was a military advantage because as a
result they could not target our planes. But is hitting a building in
which you think Khaddafi is located a military advantage or a political
advantage? Is that aiding in the military capture or defeat of the en229. Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 52(2).
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emy? I question whether it is.
Whether unintended or not, the two-fold step set forth in article 52,
paragraph 2,230 which requires a military objective first and then a military advantage, actually works well. It is not just the bomber pilot
sitting in the cockpit who reads these rules, because he is little more
than a robot up there. He goes where his commander tells him to go.
These rules are therefore more important to regulate the decision
makers.
It is also true that something can represent both a military advantage and a political advantage. The question in my mind is, what is the
predominant motive? Is it in fact to gain a military advantage? That is
the expression used in the Protocol. It does not say "definite advantage" rather it says "definite military advantage." Is the predominant
motive simply to put political pressure on the opposition? My critics
argue that all wars are fought for political ends. That is true. Wars are
fought for political ends, but military operations are taken for military
objectives and military ends. Therefore, if you are bombing a place not
for the military objective but to put political pressure for some shortterm objective on the enemy, I do not think the bombing fits within the
definition of the Protocols.
Another question that should be addressed is what triggers the application of the rules in the Protocols? What exactly is an armed conflict?
Our Navy jet pilot was shot down over Syria, and they captured Lieutenant Goodman. I believe he was a prisoner of war, and for the purposes of his status there, was captured in an armed conflict. When the
Israelis bombed southern Lebanon, it was definitely a Protocol situation, regardless of whether they were bombing for a military end, a
military objective, or a political purpose.
The same problem runs through the doctrine of proportionality.
What is excessive in relation to the military objective? I think the doctrine fluctuates according to the intensity and the scope of the conflict
and who is involved. I would like to see more implementation of these
rules in the manuals, more distinction of what is a military objective
and what is not, and more discussion of proportionality.
I would like to suggest three things. First, expand the excluded target areas. Second, distinguish clearly military advantages from political
advantages. Third, include in the manuals concrete cases where it is a
military advantage and a true military objective, and cases where it is
not. Thank you.
230.

U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 2.
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DISCUSSION

The Moderator, Professor SOLF, wished to clarify Professor DeSaussure's definition of military objectives in the Protocol. He noted that to
define a military objective and suggest that states may attack, destroy,
capture, or neutralize it is a leap forward in candor with respect to
humanitarian treaties. All prior humanitarian treaties, unlike the
Lieber Codes, limited themselves to what states must spare and did not
elaborate on what states may destroy or attack. This limitation, he
stated, was not appropriate in a humanitarian instrument. He indicated
that the fighters of war must decide what constitutes a military target,
and one need not put any imprimatur of justification on it. He added
that for this reason, none of the treaties define military necessity.
Professor SOLF indicated that until the Protocol, an abstract definition of a military objective never existed, and when the ICRC suggested such a definition, the traditionalists complained that a humanitarian instrument should not include such a definition. The various
groups ultimately reached a compromise in article 52, paragraph 1,
where the article defines military objective in the traditional, prohibitive way. The article defines civilian objects as those that are not military objectives and thus not the object of an attack. Paragraph 2 of
article 52 then defines a military objective, within the context of the
Protocol, through satisfying a two-pronged test that every target must
satisfy. In describing the test, Professor SOLF noted that first, the target must contribute significantly to the military action of the enemy
through factors such as its nature, location, purpose, or use. Second,
partial or total destruction, neutralization, or capture of the target
must afford a definite military advantage.
Professor SOLF further noted that the basis for the ICRC draft of
the Protocol in article 51, was the concept that civilians lose their individual immunity from attack if they engage actively in hostilities. It is
harder for individuals to lose their immunity than for objects to become
military objectives. As an example Professor SOLF noted that a plant
that produces rubber boots for the civilian population may not constitute a military objective. If the product made at the plant, however,
goes primarily toward military forces, that item may become a military
objective because it is effectively contributing to military action. He
concluded, therefore, that an attack of the plant is permissible. The
civilians making rubber boots for the military are not legitimate targets
for attack as individuals, but the plant where they are working is a
legitimate target. Professor SOLF, therefore, concluded that the civilians assume a risk when they work inside such a factory. Professor
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furthermore explained that civilian members of a military aircraft group assume an even greater risk, although the civilians do enjoy
the protection of the rule of proportionality. If the target is important,
however, real effective protection is minimal.
Lieutenant Colonel CARNAHAN, commenting on the status of civilians closely associated with military objectives, pointed out that article
57 seems to require military officers to weigh the dangers to such civilians when determining military objectives. He noted, however, that no
individual seriously believes that a combatant will follow this rule in
the Protocol, or that military staff officers will actively balance the advantages of destroying an aircraft with the danger to the civilians in
the aircraft when the officers can shoot down other types of aircraft
carrying all military crews. He concluded that the tests in the Protocol,
such as civilian versus military, are a bit inadequate, and that a greater
distinction is needed in this definition.
Lieutenant Colonel CARNAHAN also wanted to correct the misconception that he and Professor DeSaussure disagreed on the value of
military manuals. When Lieutenant Colonel Carnahan spoke before of
the skepticism military members express toward certain aspects of the
law of war, he referred to the law of war in its raw, unseasoned form
rather than to military manuals that offer international legal concepts
in a digested form. When an officer reviews operations, plans, or rules
of engagement and wants to advise the military operator of a particular
procedure, the officer will not explain the process in international law
terms, but rather cite from a section of the field manual. The actions of
the officer thus confirms the field manual as the approved legal proposition that will become the authority for future orders. For this reason,
Lieutenant Colonel CARNAHAN recognized military manuals as very
important.
Lieutenant Colonel CARNAHAN stated that he has always supported
Professor DeSaussure's argument that military objectives should depend on the intensity of the conflict. He noted that it is unfortunate
that Protocol II does not recognize this viewpoint. At a less intense
level of conflict, for example, states can care a great deal about the
environment, as prescribed in article 55, but in a high intensity conflict
like World War II, countries cannot spend time worrying about the
environment. To a degree, the West recognized this problem through
the statement that the Protocols did not apply to weapons of mass destruction or nuclear weapons. He added, however, that the text of the
Protocol does not expressly acknowledge this issue. Lieutenant Colonel
CARNAHAN noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff initially thought the
Red Cross agreed that such distinctions are ambiguous, but retreated
SOLF
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in some of its recent pronouncements on this point. Lieutenant Colonel
CARNAHAN commented that allowing the level of conflict to determine
the proper military objectives presents problems, although as a general
proposition it is needed as the law of war. For example, he indicated
that individuals who are able to tell the difference between a military
and a political objective have a unique ability. For many years, people
have believed that this distinction exists and claim that it should continue to be made. The military services, on the other hand, do not differentiate between these objectives. They assume that all military action intertwines with a political goal of some sort. Lieutenant Colonel
CARNAHAN agreed that probably no such distinction exists in military
services, but if it does exist, he doubted that the distinction is
necessary.
In concluding, Lieutenant Colonel CARNAHAN noted there is a tendency to forget that in customary law, the principle of distinction is not
universally applicable. Customary law recognizes some situations and
techniques of warfare where the principle of distinction need not be
respected. This circumstance is especially true in the traditional law of
naval blockade, a highly effective means of warfare. The Protocol may
delete some of these exceptions and Lieutenant Colonel CARNAHAN
recognized this as one of its problems.
Professor O'BRIEN stated that if the principles of military necessity
and discrimination had been applied across the board during World
War II, the question of whether there was a sufficient, positive, conventional law on aerial bombardment would not have arisen. Indiscriminate bombing simply would have been considered illegal. He referred to
the United States bombing of Brest as an example of indiscriminate
bombing. He suggested that nations emphasize these principles to prevent contradictions and gaps in positive law from occurring because
presently, some activities are prohibited while other reprehensible
events are not.
Professor O'BRIEN agreed with Lieutenant Colonel Carnahan's comments on the positive function of the law of war. He indicated that the
law of war should strive to force a belligerent to fight fairly, but with
some limitations, and should not attempt to maximize every conceivable prohibition or limitation. Professor O'BRIEN stated that comparatively modest rules and guidelines that are practical and acceptable to
the practitioner are more beneficial than overly detailed rules.
Professor O'BiuEN disagreed entirely with Professor DeSaussure on
the usefulness of distinguishing political from military goals. For example, in the interest of just and limited war, the Christmas bombing of
Hanoi was one of the most sensible things ever done, because it used a
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limited military force to end a conflict. He noted that the object of war
is political and may involve the destruction or reduction of the forces of

the enemy as an intermediate step. Therefore, it is best to move directly from military force to the desired and legitimate political
purposes.
Professor O'BRIEN indicated, for example, that it is not better to declare war against Khaddafi and then try to reduce his military forces.
He noted that although this action has a military purpose, it does not
accomplish the goal of the United States. He suggested that the United
States put pressure on Khaddafi, until he stops encouraging and exporting terrorism. He considered a raid on Khaddafi's headquarters or
home as an attack against a military target because Khaddafi's whole
terrorist network begins there. If all these sensible politically vital
things are contrary to the Protocol, Professor O'BRIEN suggested it is

all the more reason not to have anything to do with the Protocols. He
recognized that from a political point of view, people are interested in
using armed coercion for important political purposes, but still trying to
limit armed conflict as much as possible. He further stated that if the
Protocol contains a logic that says everything must have a distinct military advantage and that logic collides with the technicalities of the law
of war, then the Protocols to that extent are not recommended to those
looking for limitation of armed coercion in international politics.
Professor SOHN disagreed with the notion that war is useful, stating
it undermines the whole idea of the rule of law, and disregards the
many useful decisions of the International Court of Justice and is an
extremely negative position. He suggested the development of other
methods of solving problems, as well as the establishment of a body
with enough authority to interpret the laws of war. Until such a body is
created, he noted, interpretation of the law will involve the creation of
more and more rules, which, in turn, will require further explanation.
Recognizing that most of the Protocol improves the law of war, he recommended that the United States adopt this document and make reservations where necessary.
Lieutenant Colonel CARNAHAN responded that he certainly did not
mean to suggest that war is a desirable thing. As an empirical matter,
war has survived all efforts to abolish it, and he was simply trying to
account for this survival. War has survived because it serves the purposes of nations. Lieutenant Colonel CARNAHAN, however, was not suggesting that war as an institution is a way of solving problems, and that
nations should not find other ways to solve problems under international law. He stated that a law of war must consider the objectives
that the war accomplishes, and that some efforts at writing the law of
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war do not accomplish this result. As an example of this Lieutenant
Colonel CARNAHAN noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff carefully reviewed the Protocol but could not recommend ratification simply because it would create too many problems as a result of the complexity
and comprehensiveness of the Protocol. Professor SOHN and Mr. GOLDKLANG23 1 pointed out that the human rights treaties that President
Carter sent to the Senate contained almost twenty reservations.
Professor DESAUSSURE stated that Professor O'Brien's point is that
the end justifies the means, and an action that shortens the war is permissible. This viewpoint obviates the rules; therefore Professor DeSaussure did not agree with the idea. Professor DESAUSSURE indicated that
many of the rules that the Protocols incorporate are handed down
through generations, including the requirement that there exist a military objective serving a military advantage.
Professor DESAUSSURE agreed with Lieutenant Colonel Carnahan
that there is a time when civilians, due to the nature of their work, are
considered legitimate military objectives. He pointed out, however, that
the most worrisome engagements are not the whole scale conflagrations, but rather the limited types of engagements, such as the taking
of the Falklands and Grenada, the bombing of southern Lebanon, and
the events in Nicaragua.
Judge SKARSTEDT remarked that, contrary to Lieutenant Colonel
Carnahan's opinion, he feels the rules in Protocol I are practical. Military and technical experts, not diplomats, formulate these rules.
Problems closely associated with the war effort, such as protection of
civilians, are solvable.
Lieutenant Colonel CARNAHAN stated that military lawyers and operatives have little trouble with article 52(2) because they act under
the assumption that military and political objectives are intertwined. In
fact, the definition of military objective contained in article 52(2) accurately corresponds with the method military targets choose, especially
in bombardment situations. He noted, however, that the military may
veto these targets later for political reasons, as often occurred in
Vietnam.
The MODERATOR added that difficulties arise when conflicts affect
civilian populations or civilian objects, a situation articles 51 and 57
address. Humanitarians seriously criticized these articles. The rules require military officers to balance anticipated civilian casualties against
the importance of the target. Commanders could develop a sense of
231. Attorney Advisor for Security and Emergency Planning, United States Department of Justice.
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such balancing acts in training and exercises. Professor DESAUSSURE
questioned which types of situations come under the provisions of Protocol I, at least as it reflects customary rules. If the Protocol meant any
type of advantage, he questioned why the word "military" is used in
the Protocol rather than merely using the phrase "a distinct advantage
to the country."
Professor W. T. MALLISON 232 raised some of the problems in naval
warfare, such as attacks on neutral flag merchant ships, and the legality of submarine attacks on them. He said that these situations involve
customary law and that any merchant ship exercising a belligerent
function immediately becomes a lawful object of attack. In the Second
World War, Allied merchant ships became a part of the belligerent
naval forces through their incorporation into the naval convoy system.
No merchant ship sailed without the permission of the United States
Navy Department or the British Admiralty. In the same way, neutral
merchant ships were forced into the naval warfare system, as described
by Ms. Mertens in her book in the British official series entitled
Merchant Shipping & the Demands of War. Consequently, submarine
attacks upon such functional combatant merchant ships were lawful.
This is also consistent with customary law, which provides that a military unit or ship cannot become a combatant unit without simultaneously becoming a lawful object of attack. This subject is considered in
more detail in Professor Mallison's book entitled Studies in the Law of
Naval Warfare, printed by the United States Naval War College in
1966.
Commander FENRICK remarked that most of Protocol I is worthwhile, and many of the provisions reflect customary law and state practice. If these provisions are not embraced as customary law, then essentially nations must rely on undefined concepts, such as military
necessity. He concluded that more precise standards are needed. Lieutenant Colonel CARNAHAN replied that the Protocol is directly applicable to low-intensity level conflicts. Because the legitimacy of a military
objective changes with the intensity of the conflict, he recognized that
the problems arise at the higher level conflicts. Professor SOLF stated
that it was agreed that a certain place in the hierarchy of command
establishes the level of the conflict. People who know what article 56
means and how to apply it are making the decisions about what to
attack and at what level. He assumed they base their decision on careful preplanning and consideration of all factors.
Lieutenant Colonel CARNAHAN observed that it is difficult to deter232.

Professor of Law, The National Law Center, George Washington University.
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mine the location of civilians. Tactically it is difficult to predict the
extent of civilian losses when weighing them against military advantages because the military usually has no way of knowing the location
of the civilians.
Colonel JAMES A. BURGER23 3 stated that the concept of customary
law is connected with the definition of a just war. He regarded customary rules as important because they apply to the conduct of many nations that have not signed the Protocols and represent a reliable source
of law outside of the treaties.
Commander FENRICK pointed out that there are important reasons
to have manuals, aside from their role in defining customary rules. He
regarded manuals as important because they define the rules of the
game, even though they may never settle the question of what the rules
are as points of law. In a conflict, he remarked, a country should know
the practices it should follow and the rules the adversary will abide. He
was concerned that both states continue to follow those rules. If one
party disregards them, however, most likely the other nation will also.
He considered it unfortunate that a large group of nations signed the
Protocol without giving very much thought to its application. He noted
that when a country starts to develop manuals and issues instructions
to its forces, it indicates that it is seriously considering the application
of the rules.
Mr. GASSER commented that states, including the United States and
its allies, negotiated the Protocols over many years, and Western nations heavily influenced the substance of these treaties even though the
"automatic majority" of the Third World was always present. In spite
of this influence, he noted, it seems today that the United States does
not consider those same rules to be any longer acceptable. This is all
the more surprising as military experts had been involved in the negotiating process. He also noted that the United States only disputes small
parts of Protocol II, and he wondered whether the whole may not be
accepted even if a small part of it is disliked.
Mr. GASSER further commented that the ICRC does not consider it
better that states decide which means are justified based on their own
perceptions. He stated that the ICRC would urge one side in a conflict
to respect the provisions even though Protocol I binds this party and
not the other. Lieutenant Colonel CARNAHAN added that the responses
of a non-party state will serve to elucidate the parts of the Protocol that
are or could become customary law.
233. Chief, International Affairs Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General,
United States Department of the Army.
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Professor L.F.E. GOLDIE 234 questioned the extent to which lawyers
who prescribe proportionality deviate from the prudent prescription of
military economy. He noted that commanders traditionally are called
upon to exercise no greater force than is necessary to overcome the
enemy, which is known as the war of military economy. If proportionality is taken away from military economy, Professor GOLDIE wondered
if military economy becomes less economical. If so, he questioned
whether the army would sacrifice its soldiers to the enemy.
Professor SOLF stated that not much divergence between the principle of war of economy and the rule of proportionality occurs. He suggested that military legal advisers familiarize themselves with the
problems of military commanders and planners. The security of a military's own forces is an important factor in weighing the military advantages against civilian casualties. He concluded that a commander,
therefore, does not have to sacrifice his troops because the security of
those troops is part of the military advantage that military advisors
must weigh.
Mr. LUKE T. LEE 23 5 stated that according to a well established rule
of customary law, a country that has signed but not yet ratified a treaty
still has certain obligations. One of these obligations is not to defeat the
purpose of that treaty pending ratification. Mr. LEE questioned how
this applies to a country that has signed but not ratified Protocol I and
is directly involved in an armed conflict. He also inquired about the
results when that country is not directly involved in an international
armed conflict, but has troops in an international force.
Lieutenant Colonel CARNAHAN responded that the obligation prohibits rendering the ultimate act of ratification meaningless. The United
States, specifically, has notified the depository of Protocol I that it will
not ratify the treaty. Notice was then sent to the other parties and
signatories to the treaty that the United States is no longer under that
obligation.
Professor SOHN agreed that one of the agreements of the law of treaties, which the United States has not ratified but abides by, is that a
party to the treaty should not do anything that would clearly indicate a
lack of compliance with the Convention. The agreement also establishes a way to limit this obligation because it states that this obligation
no longer binds a party if the party clearly notifies other nations that it
234. Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program, Syracuse University School of Law.
235. Director, Office of Planning and Programs, United States Coordinator for
Refugee Affairs, United States Department of State.
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is not going to ratify the document. Intermediate stages exist, however,
where a nation states that it will not ratify the treaty but will apply the
Convention where appropriate. This situation creates ambiguity because other nations do not know which rules that nation will respect.
For this reason, he recommended that the United States list the articles
it will abide by, rather than wait until a war starts. Alternatively, the
government may prepare a list of the provisions it will not follow, so
work can be done to overcome those objections. He noted that such a
list would help other nations know which articles the United States
does not comply with, and equally as important, know that the United
States will respect the remaining three quarters of Protocol I.
Captain ROACH discussed the importance of determining the types of
activities that constitute international armed conflicts under Protocol I.
Regarding the identification of state practice, Captain ROACH stated
that those involved in writing military manuals apply a reasonable person test, or at least a reasonable military person test. He added that the
process of working out what commanders are expected to do is in part,
an indication of what is viewed as customary law.
Professor ALMOND commented on the customary law incorporated in
military manuals. He remarked that states share a common international legal system and strive for commonality in the interpretation of
that law. He, therefore, suggested that the manuals in the future substantially conform to each other. He also recommended the creation of
a common NATO war manual in the future, even though some policy
reasons exist that may block the creation of such a manual.
Professor ALMOND further noted that the rules of engagement, many
of which are classified, represent another source of the view of the
United States on customary law. The rules of engagement incorporate
international law in their framework. He suggested that others, especially our adversarial nations, do the same.
Professor ALMOND questioned whether reprisals represent part of
customary international law. If they do, he indicated that Protocol I
waives the right of a state to exercise those rules of customary international law. He recognized that reprisals are remedial measures, asserting that one of the terrible deficiencies of the Protocol is the elimination of reprisals. He viewed reprisals as a means of forcing
conformance to the law of war. Professor ALMOND considered it unfortunate that Protocol I removes this type of sanction.
Professor SOLF noted that the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I
contain a provision that requires the parties to send to the depository
state a copy of their official translation of the treaty and copies of all
published implementing regulations. The United States did send multi-
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pie copies of Field Manual 27-10 to Geneva. Although he did not recall whether the United States disseminated copies to all other parties,
he doubted that any other nation had ever sent anything. Professor
SOLF inquired why nobody requested the Swiss government to urge all
parties to comply with that requirement. He noted that these parties
could create a large storehouse of copies of all military manuals, except
those that are classified, for scholars to compare.
Mr. GASSER responded that a number of states have not adopted any
regulations, and some other states have not adopted satisfactory regulations. Even those states that have adopted good regulations have not
complied with the duty to circulate these to all of the parties to the
Convention. The last step taken in this direction was an invitation by
the 25th Conference of the International Red Cross (Geneva 1986) to
all states to adopt legislation implementing the Geneva Conventions
and to inform all parties on the measures taken.
Professor DESAUSSURE, commenting on Professor Almond's statement, pointed out that as of 1970, the United States Air Force was
very proud of the fact that it had never made a reprisal air raid. He
defined reprisal as the unlawful conduct in response to prior unlawful
conduct. The Air Force has asserted publicly that it has never made
reprisals, rather it made retaliations. As Professor DESAUSSURE reads
the Protocols, they outlawed reprisals except against military objects.
Every other provision contains a specific prohibition against reprisals.
Professor SOLF pointed out that if the retaliation is lawful, a state
may attack a lawful target with lawful means. He noted, however, that
a reprisal is unlawful; its sole purpose is to force the enemy to stop
committing some particularly harmful illegality. Customary law, at
least as reflected in the United States military manuals and every other
military manual Professor SOLF had seen, outlines the conditions where
reprisals are made. Professor SOLF knew of no treaty that included
these conditions and noted that an attempt by France to include them
in the Protocol was defeated because of the humanitarian notion that
these instruments should not include authorization for violence.
One participant noted that the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties" 6 addresses the notion of reprisals. The provision on the suspension for breach, that is a form of reprisal, recognizes suspension
only when humanitarian considerations and the protection of individuals are not at stake. For example, if one country shoots ten people in
another country, the second country cannot shoot ten citizens of the
attacking country. He noted that in the Iran hostage situation, many
236.
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people urged the United States government to take Iranian diplomats
hostage, but the United States refused this suggestion based upon the
same principle.
Mr. GASSER commented that several nations consider making reservations against the prohibition of reprisals. He asked Professor Almond
to cite situations where reprisals efficiently stopped violations of humanitarian treaties. Professor ALMOND answered that first, reprisals
operate as a deterrent. Second, reprisals operate through their actual
use. During World War II, Nazi Germany threatened to use lethal
gasses against the allies of the United States. In response, the United
States referred to its right of reprisal under customary international
law. President Roosevelt, in 1943, declared that such an act by Germany was illegal and was subject to an act in response. Professor ALMoND indicated that such a response would clearly constitute an illegal
act. This use of reprisal represented an effective threat because the reprisal was available. If Roosevelt had instead faced the situation under
the Protocol, which forbids reprisals, he would have been compelled to
do something without violating the Protocol.
Another participant mentioned another example of the effective use
of reprisals. Hitler, in order to respond to the threat of commando
raids, shackled prisoners. The 1929 Conventions did not permit this action. The United Kingdom promptly retaliated through shackling German prisoners, whereupon the German shackling quickly ceased.
Professor SOHN indicated that very often the language is changed
but the basic principle remains. The basic problem is simply the word
"reprisal" because now reprisals are condemned in many ways. As a
result, if a state asserts that it will implement a legal reprisal, other
nations become upset. He noted that the Protocol permits a state to
take legal countermeasures. If a state, therefore, reserves the right to
take countermeasures when another nation violates international law,
no one can object. On the other hand, if a state reserves the right to
take illegal reprisals, it has done the worst thing possible.
Professor ALMOND reiterated that a reprisal is legal. He noted that a
state has the legal right to either respond with another illegal method
of attack or respond with an illegal weapon to an illegal act that another state has committed against that state. He was certain that this
legal right exists under those conditions.
Professor SOHN responded that a state can take reprisals or retaliations provided that it does not violate human rights. For example, the
bombing of a city is possibly a legal reprisal, but the state must give
notice to the civilian population to evacuate. Otherwise, he indicated,
the reprisal violates the law of war.
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The afternoon round table convened at 3:00 p.m., Professor
Waldemar Solf moderating.
REMARKS OF THE MODERATOR

The topics for this afternoon's round table include: medical air and
sea transport, articles 24 through 31; the relationship of the prohibition
of starvation of civilians as a method of war with the relief measures,
articles 54 and 69 through 71; and the qualifications of combatants as
prisoners of war, articles 41 and 43 through 47.
Let me step down from my role as moderator and make a few comments on the Swedish Paper. The Swedish Paper indicates that articles
18(1) and (3) of Protocol I require medical transports and medical
units to be identifiable and call for installing whatever equipment and
training is necessary for people to recognize these emblems or signals.
The Swedish Paper suggests that the main outline of articles 25
through 27 is customary international law. These articles create different zones with slightly different rules pertaining to the protection of
medical aircraft. This is necessary because under the present rules of
the Geneva Conventions, medical aircraft are not protected anywhere
in the world unless they are flying under an agreed flight plan. Their
heights and routes have to be agreed to by the adverse party, otherwise
they are not protected. This turns out to be very restrictive, particularly
in the battle area where helicopters must be capable of transporting
wounded personnel.
The Geneva Convention contained this restrictive rule because it became apparent during World War II that aircraft could be destroyed
at ranges that far exceeded the capability to recognize a Red Cross
emblem, which was the only way medical aircraft were identified. Furthermore, there was a general feeling that medical aircraft could
threaten security because they could see enemy dispositions which in
turn would lead to an advantage. This fear of abuse of medical protective status also created the need for certain restrictions.
Our unfortunate experience in Vietnam, where a great number of
medical aircraft with patients were lost by ground fire, motivated the
United States to do something about this. Two problems were identified. First, the range of recognition had to be extended. Second, confidence that protected status would not be abused had to be instilled. We
discovered that the range of recognition could be extended through an
improved means of communication. A frequency that would allow communication by medical aircraft, a light signal that would allow monitoring of the planes, or a radar signal, such as the "identify: friend or
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foe" signal, were all technically feasible. A Department of Defense
study found that it would only cost about $500,000 to modify all Hawk
surface-to-air missile launchers world-wide so that they would be responsive to an additional security signal.
It is still necessary to get permission from the adversary for an aircraft to trespass on territory that is physically controlled by the enemy.
The term "physical control" was used to avoid the legal aspect of what
is occupied or invaded territory. For this purpose, article 29 establishes
communications procedures, including obligations as to what has to be
agreed upon, who has to be notified, and the duty of the adversary to
respond.
Specific restrictions as to unacceptable activities were also included
in the Protocol. For example, medical aircraft, ideally suited for
searching the battlefield for wounded, cannot go on a random search
because the enemy will consider them to be performing reconnaissance.
A rule prohibiting search in the contact zone, unless an agreement exists, also was included. The rules and means of communications are
provided for in detail in articles 6, 7, and 8 of the Annex. The rules of
the international IKO Civil Aviation Agency on challenging and inspecting aircraft were adopted. These provisions are mentioned to show
that providing reasonable protection to medical aircraft is a very complicated matter that requires complicated solutions. In fact, there are
twenty-two articles in Protocol II, about eighteen percent of the entire
agreement, that have some essential relationship to the protection of
medical aircraft. A problem could arise if a conflict erupted between a
state party to the Protocols and a state that is not a party. To protect
medical aircraft, a special agreement must be arranged between the
parties to apply the provisions suggested by the Protocols.
I support the conclusion in the Swedish Paper that articles 25, 26,
and 27 are humanitarian law. Because present law only recognizes protection when there is an agreed upon flight plan, however, these provisions are not customary international law. I am optimistic that this desire to protect medical aircraft will continue. Such an effort was made
in the Falkland Islands conflict, and the Soviets favored these positions
at the Diplomatic Conferences.
REMARKS OF COMMANDER WILLIAM J. FENRICK

I support the articles and would like to see as many of them as possible become customary law. Currently, article 24, which has a general
principle concerning the respect and protection of medical aircraft, and
article 28(1), which prohibits the use of medical aircraft to gain a mili-
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tary advantage, clearly constitute customary law. The remaining provisions in articles 24 through 31 are suitable for eventual incorporation
into customary law, with one proviso: they may be too detailed for incorporation into customary law. This is a problem with a lot of the
provisions in the Protocols. I am not completely convinced that many
parts of the Protocol are suitable for customary law, but I certainly
remain open to persuasion.
The relief measures provisions are relatively modest adaptations of
preexisting provisions and hopefully are suitable for eventual incorporation into customary law, subject once again to the question of whether
or not they are too detailed. I would like to see the starvation provision,
except the reprisal part, become part of customary law. The provision
is relatively general, but it does not quite sort out the law concerning
starvation which existed prior to adopting the Protocols. Admittedly,
this is a rather difficult task. Naval war practices concerning blockades,
land war practices concerning sieges, the Hague rules on devastation of
enemy property, and the restrictions concerning poison are examples of
what must be looked at. A substantial portion of the starvation provisions in article 54 is customary law, and I suggest that it comes very
close to being customary law'when considered as a whole. Regarding
prisoner of war provisions, articles 43 and 44 are clearly intended to
extend the scope of the groups of people who are entitled to prisoner of
war status, in particular by relaxing the criteria for identification of
lawful combatants. These provisions are the new law to the extent that
they differ from the Geneva Conventions. Whether or not they are suitable for eventual incorporation into customary law depends essentially
on how one comes down on the side of a very lengthy debate. The debate concerns whether or not one is upset about the blurring of the
principle of distinction, which obviously occurs if relaxed standards are
applied, or whether one prefers to use the "carrot-and-stick" principle
to bring a broader group of people in under the law of armed conflict
and provide them with an incentive for compliance with the law. Personally, I believe these provisions should be incorporated into customary international law because the idea of using incentives is useful, and
because guerrilla warfare or irregular warfare is inevitable. Holding to
the old standards is not going to change that fact; guerilla warfare is
not going to go away if one maintains that these people are not entitled
to combatant status. The current effect of denying these groups of people combatant and prisoner of war status, however, is relatively minor;
Western democracies would still never do such things as engage in the
mass execution of captured irregular troops.
The provision regarding mercenaries in article 47 clearly does not
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constitute customary international law at the present time. It is undesirable that it should constitute customary international law at any
point in time because it essentially penalizes a group of people on the
basis of status rather than on any acts they may commit. This article
tends to differentiate entitlement to lawful combatant and prisoner of
war status on the basis of motive, which is a re-emergence of "just
war" concepts in a totally inappropriate environment. The mercenaries
provision could develop into some sort of concept which holds that people fighting for the "bad side" are not entitled to combatant or prisoner
of war status, and of course everyone knows that the person on the bad
side is the person fighting you.
People argue that the mercenaries provision constitutes customary
law largely because there were minimal objections to it on the part of
the Western powers during the negotiation of the Protocols. They also
rely on such things as the various OAU and United Nations General
Assembly declarations. There are, however, many questions concerning
the relevance of OAU resolutions and the legal validity or efficacy of
United Nations General Assembly declarations.
REMARKS OF BRUNO ZIMMERMANN

I would like to begin by pointing out that the Geneva Conventions have
been accepted by almost all states and may be considered customary
law. In comparing Protocol I to the Conventions, article 70 is considered one of the most impressive steps made by Protocol I in relation to
the civilian population. It provides that if the civilian population of a
nonoccupied territory is not adequately provided with supplies essential
to its survival, such as food, medical supplies, clothing, bedding, and
means of shelter, relief action shall be undertaken subject to the agreement of the parties concerned. The rights of the parties allowing the
passage of consignments are roughly the same as those in the Fourth
Geneva Convention regarding search and supervision.23
It is interesting to look into the meaning of the clause "subject to the
agreement of the parties concerned." According to the Commentary to
the Protocol, "the parties concerned" are the state that is to receive the
relief and the authorities of the territory from which it is to come. 38
This requirement of an agreement is not to be understood as allowing
any wanton or habitual refusal, but as an attempt to reserve extreme
and varied reasons for objection. This clause does not refer to other
237.
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parties, which have to allow passage of relief consignments. Those parties are mentioned later in paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 70 and they
enjoy only certain rights in relation with the passage of consignments.
A similar concern for the safety and survival of the civilian population was made and manifested in Protocol I, article 54, "Protection of
objects indispensible to the survival of the civilian population." Paragraph 1 of this article reads, "Starvation of civilians as a method of
warfare is prohibited." If paragraph 1 of article 54 and article 70 are
considered together, it inevitably raises the questions of siege and
blockade.
These provisions require besieging forces to allow evacuation of the
besieged population if there is no other way to avoid its starvation. This
is the extreme case in which arrangements to organize relief action
under proper supervision are not available. This is in sharp contrast
with the pre-existing law and custom as reflected in the Geneva Conventions. The pre-existing law restricted the free passage of relief consignments. Article 17 of the Fourth Convention states that the parties
to the conflict only had to endeavor to conclude agreements for the
evacuation of wounded, sick, aged persons, disabled, and maternity
cases.
As to blockades, there is no doubt that Protocol I, article 54, paragraph 1, would also apply to this aspect of naval warfare. This clearly
results from article 49(3), which reads in its first sentence, "The provisions of this section apply to any land, air, or sea warfare which may
affect the civilian population, individual civilians, or civilian objects on
land."
In conclusion, Protocol I imposes greater limitations on siege and
blockade than the Fourth Geneva Convention. At the same time, Protocol I provides means that prevent humanitarian rules from unduly advancing the military efforts of the beneficiary. These limitations are
much greater than the limitations contained in the Geneva Conventions, considered as customary. Those Conventions alone would not prohibit starvation of civilians if it was necessary to obtain the surrender
of the besieged place or to defeat a country.
REMARKS OF COMMANDER JOHN BENNETT 23 9

I would like to premise my remarks by pointing out that they represent my own sad, bloodthirsty thoughts. It seems clear that custom239. Maritime U.N. Division, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United
States Navy.
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ary international law allows a state to use starvation when its intent is
to hasten the surrender of the other side. The Protocol rules would
make major changes. It is also questionable whether article 49(3),
which deals with blockades, is desirable customary international law.
The Fourth Geneva Convention contains a nicely balanced operation
whereby various protected or semi-protected people get relief, but a
state is not obliged to do so if it would give the other side a military
advantage. This has important implications for the general civilian population. In the Protocol, civilians in the war factories have to be fed.
The general statement in article 24 on the protection of medical aircraft and the statement in article 28(1) on not using medical aircraft
for military advantages are customary. Other provisions are more problematic. "Control" could be hard to determine for aircraft flying over
the sea and even for airspace over land. It may not be a great advantage to move away from having to agree on specifics ahead of time
because in the confusion of war, a state may not be able to make all of
these distinctions. I agree with Professor Solf that there are some exceptions to what is customary law in article 15. The distinctive signs
and references as applied to military units certainly are customary. The
distinctive signals have nothing customary about them at all. As for
paragraph 3 of article 15, applying these rules to civilians is new and
would certainly be an appropriate extension of customary law. One impediment to developing customary law on the details of identifying
medical aircraft is that the flashing blue lights have proven to have
certain problems. They tend to look like gunfire or rocket fire from the
helicopters, and at a distance the blue light turns white.
REMARKS OF PROFESSOR

W.T. MALLISON

My remarks focus on the articles relating to combatants. It is very
important that all combatants who exist de facto be brought within the
legal system. When we talk about combatants, we are also dealing with
the equally significant value of protecting civilians as much as possible
in the grim context of an international armed conflict.
Before getting to the Protocol, let me discuss part of the customary
law that appears in the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, 4 '
particularly article 4(A). The fourfold criteria of military command,
distinctive sign, open arms, and adherence to the law are set out in the
article and are ancient and venerable requirements dating back to the
240. Third Geneva Convention of 1949, supra note 4.
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Hague Convention Number Four of 1907,241 Number Two of 1899,242
and also to the unratified Brussels Declaration 24 3 which first enunciated
these four criteria in article 9. Even though the Brussels Convention
was not ratified, the fourfold criteria of article 9 were respected as customary law and the exact wording appeared in the subsequent conventions, including article 4(A)(2) of the Geneva POW Convention.
A few words were added to the wording of the earlier conventions in
article 4(A)(2). For example, organized resistance movements were
added as a party to a conflict. It is widely agreed that the principal
model for this article was Marshal Tito's Partisans. The article-by-article analysis of the Protocols written by our distinguished colleague Professor Solf and two European coauthors, points out that an organized
resistance movement, if it meets the qualifications of independent status and recognition, should be regarded as its own party to the conflict.
Two obvious examples are the South West Africa People's Organization and the Palestine Liberation Organization, each of which is recognized by a number of states and by its respective regional public
organization.
Other provisions in the article describe factors for recognizing
whether an organized resistance movement has the status of a party to
the conflict. For example, article 4(A)(3), modeled on General
DeGaulle's Free French Forces, refers to a government or a nongovernment public authority not recognized by the detaining power. The common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the miniconvention
dealing with civil wars, refers to the parties to the internal conflict as
"each party to the conflict," thereby giving such status to rebels and
insurrectionists. This definition is important because it is consistent
with the history and the reality of organized resistance movements in
the Second World War, and it does not require a connection with a
state. If there is a connection with a state, so much the better, but a
connection is not a requirement to giving this important status to the
organized resistance movement.
Another feature of article 4(A) insufficiently emphasizes that the criteria for regular combatants are identical with the criteria for irregular
combatants. At the Geneva Diplomatic Conference of 1949, it was proposed on the floor of the conference that the four criteria for irregulars
in article 4(A)(2) be amended and specified as applying to regulars
241. Hague Convention No. IV of October 18, 1907, supra note 71.
242. Hague Convention No. II of July 29, 1899, supra note 71.
243. Declaration of Brussels of August 27, 1984, Concerning the Laws and Customs of War Adopted by the Conference of Brussels, reprinted in 1 THE LAW OF WAR,
supra note 197, at 194-203.
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under article 4(A)(3). The response was that it was so well-known that
these same four criteria applied to regular combatants that it was actually not necessary to specify it at all. The fact that article 43 of the
Protocol makes no distinction between regulars and irregulars is not
quite as novel as it is sometimes regarded.
It is important to recognize that article 44, paragraph 3 does not
repeal the four basic criteria, except in situations where they are unworkable. In the situation where compliance with the criteria of article
4(A)(2) of the POW Convention could be a suicide pact for the organized resistance forces, an exceptional arrangement is spelled out. When
forces practicing what is widely known as guerilla warfare, referred to
as the nature of the hostilities, cannot meet the four criteria, it is sufficient that arms are carried openly during each military engagement
and during the time when forces are visible to the adversary in the
military deployment leading up to the engagement. There are differences of opinion as to how long or short that time is. It is important
that now we have provided something not in the pre-existing customary
law of the Geneva Conventions that permits and encourages the irregulars to stay within the ambit of the rules. The United States Army
Rangers and the Marine Corps Raiders are outstanding practitioners of
guerrilla warfare. They, like the irregulars who are their own party to
the conflict and who may not even be associated with a state, are the
beneficiaries of article 44, paragraph 3. It is extremely important that
we recognize the benefits of article 44 for regular armed forces as well
as for irregular forces.
REMARKS OF PROFESSOR HOWARD S. LEVIE

These remarks refer to the same articles that Professor Mallison discussed, but from a slightly different perspective. Articles 43, 44, and 45
actually were enacted in order to give Protocol I some specifics with
respect to the general provision on the protection of members of national liberation movements contained in article 1(4) of the Geneva
Convention. Article 43 provides that an individual captured in the uniform of an organized armed force will be regarded as combatant. Article 44 says that such a person would be entitled to the status of a prisoner of war, and the fact that he has allegedly violated the law of war
would not deprive him of that status. Moreover, despite the fact that
the person is captured in uniform and may not have complied with the
law of war, if administratively the enemy determines that the individual is not a prisoner of war, he has a right to an adjudication by a
tribunal as to his status. While awaiting that determination, the person
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is entitled to the treatment of a prisoner of war.
Article 85 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 states that prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the detaining power for acts
committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits
of this Convention.
This Convention was not in effect at the time of the Korean Conflict.
Both sides, however, agreed to comply with the humanitarian principles
of the Convention, and without dispute, article 85 was one of those
humanitarian principles. Nevertheless, the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists stated that captured United Nations command troops
were not entitled to prisoner of war status, until they repented for their
misdeeds. The North Koreans never stated exactly what the prisoners'
misdeeds were or why they were not entitled to prisoner of war status.
It was probably because the prisoners were fighting communist
imperialists.
When the Soviet Union ratified the Third Geneva Convention, it did
so with a reservation to article 85.244 This reservation indicated that the
Soviet Union did not consider itself bound by article 85 "to extend the
application of the Convention to prisoners of war who have been convicted under the law of the Detaining Power, in accordance with the
principles of the Nuremburg trial, for war crimes and crimes against
humanity, it being understood that persons convicted of such crimes
must be subject to the conditions obtaining in the country in question" 245 while serving their punishment.
There was some concern with regard to that reservation. The Swiss
government, as the depository, was asked to inquire as to the meaning
of the reservation. The Soviet Union responded that its reservation signified that prisoners of war who, under the law of the Soviet Union,
have been convicted of war crimes or crimes against humanity must be
subject to the conditions in the Soviet Union for other convicted persons. After the sentence becomes legally enforceable, persons in this
category consequently do not enjoy the protection that the Convention
affords.
North Vietnam acceded to the Convention in 1957, so during the
entire Vietnam imbroglio it was in effect. When North Vietnam acceded, it made a reservation similar to the Soviet reservation. All the
communist states made somewhat similar reservations. North Vietnam
244. Reservations Made at the Time of Signature of the Geneva Conventions for
the Protection of War Victims of August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 419, 458-60 (reserva-

tions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).
245.

Id. at 460.
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said prisoners of war prosecuted for and convicted of war crimes or
crimes against humanity in accordance with the principles established
by the Nuremberg tribunal will not enjoy the benefits of the provision
of the present Convention as provided in article 85. During the hostilities in Vietnam, North Vietnam stated, in effect, that it would regard
captured Americans as "pirates," people who have destroyed the property and massacred the population of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, as major war criminals caught in flagrante delicto and liable for
judgment in accordance with the laws of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam. This can be construed to mean exactly what the Soviets had
said their reservation meant: when a person is captured he or she is a
prisoner of war, until he or she is tried and convicted in accordance
with the laws of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. That is not,
however, the way the North Vietnamese construed it. They contended
that all American prisoners of war were automatically war criminals,
despite the fact that there was never a trial and never a conviction.
Under articles 43, 44, and 45 of the Protocol, it should be much
more difficult for anyone to advance the contention that by the flat of
the capturing power, a captured member of an organized armed force
in uniform can be considered not to be a prisoner of war, but a war
criminal. Thus, the provisions of these articles, which originally were
intended to extend specific protection to members of national liberation
movements, unintentionally grant greater protection to members of organized armed forces because they are guaranteed these specific rights,
which were not included in article 85 of the Convention and were eliminated by the reservations made by the Communist countries.
These provisions amplify and make more specific the provisions of
the Geneva Convention, but they do not enlarge it. They give to uniformed personnel benefits that existed before, but in a more specific
manner. It will be much more difficult for any country to contend that
a person captured in uniform is a war criminal, when he has not been
tried and convicted. This, however, is not a panacea or a complete cure
because there are undoubtedly "law-defying nations," which, despite
the more specific provisions in the Protocol, will still take the position
that captured soldiers fighting for capitalism are war criminals per se
and not entitled to prisoner of war status.
DISCUSSION

Judge SKARSTEDT agreed that the articles concerning the protection
of medical aircraft constitute customary international law. The Swedish International Humanitarian Law Committee has attempted to es-
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tablish that the rules in Protocol I also have the status of customary
law. Professor Mallison's belief that there were more articles than those
mentioned in the Swedish draft that could constitute customary law

impressed Judge

SKARSTEDT,

who said he would convey Professor Mal-

lison's ideas to the Swedish government.
Major General PRUGH expressed surprise over Commander Bennett's "luke warm" support of the medical evacuation protections. He
got the impression that Commander Bennett felt that they were not
very significant, although many regard the medical provisions as a major step forward. Major General PRUGH pointed out that the provisions
constitute new humanitarian law, offering a new technique for quickly
evacuating a wounded soldier from the battlefield. He strongly supported the new evacuation provisions, even though they are contrary to
the thrust of the war.
Commander BENNETT replied that he based his criticism on the impracticality of the provisions in those articles. In his view, the protections offered in real war circumstances are illusory. He also questioned
the reliability of distinctive signals for determining the aircraft types of
planes that are possibly 200 miles away.

Mr.

THOMAS

E.

MCMANN 246

stated that while stationed in Vietnam,

199 medical evacuation helicopters were shot down in his outfit. He
explained that when word got out that the enemy was shooting at medical aircraft, it was very difficult to get aircraft to land in the rice paddies to provide support. He found it distressing that the law of war in
place then, offering no protection, still governs today. According to Mr.
MCMANN, the Protocol rules may not work, but unlike the Geneva
Convention rules, they will not authorize the shooting of medivac helicopters. In his view, it is impossible to adhere to the Geneva Convention rules. Because young soldiers die when these aircraft cannot safely
land, Mr. MCMANN emphasized that the guidelines of the Protocol
rules are needed.
Professor SOLF suggested that the principle underlying these rules
should make medical aircraft immune from attack. The problem, however, is getting them recognized. He noted that blue lights were the
only alternative to the red cross available at the time they were used,
and in a demonstration, blue lights were visible at a distance of seven
or eight kilometers, which is much greater than the visibility of a red
cross. He strongly suggested that research on the electronic signal system continue.
Professor SOLF also recognized that electric signals, which are more
246.

Esquire, Reston, Virginia; Vietnam War veteran.
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effective than the blue lights, are not used. After passage of resolutions
at the Diplomatic Conference, the International Telecommunications
Union began work on the electric signals issue. The World Administrative Radio Conference, in 1979, provided rules that authorize the use of
international emergency signals for initiating communications about
the movement of medical transports. When a medical aircraft is under
attack, the rules call for the pilot to switch to one of the authorized
emergency frequencies to establish communication. Professor SOLF suggested that work be continued to improve the electric signal systems,
and indicated that the Conference will revise the rules as technology
changes.
Mr. ROBERT HALFYARD 247 suggested that the various objections to
Protocol I and the reservations to Protocol II result from critics looking
at the proposed Protocols with a negative attitude. He proffered that
the critics identified issues that are only potential and not inevitable
problems. He drew analogies from historical debates about prior agreements. For instance, in 1907, many people criticized the Hague Conventions as unworkable; the Conventions, however, governed activities
during World War I. There were also many people who thought the
1929 Geneva Convention would not work, but combatants adhered to it
throughout World War II. In addition, although many criticized the
1949 Geneva Conventions, combatants have observed them in various
military operations since 1949. Mr. HALFYARD emphasized that people

can learn from history and concluded that our military leaders can
learn ways to conduct war within the restrictions of the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions, and the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions.
Mr. HALFYARD vigorously urged the President and the Senate to ratify Protocol II. After gaining experience with Protocol II in what he
perceives as unfortunate and inevitable military operations, Mr.
HALFYARD stressed that if Protocol II works, the United States should
go ahead and have the courage to adopt Protocol I, with some necessary reservations. Although some of Protocol I is slightly slanted
against the type of military operation the United States conducts, he
believes the United States has nothing to lose in ratifying Protocol II
because it is unimaginable that a nation could lose a war because it let
a medical helicopter go through.
Mr. ZIMMERMNANN explained that article 49 was not intended to alter
the law of blockade. He stated that blockade is not prohibited, but
when a starving civilian population requires medical personnel or other
247.

Esquire, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

[VOL.. 2:415

relief actions, combatants must relax the blockade to prevent starvation. He added that these measures could be done, in particular, by
relief activities under the supervision of protecting powers.
Professor MALLISON lauded the United States delegation to the Diplomatic Conference on Protocol I for its success in obtaining the objectives of the United States and noted that the existing articles, including
article 96, reflect those objectives. He considered the delegates' performance outstanding.
Mr. GASSER sought to end the debate on a positive note. He reiterated Professor Levie's comments on Vietnam and article 85 and emphasized the importance of Vietnam's ratification of Protocol I without
reservations to articles 43, 44, and 45. He was confident in the law of
the Protocols, and stated that they are workable and contribute also to
the consolidation of customary law rules protecting war victims.
The MODERATOR closed the Workshop with the conclusion that the
Workshop was successful in starting a dialogue in the United States on
which provisions in the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions
are recognized as customary international law.

